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Abstract 
 
 
 
State-industry coordination has been regarded as fundamental to effective policy intervention, 
but the fact is that the state sometimes meets resistance from certain industrial sectors in the 
efforts of building national industries. So why are firms in some industrial sectors cooperative 
with the state but those in other sectors unresponsive to state directions? While studies have 
shown that the pursuit of economic competitiveness and national security accounts for the 
techno-nationalist orientation of a state, few explain the distinct firm responses to state 
directions across sectors. In order to understand the sectoral variation in firm behavior, this 
thesis develops a theoretical framework based on industry characteristics and examines 
manufacturing industries in two categories, complex product systems (CoPS) and mass-
production. It proposes that the distinct natures of the sectors are associated with different 
domestic-foreign business relationships, which tend to lead to distinct firm responses to state 
policy in these sectors. Looking into China’s nuclear and wind power sectors, respectively 
representing CoPS and mass-manufacturing, the research finds different outcomes despite 
Beijing’s commitment to a nationalist agenda in both sectors. Indigenous Chinese firms in 
nuclear power established long-standing strategic business relationships with international 
vendors and were unresponsive to the national policy of reducing foreign technology 
dependence, whereas those in wind power were supportive of Beijing’s nationalist policies 
because of the rivalry with leading global producers. Through theoretical and empirical studies, 
this thesis generates conclusions that are relevant to other political economies and can be 
applied to other industry sectors. 
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Chapter 1  
Techno-nationalism and the study of firm behavior 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis is about firm behavior: why firms across sectors respond differently to state policies 
in pursuit of techno-nationalist goals. Firm behavior here is not understood as the pursuit of 
interests in policy formulation but rather firms’ response to the state commitment of building a 
national industry. In the industrialization process, firms in some sectors are dedicated to fending 
off foreign competition and making use of government support to become privileged “national 
champions”, whereas firms in other sectors make themselves into the “global partners” of 
technologically advanced companies and are decidedly lukewarm towards nationalist initiatives. 
This thesis explores sectoral variation in firm behavior through studies of new energy industries 
in China, and provides a theoretical framework that explains why firms in different sectors are 
more or less responsive to state policy. This is done through an examination of two industry 
sectors, wind and nuclear power.  
This chapter introduces the present research through the following moves. It first 
summarizes the literature on techno-nationalism, including the limits on state capacity in this 
regard. It then discusses the theoretical and empirical significance of understanding firm 
behavior by demonstrating that it is an important factor that affects effective policy intervention. 
This discussion is followed by a detailed statement of the research question and an outlining of 
the research design to address the question. This chapter then briefly reviews principal findings 
from the research and closes by indicating the structure of the thesis. 
2. Current perspectives 
Techno-nationalism is seen in many countries, where governments tend to link technological 
capability with national interests. Countries with such a tendency regard technology as “a 
crucial national asset in a highly competitive world” (Kennedy 2013: 913). In particular, states 
in some industrializing countries stress the essential role of independent manufacturing and 
technological capabilities in maintaining national security and promoting domestic economic 
growth (Keller and Samuels 2003; Samuels 1994: 307).
1
 For these countries, national interests 
                                                     
1 For in-depth discussion, please see Chapter 2. 
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lie in building a national industry comprised of not only domestically owned firms but also 
domestically owned technologies. In order to achieve the goal, states in these countries are 
generally committed to enhancing the competitiveness of domestic firms and turning them into 
“national champions” in the international market. The post-war rise of Japan and consequently 
South Korea and Taiwan was a well-researched area to delineate the process. Despite being a 
late-comer compared to its East Asian neighbors, China has long been described as a country 
with the same tradition (Feigenbaum 2003). Notwithstanding the externally-oriented and 
market-friendly policies in these countries, most of the countries attached great emphasis on 
national ownership and technological autonomy in industrial upgrading. 
A neo-mercantilist rationale was seen dominating in techno-nationalist countries, where 
states intervene actively in economic activities. Scholars of development research found that 
states in the East Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs) placed top priority on economic 
development because of a sense of insecurity and the vulnerabilities related to resource 
constraints and external threats (Doner, Ritchie and Slater 2005; Johnson 1982: 307; Matthews 
and Ravenhill 1994: 76). Therefore, a developmental orientation is associated with an ideology 
of striving for economic and technological independence from other states. A number of studies 
examined the experience of the East Asian NIEs and attributed their economic success to the 
developmental states at work (Amsden 1989; Haggard 1990; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990; White 
1988). In these countries, the nationalist goals were facilitated by states, which developed a set 
of policy instruments to enhance domestic productive and innovative competencies. These 
policies nurtured indigenous firms through government subsidies, tax incentives, better access 
to low-interest credit loans, preferences in public procurement, and other regulatory privileges. 
In many cases, governments in these countries imposed technology transfer requirements on 
foreign partners for the development of local industrial capabilities. This line of research 
pointed to an East Asian model that differed from the neo-liberal approach in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, one that stressed the bureaucratic role in targeting and promoting strategic industries 
through the use of industrial policies. 
The capacity of states to formulate and implement policy is essential to fulfill the tasks of 
fostering national industrial and technological development. In the developmental state 
literature, states in the East Asian NIEs were seen as strong, cohesive, and autonomous in the 
policy process (Amsden 1989; Johnson 1982; White 1988). As bureaucratic agencies did not 
simply represent the preferences of particular political groups and individual firms, they had the 
autonomy to develop strategies and policies for industrial upgrading. Such state autonomy 
enjoyed support from a strong and rational bureaucracy staffed by professional and competent 
bureaucrats based on meritocratic recruitment. The capacity was also strengthened by powerful 
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“pilot agencies” within the bureaucracy, which provided strategic guidance for the purpose of 
economic transformation and helped industrial sectors overcome obstacles of late development. 
The interventionist state committed to industrial promotion had access to a variety of policy 
instruments to wield influence over private sector behavior. As Zysman (1983) demonstrated, 
the government’s control of the financial system contributed to the state’s capacity to intervene 
in the economy. These policy tools included but were not limited to the organization of cartels, 
tax rebates, and the promotion of state companies (Johnson et al. 1989). 
In reality, state capacity is often constrained by two institutional factors: bureaucratic 
coordination and government-business interactions. First, with a focus on the complex and 
dynamic internal workings of the state, studies criticized the simplistic assumption of the state 
as an internally cohesive, rational, and unitary actor (Moon and Prasad 1998). Variations in the 
executive-bureaucratic nexus, intra-bureaucratic dynamics, and bureaucratic constituents led to 
differing policy choices and outcomes (Cho 1992). The rationality of states was challenged by 
the fact that industrial policies were highly politicized (Haggard and Moon 1990; Moon and 
Prasad 1998). On top of the influence of political parties, decision-making within the states was 
often decentralized (Murakami 1987; Noble 1987). In Divided Sun, Callon (1995) showed that 
contrary to the widely accepted coherence argument, the industrial policy process in Japan was 
fraught with bureaucratic sectionalism and inter-agency rivalries. Similarly in China, the 
authority below the peak of Chinese politics was fragmented, segmented and stratified among 
ministries and provinces (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). 
Conflicting interests were seen among functionally specific clusters of bureaucracies (Shirk 
1994: 93) as well as among multi-level governments (White 1993). In particular, diverging 
interests between the central and local governments undermined state capacity for channeling 
capital and resources to competitive firms (Thun 2004). 
Another limit to state power is the ineffective coordination with society and specifically 
with industrial capital in policy-making and implementation. In addition to the need for internal 
coherence, the embeddedness of state in deep links with the private sector is essential to 
successful state action, which can be achieved through “the continual negotiation and 
renegotiation of goals and policies” (Evans 1995: 59). Within the collaborative relationship that 
took place, there were two-way flows of information occurring between state agencies and firms. 
That is, firms were “disciplined” by the state, and government support was contingent on firms 
meeting agreed criteria. Even so, firms still have some degree of agency in policy 
implementation, either in a positive or a negative way. As discussed by Chibber (2003: 7), the 
quality of state intervention also lies in whether a state was able to “extract performance” from 
industrial actors in exchange for the supports that were given to them. In this sense, the degree 
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of firms’ willingness to cooperate with the government would affect the state’s ability to 
achieve nationalist goals in the country. Depending on whether business interests are consistent 
with national ones, firms may be more or less responsive to state policy and as a result facilitate 
or impede the state-initiated industrialization. 
The restraining effect of institutional factors to state capacity is also applicable to the sub-
national economy and industrial sectors. Research has already been conducted on analyzing the 
effectiveness of state intervention based on “the fit between local institutions and firms within a 
particular sector” (Segal and Thun 2001: 557). Later scholars in this group furthered the 
research to include variation at the local level: the impact of local bureaucratic structures and 
government-business relations on the effectiveness of industrial policy in different localities. 
Looking into China’s information technology and auto industries respectively, Segal (2003) and 
Thun (2006) compared a few municipalities and found that different combinations of local 
institutional arrangements led to different economic outcomes. Similarly, another stream of 
studies on “networked polity” also showed that the same logic applied to local and sectoral 
politics, which shaped the networks of state agencies and industry actors in a country, and 
between these actors and those in the international production markets (Breznitz 2007; Ó Riain 
2004). In the Politics of High-tech Growth, Ó Riain (2004) argued that an alliance between the 
state and domestic technical communities helped promote the information economy in Ireland, 
Taiwan and Israel.   
3. Problem statement 
One problem in the existing studies is that sector-specific institutional variation, especially in 
terms of government-business collaboration, remains largely overlooked and unexplored. In the 
investigation of local variation, Segal (2003) and Thun (2006) focused on a single industry in a 
single country. Similarly in the state-level analysis, Ó Riain (2004) only observed one industry 
in different countries because the comparison can only be achieved by holding constant the 
industry sector. This constraint determines that their focus is not on sectoral variation, which is 
an essential part to the understanding of varying practices in industrializing economies. The 
importance of sectoral politics has been established by researchers stressing the multiple forms 
of state-industry relationships in the specific sector level, because of which state can both fail 
and succeed in their industrialization efforts in different sectors (Breznitz 2007: 206). Some 
emphasized the sectoral analysis of institutional structures because the pattern of whether a state 
was able to advance industrialization goals was coherent within certain types of sectors (Evans 
1995: 81-82; Samuels 2003: 8). While there are many studies focusing on sectoral analysis, 
most were not designed to explain variations across sectors within a country.  
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This thesis aims to fill this gap by exploring the various state-industry relationships and firm 
behavior in different sectors in the same country. By holding constant bureaucratic structures 
and economic transformation at the national level in a single country, this study of sectoral 
variation pays greater attention to the state’s relations with or its capacity to “extract 
performance” from firms. In this sense, state-industry coordination in the shared effort of 
industrial upgrading plays a pivotal role in facilitating national industrial and technological 
development, but a lack of the coordination may result in a weakening of state capacity in 
different sectors. As Norris (2010: 3) argued, one important factor for the successful “economic 
statecraft” is “alignment of goals between the state and the commercial actors”, and it would be 
a challenge for the state to manipulate commercial actors when business interests diverge from 
those of the state. In a country where the state plays an activist role in industrialization, not all 
industrial actors follow state directions and are whole-heartedly supportive of government 
policies. While a cooperative industry is necessary for effective state intervention, one that is 
apathetic about state-led development erodes a public-private synergy that is supposed to 
contribute to effective state intervention. In other words, whether business interests are aligned 
with those of the state or whether firms actively cooperate with the state in nationalist initiatives 
determines economic outcomes.  
The possible variance in the state-industry relationship lies in whether short-term business 
interests are consistent with long-term national ones. When seen in the embedded autonomy 
approach, the processes of policy-making and implementation are reflected in the interactions 
between states and firms, with firms sometimes being the initiators of particular policies and an 
identification of specific collaborative mechanisms through which policies were implemented 
(Evans 1995; Noble 1998). However, when the government takes the initiative to formulate 
policy in consideration of long-term national interests, firms may be in a position to choose how 
to respond to state policy. In terms of achieving techno-nationalist goals, state policy may not 
always agree with short-term business interests, and business responses to state directions 
determine the effectiveness of policy implementation. In this sense, this thesis is not dealing 
with the question of how policy is formulated but rather, once a country commits itself to 
specific policies in pursuit of techno-nationalist goals, what the response of firms is to that 
policy. 
So in a country guided by a nationalist ideology, why do firms in some sectors cooperate 
with the state but those in other sectors are less supportive of state policy? Previous studies 
emphasized the fact that a mix of conditions such as the threat of wars and colonial legacies 
gave rise to interlocking government-business ties that remained in place even when 
circumstances changed and the imperative factors diminished over time (Stubbs 2009). With the 
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changing global security environment and rapid economic growth, there was a reorientation of 
the relationship in which state capacity was weakened and industrial capital was strengthened. 
However, due to entrenched ideas and sticky institutions the state-industry alliance was still at 
work generally as a whole in countries with a techno-nationalist tradition. Therefore, the holistic 
approach to techno-nationalism does not give reasons for sectoral variation in firm behavior, or 
firms’ responses to policy intervention. The fact is that different practices prevail at the firm 
level in different types of production and processes. In many cases states face greater challenges 
or need more time than expected to have the desired outcomes due to business resistance in 
some industries. Since a national threat is identified as the cause of state-industry coordination 
that is durable over time, what is responsible for the variant firm behavior in different sectors?   
4. Research design and case studies 
The thesis is motivated by this puzzle and seeks to explain the variant business responses to 
state-initiated industrialization across sectors. Studies of local variation have identified the 
origins of local government institutions based on region-specific characteristics, mainly the 
institutional context of central-local relations as well as the local culture and shared beliefs 
among government officials and industrial actors (Segal 2003: 42-46; 156-161). Similarly, the 
study of sectoral variation should be based on sector-specific characteristics. Traditional studies 
of firm behavior normally explored the organizational efforts of industrial actors in the policy 
process rather than the prevailing preferences of firms as individuals in a specific sector (Moe 
1980; Olson 1965). Sector-specific economic characteristics such as ownership type, company 
size, and industry structures have been found to have an effect on firm behavior and types of 
government-business interactions (Kennedy 2006; Noble 1998). However, most research 
concentrated on the collective action of firms in driving state policy without explaining whether 
individual firms are willing to follow the state-led promotion of indigenous capabilities in 
different sectors. In order to explain the contrasting firm behavior, this thesis begins with 
searching for the industry characteristics that affect firms’ willingness to cooperate with the 
state in national industrial development. 
Considering the role of technology acquisition in industrial development, the nature of 
production and particularly technology complexity may be related to the dependent variable. In 
the literature on late-industrialization, firms from some industrializing economies generally 
relied on those from technologically advanced countries and tended to cooperate with the state 
to reduce the foreign control and grow in manufacturing and technological capabilities (Amsden 
1989). In the process, it is almost always easier for governments to limit foreign ownership 
control than to wean domestic firms off foreign technology dependence. When firms are not 
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able to assume independent production or develop proprietary technologies, they may find that 
the effort of working toward technology autonomy puts their profit-making potential at risks. 
Due to the expected loss from breaking away from foreign dependence, domestic firms may 
resist the state by preventing this happening. In this scenario, they may choose to maintain their 
relationships with foreign firms at the cost of the institutional supports they can receive from the 
state. Therefore, whether firms from industrializing countries want to follow the state in pushing 
through a nationalist agenda depends on the transferability of skills, which is determined by the 
nature of production and especially the complexity of technology systems.
2
  
This thesis attempts to address the central question by exploring the links between industry 
characteristics and firm behavior. In doing so, it enquires into the following sub-questions. First, 
what are the industry attributes and their impact on the accessibility of technologies and 
capabilities in a particular sector, and how do firms in the sector acquire technologies from the 
international market? Second, in what ways does the mode of technology acquisition influence 
business interests, and how would the form of business collaborations affect the relationships 
between technology recipients and international providers? Third, how would the incentive 
systems shape institutional arrangements between state and industry, and determine firms’ 
response to the state-directed industrial upgrading? It is expected that these investigations would 
help understand different firm behavior in a techno-nationalist country, and the fact that firms in 
some sectors follow state directions and behave in a nationalist way but firms in other sectors 
are half-hearted in implementing nationalist policies and unresponsive to the government’s 
guidance. 
The investigation is carried out in the context of China considering its rising significance in 
the world economy, historically rooted techno-nationalist ideology, and sectoral variations. As 
China is rapidly rising as one of the largest economies as well as exporters in the world, it 
currently enjoys an escalating global influence derived from its internal developments. Over the 
three decades of economic transformation and spectacular growth, China together with other 
emerging economies came to the forefront of development studies. In spite of controversies, 
political economists see China as generally fitting into a developmental state model driven by a 
nationalist goal. As inter-agency rivalries and local interest divergences are not uniquely 
Chinese, these factors will not set China apart as a unique case out of East Asian countries. And 
as seen in its Asian neighbors, industrial policies and selection of promising sectors are common 
practices, and differing business responses to nationalist initiatives are similarly prevalent in 
China. Unlike some scholarly work highlighting the “uniqueness” of the Chinese way of 
development as a “China Model” or “Beijing Consensus” (Ramo 2004), this project places the 
                                                     
2 For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 2. 
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Chinese experience within a broader comparative context and is meant to generate conclusions 
relevant to other political economies and that can be tested in other cases.  
Setting the story in China helps hold the general context constant so that comparisons can be 
made against the same background. Since a nationalist ideology has dominated China’s 
economic transformation most of the time, it experienced a revival in the early 21st century. The 
liberal market reform gave way to some extent to a new round of state activism after China’s 
WTO accession in the end of 2001. Factors such as a fading socialist ideology, Asian Financial 
Crisis, challenges originated in WTO rules, and risks of civil unrest were identified as sources 
of systemic vulnerability that led to the change in China at that time (Naughton 2011; Naughton 
and Segal 2003: 160-61). In addition, the country’s dependence on foreign technologies was 
seen as a threat to national security, which justified the goal of achieving technological 
autonomy by nurturing national firms with indigenous capabilities (Segal 2003). At that time, 
nationalist voices in Chinese academia took hold and validated the need for government 
intervention and industrial policies in the promotion of national industries. Since then, Beijing 
placed greater emphasis on advancing indigenous innovation capability than before and was 
committed to achieve industrial upgrading in the whole economy, in particular the targeted 
sectors that were expected to give the country’s economy not only a boost but also a sustainable 
future.  
In order to understand why the nationalist goal was pushed through successfully in some 
sectors but not in others, this project examines the nuclear energy industry and the wind power 
sector focusing on the period from 2003 onwards. The two cases were selected for the following 
reasons. First and foremost, the authority overseeing the two sectors is the same after the 2003 
institutional restructuring. This fact makes possible the comparison of firm behavior across 
sectors by holding the state structure constant. Second, the two sectors experienced the same 
nation-wide economic transformation over time. Both the nuclear and wind power sectors 
started at the time of China’s opening-up policy in the 1980s and went through the same 
changes of policy environment in the past three decades. Neither was given strategic 
significance in national industrial development and energy use until 2003. As it did to the 
automobile industry in the 1990s, Beijing designated the two sectors along with many others as 
new frontiers of industrial development in the early 2000s. Aside from such consideration as 
energy supply and environmental conversation, the Chinese government also regarded the two 
sectors as new growth points and new frontiers for industrial upgrading. Third, the sectors under 
examination pose a perfect contrast to the central question of the thesis: firms in the wind 
energy sector followed Beijing’s guidance for the most part of its catching-up process whereas 
those in the nuclear energy industry were largely unresponsive to national policy initiatives. The 
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two sectors are perfect testing grounds for why firms played out so differently when the central 
government was trying to implement a nationalist strategy across the economy. Fourth, the two 
sectors are selected as comparable but least similar cases that differ significantly on the 
independent variables specified in the sub-questions of the research, mainly industry attributes 
and domestic-foreign business relationships.  
This research makes use of both primary and secondary sources of information to inquire 
into the cases discussed above. It draws heavily on sources in Chinese, especially Chinese 
media, such as Outlook Weekly (Liaowang), Caijing Magazine (Caijing), New Century Weekly 
(XinShiji Zhoukan), Business Watch Magazine (Shangwu Zhoukan), China Economic Weekly 
(Zhongguo Jingji Zhoukan), and China Business Journal (Zhongguo Jingying Bao). The heavy 
reliance on Chinese sources is balanced by an extensive use of Western media reports in Factiva, 
including Reuters News, Bloomberg, New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal. Other than 
that, data collection also relied on written material from various sources, including academic 
research, official policy releases, and reports of industry associations, research institutions, and 
government departments. These were supplemented by semi-structured interviews conducted in 
China between 2012 and 2013, and participants in the research include government officials at 
various levels, business executives and scholars. The fieldwork included meetings with current 
and previous employees in the selected industry sectors; it covered visits to bureaucratic 
agencies overseeing industrial planning, science and technology, and energy administration; it 
also included scholarly visits to universities and public research institutes, where many scholars 
actually took part in the panel discussions for national policy-making (see Appendix: The list of 
interviews, 2012-2013).  
Through the lens of comparative case studies, this thesis seeks to build on and add to the 
literature on techno-nationalism and the political economy of industrial upgrading. More 
specifically, the research is meant to take the development research further by exploring the 
origins of business interests, which are seen to have an impact on state capacity and policy 
effectiveness. Existing studies identified external threat and resource constraints as the reasons 
for a cooperative state-industry relationship; this project goes beyond this existing literature to 
shed light on sectoral variations in the relationship and firms’ responses to state directions 
within a country guided by a nationalist ideology.  A further significance of the study is that it 
takes into consideration cross-border business collaborations while most existing studies largely 
leave foreign firms out of the understanding of business interests and their impact on state 
policy. Some include discussions of multinational corporations and global production networks 
but fail to incorporate them in the examination of firms’ interactions with states. At the same 
time, this thesis also provides an institutional analysis following the tradition of earlier studies 
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of China’s industrial policy-making and implementation. With the growing academic attention 
on a stronger political role of industry in China (Deng and Kennedy 2010; Guo 2003b: 194; 
Kennedy 2005: 3), this project contributes to the inquiry by answering why firms in certain 
sectors choose to resist Beijing’s guidance but not in others, which remains under-investigated. 
5. Argument in brief 
This thesis investigates whether the nature of technology and production in a particular sector 
determines the mode of technology acquisition and transnational business cooperation in that 
sector, which affects domestic firms’ reactions towards the state policy of promoting national 
industries. As discussed in the theory chapter (Chapter 2), industry attributes are accountable for 
firms’ preferences in regard to whether they want to incorporate foreign business interests into 
part of their own. While generally Chinese firms are cooperative in implementing a nationalist 
agenda, some in certain sectors have to bundle their business fortune with overseas technology 
suppliers and push for open policies. Subject to the nature of technology and production, 
industry actors in some sectors have to enter into strategic business relationships with global 
lead firms but in others are able to quickly seize technological capabilities and compete with 
international firms at the frontier. Therefore, for firms from late-industrializing economies, how 
they react to state directions depends on the relationships with global lead firms. In the sectors 
where transnational business coalitions are necessary for technology transfer, firms are likely to 
pursue open policies and challenge the central authority; whereas in other sectors where 
technologies are readily available, firms do not have to form business coalitions with foreign 
suppliers, but instead make good use of national support for advantages over foreign 
manufacturers. 
The differing natures of industries and domestic-foreign business relationships are fully 
reflected in two distinct types of sectors, respectively Complex Product Systems (CoPS) and 
mass-manufacturing industries.
3
 In sectors with CoPS, technology recipients have to establish 
long-standing strategic business relationships with international vendors due to the difficulty of 
technology duplication and the need for protracted interactions in customized and engineering-
based processes. They derive their intimate relationships with foreign partners from the very 
complex component interfaces, the need for system integration and project management skills, 
and the conversion from conceptual to detailed designs. All these normally take a very long time 
to develop and tend to reinforce the collaboration as a result of a long life cycle, high entry 
barriers and industry concentration. At the same time, international vendors also need to 
cooperate with firms from emerging economies not only for business expansion but also for 
                                                     
3 For more details, see Chapter 2.  
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brushing up skills and maintaining competitiveness through more installations and follow-on 
services. For the same reason that technologies and capabilities are “sticky” and “locked in”, 
well-established firms do not have to worry about losing competitiveness even through close 
interactions with recipients. Therefore, domestic and foreign firms in CoPS need to team up to 
win contracts: sometimes domestic firms act on behalf of their foreign partners and thus become 
a challenge to the nationalist initiatives of the state.  
In mass-manufacturing sectors, however, transnational coalitions are neither necessary for 
late-comers nor appealing to global lead firms because of technology transferability and the 
relative ease of rapid overtaking through codified and standardized production processes. Late-
comers could rapidly ramp up production without binding themselves to foreign pioneering 
manufacturers because of the relatively simple component interfaces, the replicable production 
line and cost minimization, and most importantly the possibility of reverse engineering with or 
without help. Production capacity could be achieved with the help of small design firms in a 
very short period of time due to short product cycle, low entry barriers and large number of 
competitors. With respect to global lead manufacturers, they have no incentives to get involved 
in the production process of late-comers considering the relative ease of technology transfer and 
being overtaken. Bearing such considerations in mind, world-leading firms tend to make every 
effort to stay away from potential competitors to avoid technology spill-over, even after they 
decide to enter the target market for greater opportunity. As a result of the competing interests, 
firms from emerging economies are in a position to compete with global leaders for orders and 
thus are generally proactive in response to central government support.  
These findings are supported by the case studies in China’s nuclear and wind power sectors, 
of which the former is a typical case of CoPS and the latter one of traditional manufacturing. As 
expected, the Chinese nuclear industry has strategic domestic-foreign business coalitions that 
are in pursuit of open policies whereas wind equipment production sees competing domestic 
and foreign interests that motivate local firms to respond positively to the central goal of 
building up a national industry. In the case of the nuclear industry, politically powerful 
coalitions played into bilateral government relations, in which Chinese firms lobbied Beijing to 
choose the foreign models they preferred and their foreign partners mobilized support from 
home governments for bidding. Chinese nuclear firms acted as their foreign partners’ 
representatives to Beijing because of the need for foreign help with detailed design, construction 
and management. The CoPS attributes explain the incentives of domestic firms to accommodate 
foreign business interests and as a result are relatively indifferent to national industry policies.  
As regards the wind equipment sector, equally matched producers competed in the Chinese 
market: local firms engaged in licensed production independently from foreign manufacturers 
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while foreign manufacturers preferred complete control over local operations for the sake of 
protecting intellectual property. The fact that most Sino-foreign joint ventures did not work out 
well is perfect proof of the diverging interests between Chinese and foreign producers in the 
sector. Unlike in the nuclear power industry, the nature of mass-production determined that 
there was not a base for domestic-foreign coalitions and this was why Chinese indigenous firms 
became committed followers to Beijing’s rules in the wind sector. As a result, Beijing remained 
largely assertive in building a national industry in the wind energy sector but had to make 
repeated compromises to the transnational coalitions and departed from its intended course in 
the nuclear power industry.  
Aside from the systematic variations across sectors, each sector shows consistency in firm 
behavior regardless of timing and changing policy environment. Within the nuclear power 
sector, domestic-foreign coalitions went into being when China opened up to the outside world 
and persisted to the new century. Owing to the CoPS nature of nuclear power generation and the 
stickiness of nuclear technologies and capabilities, Chinese firms established strategic business 
relationships with foreign firms that strengthened over time and have been largely indifferent to 
Beijing’s nationalist initiatives. The trend did not reverse even when the Chinese state called for 
technology independence across the nation in the 2000s. In the wind sector, in contrast, Chinese 
firms have regarded top global wind turbine makers as competitors and been cooperative with 
Beijing in building a national wind industry from the beginning. This is so because technologies 
are easily transferable among firms in the sector, where Chinese firms devoted themselves to the 
formation of indigenous technology and production capabilities while world leading producers 
avoided local partnerships for the fear of losing competitiveness. The rivalry between Chinese 
and foreign wind turbine makers was evident even in the 1990s when the Chinese government 
strongly encouraged domestic-foreign cooperation in the sector. Due to the nature of industries, 
we can see consistent firm behavior respectively in the Chinese nuclear and wind power sectors, 
and these patterns of firm behavior in each sector endure over time, both in times of relative 
openness (1980s-1990s) and in more nationalistic periods (post-2000). 
6. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 defines a problem continuing the previous line of 
inquiry and develops a theoretical framework to address the question. It first reflects on existing 
studies on the institutional mechanisms that maintain a nationalist rationale in late-
industrializing economies, and points out that few efforts have been made to explain the 
alternatives to a cooperative industry in different sectors. It then stresses the importance of 
focusing on sectoral variations and understanding why industrial actors slow down a nationalist 
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agenda in some sectors but assist with state initiatives in others. Acknowledging the influence of 
bureaucratic and industrial forces on state capacity, the chapter advances an explanatory model 
for the varying industry behavior across sectors. It investigates the central question by 
answering the following three questions: What are the natures of technology and production in 
different sectors? How do these industry attributes affect domestic-foreign business 
relationships? and, How do the incentive systems define industries’ responses to national 
policies and affect policy implementation? 
Chapter 3 is devoted to describing the background of the study: the evolution of techno-
nationalism in China’s industrial development and Beijing’s nationalist agenda in new energy 
industries. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first delineates how a techno-nationalist 
ideology evolved since China’s independence and how it came to the fore again in the early 
twenty-first century. Focusing on a phase-wise examination, it stresses the role of changing 
internal and external factors in the vicissitudes of techno-nationalism in China, and shows that 
the risks related to liberal reforms were responsible for the renewed interest in techno-
nationalism. The second part demonstrates Beijing’s commitment to a nationalist agenda across 
the whole economy and the targeting of new energy industries, including nuclear power and 
wind power. It shows that the Chinese state made new energy a prominent part of the broader 
techno-nationalist initiative and took a heavy-handed approach in promoting local production 
and technological upgrading in these sectors. Both the nuclear and wind energy sectors received 
massive national support because of their great potential to become future “pillar” industries. 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 look into the central question and test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 2 through the study of empirical cases. Chapter 4 scrutinizes the Chinese nuclear 
energy industry by going through the three inquiries outlined in Chapter 2. It begins by 
highlighting the distinct features of nuclear energy as a CoPS industry and stressing the fact that 
technology capabilities could not be easily transferred in the industry. The chapter then 
underscores the strategic business collaborations between Chinese nuclear firms and 
international vendors as a result of the stickiness of technologies in the sector. It then focuses on 
the impact of cross-border business coalitions on Chinese firms’ relationship with state and 
responses to state policies. In particular, the chapter explores the third sub-question generally in 
chronological order, beginning with a brief overview of the industry between the early 1980s 
and 2000s and then dwelling on a detailed account of what happened in the most recent decade. 
At the end, the chapter briefly assesses to what extent business interests interferes with state 
control and policy implementation in the Chinese nuclear energy industry.  
Chapter 5 examines the Chinese wind energy sector in a structure parallel to that of Chapter 
4 but reveals a completely opposite case with contrasting natures and dynamics. It explores the 
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sources of a cooperative industry capital in the wind energy sector through the three steps 
identified in Chapter 2. First, the chapter documents the nature of technology and production 
capability by setting wind energy in one of the mass-manufacturing sectors and underlines the 
fact that technology transfer is relatively easier than in the CoPS industries. Second, it examines 
the competing domestic-foreign business relationship owing to the quick catch-up process of 
Chinese wind firms and the fear of foreigners in losing their technology edges in the Chinese 
market. Third, an attempt is made to link the competing interests between Chinese and foreign-
owned local firms to their support of Beijing’s effort of building up production capacity in the 
sector. Similar to the nuclear energy chapter, this chapter begins its examination early from the 
1980s but mainly focuses its attention on the period after 2003. Finally, it also evaluates how 
much impact a cooperative private sector has on policy effectiveness in China’s wind power 
sector.  
The concluding chapter (Chapter 6) summarizes the findings from the comparative case 
studies by considering them in the context of the broader research of international political 
economy. It begins by reviewing the case studies on the Chinese nuclear and wind energy 
industries, which provide support to the causal relationships among industry characteristics, 
cross-border business relationships, and firm behavior. The chapter then underscores how this 
thesis contributes to the literature on techno-nationalism and late-industrialization by 
establishing a link between industry characteristics and state capacity. It then recommends 
directions for future research, mainly the need for more case studies and further research in the 
context of other industrializing economies. The discussion closes by considering the 
implications this study has for the understanding of sector-specific state capacity, the non-
monolithic nature of techno-nationalism, and the economic cooperation between industrializing 
and industrialized countries. 
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Chapter 2  
A theory of firm responses to state policy 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Research on industrial policy and its implementation has a particular interest in state capacity, 
which mainly rests on policy apparatus and institutional arrangements between state and 
industry. Accordingly in explaining variations in developmental outcomes, scholars often look 
into the complex and dynamic internal workings of a state or whether the state can “get 
institutions right” in relation to the industry. As the principle works at the national level, it is 
expected to shed light on the understanding of policy performance in different sectors. When 
industry sectors in a country share the same state structure, they may have different types of 
institutional combinations between government and business. Based on the link between 
institutional arrangements and economic outcomes, this thesis assumes that policy effectiveness 
depends on the ways that industrial actors respond to state directions. In particular, the focus is 
on why firms in a sector are predisposed to engage in a more or less collaborative relationship 
with the state relating to national policies, especially those discriminating against foreign firms. 
The chapter develops a theoretical framework based on the characteristics of production and 
technologies in two distinct types of industries, complex product systems (CoPS) and mass-
manufacturing. It proposes that the contrasting natures of the sectors are related to different 
cross-border business relationships, which tend to bring about distinct business incentives and 
firm responses to national policies in these sectors.  
The rest of the chapter undertakes the above-mentioned task. Section two briefly reviews the 
literature on techno-nationalism and clarifies that in this research the term is synonymous with 
neo-mercantilism and industrial policies in emerging economies. Acknowledging a security 
threat as the origin of a nationalist rationale in a country, the discussion points out the need to 
explain why nationalist initiatives meet enthusiasm in some industry sectors but receive a tepid 
response from others. The third section builds on previous work on firm behavior and considers 
the potential explanatory power of industry characteristics, particularly in terms of product 
complexity and technology transferability. The fourth section explores how these characteristics 
shape business incentives and responses to state-directed industrial transformation, and brings 
forward specific hypotheses as a result of the causal inferences. In the process, it identifies two 
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distinct types of industry sectors that are expected to see contrasting firm behavior and state-
industry relationships. The fifth section outlines how the theory will be tested in empirical 
studies, where nuclear and wind represent the two different types of industry sectors identified 
in section four. The chapter concludes by reviewing what has been discussed and leads to the 
context analysis.  
2. Techno-nationalism and industrial policy 
Technologies have long been considered essential for nation-states to gain global economic 
competitiveness and national security, and advances in scientific and technological capabilities 
have been seen as key to industrialization all around the world. The post-war rise of Japan and 
consequently South Korea and Taiwan in the second half of the 20th century is a well-
researched area to delineate the process. Their experiences represent a distinct way of industrial 
upgrading and achieving technological pre-eminence. The approach is based on the belief that 
foreign-invested firms and their technologies would pose serious challenges to nascent domestic 
ones and that overdependence on foreign technologies would lead to national security risks. It is 
therefore necessary for the states of late-industrializers to intervene actively into the workings of 
the economy, normally through the use of industrial policies, to enhance domestic technological 
capabilities and indigenous firms’ competitiveness in the global economy (Amsden 1989; 
Gerschenkron 1962). Despite an open stance and unique Chinese characteristics, China has been 
described as a country with a similar tradition, one of being committed to reduce foreign 
dependence in the pursuit of technological prowess. The self-reliance complex in late-
industrializers is generally known as techno-nationalism, which triggers natural self-defense 
when they face external threat or other vulnerable situations. Noting the ideology at the national 
level, the section ends by directing attention to the variant types of public-private efforts in 
achieving the nationalist goals at the sector level.  
2.1 Techno-nationalism  
With the link between technological prowess and national interests at its core, techno-
nationalism bears different meanings when used in different contexts. It initially referred to the 
technology policy in the United States and other major industrial powers to prevent the foreign 
exploitation of their technologies in the 1980s (Ostry and Nelson 1995; Reich 1987). First 
appearing in the Atlantic Monthly in May 1987, the term was used to describe the emerging 
political concern in the United States about Japanese access to its technologies, and some 
national-oriented initiatives meant to give preference to American firms and protect American 
technological breakthroughs (Reich 1987). In relation to the fear of declining power compared 
Chapter 2: A theory of firm responses to state policy 
17 
to other states, the literature on techno-nationalism has latterly been largely focused on the 
catch-up of emerging economies by their moving up technological ladders. Most of the 
scholarly efforts have pointed to the fundamental role of reducing the dependence on foreign 
technologies in national security and economic prosperity (Feigenbaum 2003; Keller and 
Samuels 2003; Samuels 1994). While in developed countries techno-nationalism is chiefly 
concerned with maintaining power and prosperity by protecting technological edge (Kennedy 
2013), in late-industrializers it is more relevant to gaining power and wealth through enhancing 
technological capability.  
Most existing studies on techno-nationalism focus on industrializing economies and their 
aspirations for technological autonomy. In Rich Nation, Strong Army, Samuels (1994: x) 
demonstrated that Japan built up its techno-economic power guided by such a strong ideology, 
in which “technology is a fundamental element in national security, that it must be indigenized, 
diffused, and nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong”. Looking at China in the 
second half of the twentieth century, Feigenbaum (2003) provided a similar rendition 
highlighting the central role of technology, the strategic underpinnings of industry policy, and 
the indigenization of technologies. Rather than simply referring to a specific set of industrial 
policies, these studies covered almost every aspect of building up national technological 
competencies and achieving independence from other states. They ran the gamut from 
historically rooted motivations for self-sufficiency to national systems of innovation, and from 
science and technology policy to measures promoting all-round penetration of knowledge 
among national actors. In general, these studies featured a holistic approach, a connection 
between defense and commercial production, and a well-orchestrated, self-reinforcing system of 
cooperation between public and private sectors.  
Aside from the all-encompassing approach to techno-nationalism, some studies focus on the 
developmental aspect of techno-nationalism with a special interest in the neo-mercantilist 
rationale of industrial policy. Techno-nationalism is relevant to the technology decisions of the 
late-industrializers that prefer “making” their own proprietary technologies and building up 
national firms, which Amsden (2001) referred to as “independents”. Through the examination of 
a wide range of underdeveloped countries in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, Amsden 
(2001) also discovered that another group of countries, namely “integrationists”, were generally 
content with “buying” skills and relying on foreign investment. The distinct patterns of 
technology choice represent the difference between techno-nationalism and techno-globalism, 
of which the latter underscores an open approach to techno-industry development. With regard 
to developing countries, international collaboration in innovation often means greater reliance 
on foreign advanced technologies than the other way round. Therefore, for the “independents” it 
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is necessary to use industrial policy to reduce the insecurity related to foreign dependence, but 
the “integrationists” do not have such concerns and tend to follow market mechanisms. In this 
sense, techno-nationalism is associated with but not limited to policy interventions that the state 
uses to mend market imperfections in the area of techno-industrial development. 
Featuring an independent complex in industrial policy, the ideal type of techno-nationalism 
at one extreme of a continuum is often manifested as an intermediate regime in practice. As 
Kennedy (2013: 912) put it, “techno-nationalism has pragmatic variants” and “states may adopt 
a mix of nationalistic and liberal policies in pursuit of national technological goals”. At the core 
of “pragmatic techno-nationalism” is the promotion of indigenous technological capabilities by 
taking advantage of the opportunities provided by world economic integration, especially 
foreign technology transfer. The mixed regime echoes the concept of “neo-technonationalism” 
that stresses four elements as expanding state commitments, public-partnerships, openness 
toward foreigners, and international cooperation (Yamada 2000). In other words, strategic 
technology and industrial policies that are motivated by nationalism often go hand in hand with 
“leveraging the opportunities presented by globalization” (Suttmeier and Yao 2004: 3). 
Similarly, Keller and Samuels (2003: 12) referred to the regime as “techno-hybrids”, in which 
countries like China “self-consciously invite high-technology foreign direct investment as a 
means of technical learning” and at the same time “position domestic firms to capture some 
portion of added value in the production process”. With deepening globalization, therefore, the 
efforts of nurturing domestic innovation capacity and achieving technological autonomy in 
many countries often involve active engagement with the world economy.  
In this sense, techno-nationalism should be treated as an ideological motivation and in many 
cases involves the expedient use of mercantile and liberal policy instruments. Some studies have 
underscored the historical legacy and a policy orientation toward technological autonomy in 
many late developers. Even though Naughton and Segal (2003: 161) acknowledged that China 
became more open to foreign technology and investments than in the past, they insisted that 
“China remains strongly technonationalist” if techno-nationalism is conceptualized “as an 
ideological orientation toward self-sustained autonomy and independence from other states, 
rather than a specific set of policies”. Similarly, Segal (2003: 167) also argued that “it is 
important to stress the strategic context of technonationalism rather than the policy tools”. On 
top of the historical legacy and continuity of a nationalistic sentiment, some scholars paid 
attention to policy variation and changes that many countries have undergone as a result of 
changing global economic environment. In the Rise of “the Rest”, Amsden (2001) stressed that 
the “independents” need to buy large quantities of foreign technology. Even Japan, the 
paradigmatic example of techno-nationalism, used to rely on imported technology and its 
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technological success was attributed to “the paradox of autonomy through dependence” 
(Samuels 1994: 271). These studies paved the ways for the understanding of mixed policy 
regimes. Be it “neo-technonationalism”, “techno-hybrids”, “open techno-nationalism” (Kang 
and Segal 2006), or “pragmatic techno-nationalism” (Kennedy 2013), a common aspiration of 
the late-industrializers is to seek a balance between achieving technological independence and 
maintaining links with the outside world. 
The literature on techno-nationalism is rich and multifaceted, and an understanding of the 
term should not miss the following connotations. First, even though techno-nationalism can be 
protecting or gaining technological preeminence, it is often examined in the context of late-
industrializing countries aiming for technological competencies and autonomy. Second, it is 
related to but should not be reduced to state intervention and policy tools meant to mitigate the 
risks of foreign technology dependence. Third, techno-nationalism is often not the antithesis of 
an open economy but may be pursued in a pragmatic manner that allows for exchange with the 
outside world (Kennedy 2013). In brief, pragmatic variants of techno-nationalism are common 
in the government effort towards achieving technological autonomy. 
2.2 The root of techno-nationalism and state-industry cooperation  
The techno-nationalist orientation of a nation-state originated from perceived weakness that was 
associated with national insecurity. The lack of technological capability might cause foreign 
dependence and pose a threat to a country’s national defense and economic competitiveness. 
This is true for both technologically advanced countries and underdeveloped economies. As 
Reich (1987) noted, the rise of techno-nationalism in the United States was attributed to the fear 
of becoming “a technically inferior producer” and consequently “a less independent, less 
influential, and less secure nation”. In late-industrializers, Samuels (1994) found that Japanese 
techno-nationalism was derived from a sense of insecurity and vulnerability throughout 
Japanese history. Similarly, policymakers in Korea and Taiwan underscored the connection 
between economic development and national security, and thus a balance between strategic 
concerns and firms’ interests (Fields 1995). And according to Keller and Samuels (2003: 9), 
techno-nationalist ideology stemmed from an apprehension of “predatory foreign investors” that 
“would snuff out nascent domestic ones”. This is so because the risks of dependence on foreign 
technologies are not only related to possible attacks but also sudden price rises or cut-offs of 
technology supplies when there is not a strong domestic industry.  
Security concerns as the motivation for techno-nationalism was similarly conducive to a 
developmental ideology in late-industrializing economies. In a review of the East Asian 
experience, Stubbs (2009: 8-9) found a mix of the motivational factors for developmental states, 
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including culture, resource constraints, national insecurity, and capital inflow. Among all the 
factors, the existence of concerns about security was the most reported facilitative condition for 
the countries to place top priority on industrialization through the enhancement of productivity. 
In the post-war period, Japan accelerated its pace in technological and industrial development 
due to the vulnerability related to such “situational imperatives” as a lack of natural resources, a 
large population and the need to trade (Johnson 1982: 307). Other countries such as South 
Korea also pursued a developmental path because state elites perceived their political fortunes 
being tied to national welfare and their responses to “adverse circumstances”, including poor 
resource endowments and internal and external threats (Matthews and Ravenhill 1994: 76). The 
point resonates and is fully developed in the “system vulnerability” argument (Doner, Ritchie 
and Slater 2005), that developmental states had arisen from the political leaders’ incentives to 
sustain broad coalitions when facing security threats and resource constraints.  
Under such vulnerable conditions, the states pursuing technological autonomy played a 
directing role in economic activities. In order to overcome market failures and address non-
economic issues such as national security, the state actively intervened in the market by 
directing capital into targeted industrial sectors and selected groups of companies (Amsden 
1989). The interventionist state was committed to promoting the innovation capacity of 
domestic firms through the use of diverse policy instruments, both carrots and sticks. Looking 
into the experiences of successful East Asian countries, domestic firms in these sectors often 
enjoy government subsidies, access to low-interest credit loans, preferences in public 
procurement process, tax incentives or other regulatory privileges. With an aim to increase local 
productivity, the governments in Japan, Korea and Taiwan supported R&D activities and 
imposed a technological transfer requirement on foreign investment. Another strategy was the 
promotion of a nation’s own technical standards in particular industries to insulate domestic 
firms from foreign competition. Complementary to the incentive system, the governments also 
imposed performance criteria for the sake of efficient resource allocation among industry actors. 
Even though studies have challenged state capacity considering the structural complexity of the 
state and its rationality in decision-making (Haggard and Moon 1990; Moon and Prasad 1998; 
Murakami 1987; Noble 1987), it is hard to deny the vital role of the state in directing the course 
of techno-industrial development in the countries with a nationalist goal.  
Similarly, security concerns also justified the strategic coordination between state and 
industry, an important aspect of the state-guided approach in attaining technological 
independence. Developmental-state theorists demonstrated it was the state-industry cooperation 
that helped promote technology and production capabilities of domestic firms so that their 
nations could compete in the international market place (Amsden 1989; Haggard 1990; Johnson 
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1982; Wade 1990). Within the relationship, state and industry could reach agreement through 
“reciprocal consent”, in which the state provided support in return for the industry meeting 
certain performance requirements (Samuels 1987). Industry actors were willing to cooperate 
with the state because of the same reasons that a centralized state authority was needed to 
intervene in the market. Due to the Second World War, East Asia’s social groups were generally 
fragmented and business organizations were severely weakened, which resulted in top-down 
decision-making directed by the state (Johnson et al. 1989). This is because the private sector in 
the region was “willing to cede authority to a centralized state in order to repel the external 
threat” (Stubbs 2009: 7). The interests of public and private sectors alike coincided in avoiding 
foreign control, and the coordination in limiting foreign competitors helped protect infant 
industries and provide space for domestically owned firms to survive and grow (Amsden 2001).  
Like the techno-nationalist ideology deep-rooted in a country, developmental institutions 
tended to remain in place despite changing global security and economic environment. Since 
techno-nationalism and developmentalism are known to be related to particular situations in a 
particular period of time, a shifting environment might mean changes in the ideas and 
institutions. Conventional wisdom has it that as a result of interacting with global economy, 
state-coordinated institutions are giving way to that of a liberal market (Strange 1996). In the 
highly integrated world economy, governments become increasingly constrained in the use of 
protective policies due to the international regimes and intergovernmental agreements that 
require economic openness (Cox and Sinclair 1996). However, the understanding of a retreating 
state was challenged by scholars stressing institutional continuity. Notwithstanding a waning 
nationalist idea and an undermining state role after the Cold War, the neo-mercantilist ideas and 
institutions became deeply entrenched in the countries and continued to influence policy-
making because they “produced widespread prosperity, social stability and security against 
external attack” (Stubbs 2009: 12). Weiss (2003: 25) also pointed to the tenacity of pre-existing 
arrangements and argued that “the challenges of openness do not negate the significance of 
domestic institutions” but “tend to make existing normative and organizational structures more 
important”. An open economic environment may serve to strengthen public-private coordination 
because under international pressure economic actors may invite, rather than reject, state 
involvement (Weiss 2003: 267). Weiss (2003: 268) suggests that the change occurred in an 
‘adaptive’ way so that institutional arrangements tend to endure, “even if in newly modified 
form”. 
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2.3 Unexplained sectoral variation in firm behavior 
Existing studies have revealed the emergence and endurance of techno-nationalist ideas and 
institutions in a particular country but few paid attention to the heterogeneity at the sectoral 
level. As discussed earlier, a sense of insecurity was accountable for the nationalist initiatives 
and public-private cooperation in countries with developmental goals. Since all the state and 
non-state actors within a national border face the same security and economic environment, it is 
expected that the strategic cooperation between government and business prevail in the whole 
country. However, the public-private interactions and business reactions to state control vary 
across industrial sectors. Therefore, strategic concerns fail to explain distinct institutional 
structures in different sectors within an economy guided by a nationalist ideology. Some 
scholars have made efforts in tracing the historical roots of local institutional differences (Segal 
2003; Segal and Thun 2001; Thun 2006) but few investigated the causes of sectoral variation 
despite the significance it bore in the understanding of development.  
On top of a nationalist idea permeating state and society, it is necessary to understand the 
varying incentive systems and institutional structures in different sectors. In this sense this 
research agrees with Breznitz (2007: 30; 206) on the importance of sectoral politics, that there 
are diverging forms of state-industry relationships and political processes in different industrial 
sectors, and that economic institutions in sectors should be incorporated for the understanding of 
the developmental state. Similarly, Evans (1995: 81-82) argued that the unit of analysis should 
be sectors because they tend to vary systematically in patterns of state involvement and modes 
of governance. Similarly, Keller and Samuels (2003: 8) also pointed to the importance of 
sectoral analysis of institutional structures because “here there is more coherence within types 
of production or processes than within types of states”. Even though sectoral analysis abounds 
in development research, most studies are not designed to explain systematic variations across 
sectors with an overarching nationalist rationale at the national level. Rich Nation, Strong Army 
(Samuels 1994) adopted a sectoral perspective but all the sectors under examination supported a 
consistent image of techno-nationalist Japan. 
Just as developmental institutions account for overall economic success at the national level, 
those at the industry level also influence policy performance in different sectors. Within the 
strategic relationship between state and industry, an institutional balance was the key to 
increasing domestic technology input in industrial transformation. For the state, too much 
autonomy from business interests may result in disconnection from the market but too much 
intervention in economic activities may lead to corruption and rent-seeking. Both situations may 
mean less efficient resource allocation. As the public-private relationship provided 
“institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiations of goals and 
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policies”, an ideal situation would be “embedded autonomy”, where the state could get involved 
in business activities without being hijacked by powerful groups in the policy process (Evans 
1995: 59). Policy success or failure mainly depends on whether the state can “get the institutions 
right” and find a balance between “full autonomy and full embeddedness” (Rodrik 2007: 111). 
Only in an institutional setting making the relationship right will one find interventionist 
policies that might stimulate industrial upgrading and promote high-quality growth. Therefore, 
the effectiveness of policy intervention mainly rests with the institutional linkages between the 
government and the private sector. And the same is true at the industrial level. 
In addition to the long tradition of studying state capacity and internal cohesion, effective 
intervention also depends on whether an industry is cooperative with or indifferent to 
government initiatives. Governments made use of industrial policy to overcome market 
imperfections and achieve economies of scale. On the one hand, the rationality of states in 
decision-making as well as the consistency and efficiency of industrial policies were challenged 
by empirical studies. Due to the complex and dynamic internal workings of the state structure, 
the industrial policy process tends to be fraught with bureaucratic sectionalism and 
decentralization (Callon 1995; Haggard and Moon 1990; Moon and Prasad 1998; Murakami 
1987; Noble 1987). On the other hand, business preferences and behavior sometimes deflect 
governments away from the interventionist goals. Studies on industrializing economies show 
that industry characteristics have shaped the incentives of business actors and the patterns of 
state-industry ties (Amsden 2001; Kennedy 2005; Noble 1998). While the constraints in state 
capacity were seen accountable for the ineffectiveness of industrial policy, the resistance of 
industrial actors or a problem of “collection action” among domestic firms was given special 
attention (Noble 1998). Therefore, apart from internal state structures, effective state 
intervention is contingent on government-business interactions and particularly cooperative 
business responses to industrial polices.   
Bearing the two sides of the same coin in mind, this thesis attempts to explain the divergent 
practices of business actors and why the state-industry coordination works well in some sectors 
but not in others. In many cases a nationalist concept only remains at the central level but 
mobilizing industries around that goal is another thing in localities and sectors. Within a state-
dominated economy, the way that firms interact with the government varies dramatically across 
sectors and not all are responsive to state directions. In order to understand policy outcomes, 
especially when focusing on a particular sector, it is indispensable to “look at individual firms 
and how their strategies resonate with state actions” (Evans 1995: 20). Heterogeneity is 
particularly prominent in an economy as large as China, in which the state has played an activist 
role in the industrialization process. Notwithstanding the fact that the central government has 
Pan, National champions or global partners? 
24 
been trying to push through a nationalist agenda across much of the economy, observation 
shows that firms in some sectors play by the rules of Beijing but those in other sectors resist the 
national initiatives of promoting indigenous production capability. While a responsive industry 
seeking compromise with the state is regarded as necessary for effective policy intervention, an 
unresponsive one towards centralized authority undermines public-private cooperation. Since 
strategic coordination between state and industry is key to industrial accomplishments, it is 
necessary to systematically explain the variant business reactions to the state-dominated policy 
process in different industrial sectors.  
This task becomes particularly important as non-state interests and arrangements become 
increasingly visible in China. As Kong (2009: 790) argued, “[M]marketization and integration 
into the world economy have led to pluralization of both the Chinese society and its decision-
making process”. Economic reform has created new socio-economic forces and changed the 
balance of power between state and economy in China. In particular, the increasing political 
activism of non-state actors such as privately owned firms and MNCs has complicated the 
policy process. Firms in China have increased their efforts in defending their interests and 
involvement in policymaking. The state-dominated policy process is now being replaced by a 
mixed one with both top-down and bottom-up interactions. In Guo Xiaoqin’s words (Guo 2003b: 
194), “an emerging powerful entrepreneurial class could gradually and ultimately become the 
main engine of China’s reform economy and a constituency independent from state power that 
demands a strong voice in the political process.” China’s industrial policies can no longer be 
regarded as the clear intentions of a strong state or only the result of negotiations among 
bureaucratic agencies (Kennedy 2005: 3). Business lobbying is becoming an integral part of 
China’s policy process at both the local and national levels (Deng and Kennedy 2010). 
3. The significance of industry characteristics 
This thesis attempts to address a central question regarding the incentives and responses of 
business actors toward state-dominated industrialization in different sectors. It differentiates 
itself from traditional studies that largely focused on the organizational efforts of economic 
actors. From the Logic of Collective Action (Olson 1965) to the Organization of Interests (Moe 
1980), collective action among industrial actors was the major theme in understanding business 
involvement in policy-making. And the discussions mainly revolved around how business 
interests were organized and how strong the interest groups were in influencing national-level 
politics in certain policy issue areas. Instead of looking at how collective interests materialize, 
this thesis stresses the prevailing preferences of firms as individuals in a targeted sector in terms 
of whether they are willing to cooperate with the state in promoting indigenous technology 
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capabilities. In order to find out why domestic firms are responsive or unresponsive to state 
policy, the focus is on what factors would shape firms’ values and their interactions with the 
state in that sector.  
Economic characteristics have been identified as the factors affecting firm behavior and 
national industrial policies. Kennedy (2005) recognized the link between economic factors and 
patterns of government-business interactions, and identified ownership type, company size, 
industry concentration, technological sophistication, and so on, as influential factors in the 
policy process. In industries with greater foreign presence, transnational alliances are commonly 
seen, often putting Chinese and foreign firms on the same side of issues (Kennedy 2005: 170). 
This point was made clearer in the case of China’s WAPI standard, where a broader policy 
coalition of MNCs and their local counterparts triumphed over a narrower one of local firms 
(Kennedy 2006). In Kennedy’s opinion, size played a greater role than ownership or nationality 
in determining companies’ influence on industrial policymaking. Noble (1998) also pointed out 
that industry structures are associated with collective action, and that a sector with a high level 
of industrial concentration is conducive to cooperation among firms. This line of research 
mainly evaluated firms’ organized capacity to drive state policy but did not explain the 
intentions of firms in following or objecting state directions. This thesis thus goes further to see 
what industry characteristics would affect the willingness of business actors to come into 
strategic coordination with the state in building national industries. 
What kind of industry attributes will determine whether firms are more or less supportive of 
state directions in the process of catching up with global lead firms? As discussed earlier, 
industry structure, especially the number and size of firms, is generally related to how firms in a 
sector organize and mobilize political and economic support and how efficiently group interests 
are articulated in interactions with the government. However, these factors say nothing about 
the preferences of individual firms. Ownership type might offer explanations for why domestic 
firms cooperate with governments but not why they choose not to. Related to historical 
experiences, the existing or perceived threat of foreign ownership control has been seen as the 
major determinant of public-private cooperation in attaining technological independence. 
Looking into the fate of foreign-owned companies in many late-industrializers in the post-war 
era, Amsden (1989: 20-21; 2001: 120-121) found that efforts were made “in both the public and 
private spheres” to avoid foreign control and that “the acquisition or marginalization of foreign 
manufacturing properties cleared the decks for the emergence of nationally owned businesses. It 
was a matter of history rather than theory that this happened most in countries with colonial 
backgrounds”. Because of the memory of a miserable past and the fear of future foreign control, 
domestic firms need government support and protection for survival and growth. But the 
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ownership control of foreign investors is at most an intervening variable because it does not 
explain why in some cases domestic firms lined up with foreign partners to challenge the 
national government and in fact hindered the formation of indigenous technological capability 
and the process of domestic industrialization. 
Foreign technology control provides a useful perspective since most firms in industrializing 
countries relied heavily on foreign technologies in the early days. Due to weaknesses in 
independent R&D and production, domestic firms have to acquire technologies through import, 
joint ventures, licenses and joint design, and so on. In a country where domestic production is 
led by foreign firms, it is always easier for the government to limit foreign ownership control 
than to wean domestic firms off foreign technology dependence. For domestic firms, the 
restrictions on foreign ownership control are always appealing but those discouraging the use of 
foreign technologies are not necessarily so. These firms can be the government-selected 
“national champions” that received massive support and were obliged to invest heavily in 
independent R&D. Even though the development of indigenous technology capability is the 
common goal, divergences might appear between state and industry when the goal could not be 
achieved. Since state direction is meant to break away from foreign technology dependence, 
disciplinary or punishing measures might become a burden when firms could not assume 
independent production or obtain proprietary technical skills. Therefore, in the sectors in which 
technology acquisition is impossible in a short period of time, domestic firms might go against 
state directions due to foreign technology control.  
Following the preceding discussion, the nature of production and in particular technology 
transferability might be the answer to the central question on firm behavior. Since technology 
acquisition is necessary for domestic firms to start and continue business, whether they want to 
follow the governments’ instructions in developing independent capability depends on the ease 
of technology acquisition in a sector. In some sectors technologies and production skills are so 
readily transferable that firms in catch-up countries could take up independent production or 
even R&D. Even though some are weeded out in the process, those that are able to form 
independent skills are seen as standing up to the standards of government selection. On the 
contrary, in some other sectors technological capability cannot be easily transferred to another 
company even when suppliers agree to transfer technologies and all related documents. Due to 
the complexity of technologies, recipients have to rely on foreign technological assistance 
throughout implementation and as a result tend to resist the government initiatives of getting rid 
of foreign technology control. Therefore, the nature of technologies of a sector or more 
specifically the possibility of technology acquisition may shape business interests and firm 
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behavior in that sector. The next section will explore these factors in more details and provide a 
theoretical framework that generates two hypotheses.  
4. A sectoral variation approach based on the nature of industries 
This section is devoted to understanding different firm behavior brought forward in the central 
question through the in-depth analysis of three sets of sub-questions. One important assumption 
for the questions is that firms in late-industrializing economies largely rely on foreign advanced 
technologies and need to acquire technology capabilities from global lead firms if they intend to 
enter the market. The first set of questions focuses on the nature of technology and production, 
and the relevant characteristics of an industry sector. These mainly include the complexity of 
products and systems, the barriers of market entry and product lifecycles, and how these factors 
affect the transferability of technological capabilities among industrial players. Following these 
questions, the second step is to examine how industry attributes would affect the interests of 
domestic firms and those at the international technology frontiers, and how the incentives 
system would shape domestic-foreign business relationships in the sector. The last set of 
questions further the analysis by exploring how the relationships would affect business reactions 
toward nationalist initiatives of reducing foreign technology dependence in late-industrializing 
economies. In answering the progressive questions, the section comes out with two 
corresponding hypotheses: the first is that industry characteristics, in particular technology 
transferability or accessibility, are associated with different domestic-foreign business 
relationships in a particular sector; and the second is that transnational business relationships 
shape business interests and firm responses toward nationalist policies in that sector. 
4.1 Nature of industries 
A typology of industry sectors based on the complexity of technology systems is the starting 
point of analyzing the nature of industry sectors. In a study of civilian nuclear power technology, 
Metzler and Steinfeld (2014) directed scholarly attention to a particular type of industry sectors 
typical of complex product systems (CoPS). Considering the dynamics of innovation and 
production, Hobday (1998: 689) set mass-produced commodity goods apart from CoPS that 
“are highly customized, engineering-intensive goods”. CoPS are typical of a higher degree of 
“complexity” than commodity goods along a wide array of dimensions, and normally include 
high-value and high-technology products, control systems, and civil engineering constructs that 
are made in one-off projects and small batches over a long period of time. Examples include 
large-scale thermal or nuclear power plants, high-speed railway, offshore oil and gas drilling 
platforms (Metzler and Steinfeld 2014). Other than that, most industries fall into the category of 
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mass-manufacturing, which involves making large-volume standardized products especially on 
assembly lines. It is typical of relatively simple component interfaces, a codified production 
process, and medium-low entry barriers in comparison to CoPS.
1
 For analytical purposes, 
Hobday, Davies and Prencipe (2005: 1112-4) broke the dichotomy down into four categories 
from simple to complex technology systems, respectively assembly, subsystem, product system, 
and large technical systems or system of systems. There is a continuum of product complexity, 
but in order to simplify the examination this thesis concentrates on the two ideal types of CoPS 
and mass-production (assembly).  
Unlike cost minimization in mass-manufacturing, competition in the sectors of complex 
technical systems is largely based on systems integration and engineering. In addition to the 
large number of components and subsystems involved, the ways they are integrated together, 
the difficulties of coordination, and the risk and uncertainty in management also distinguish 
CoPS from mass-produced goods. Accordingly, firms developing CoPS derive their core 
competitiveness not from economies of scale but from a broad range of capabilities centering on 
systems integration (Metzler and Steinfeld 2014). In terms of design, CoPS suppliers need to 
develop architectural concepts to link customized components together and decide how these 
concepts are implemented in practice; with respect to equipment sourcing, they have to organize 
and manage supply chains covering a diverse variety of components and subsystems; as for 
project management, they need to develop competencies in quality control and resources 
synchronization, which involve strategies for sophisticated coordination tasks. All these 
contribute to the competitive advantages of CoPS suppliers. 
The multidisciplinary approach to CoPS makes learning and catching up by late-comers 
much more difficult than in mass-manufacturing. Considering the broad strategies required in 
CoPS production, incumbent suppliers tend to develop multidimensional strategies and skills 
involved in systems development that are difficult to duplicate. First of all, due to the extremely 
high demand for investment and cross-disciplinary expertise, only a few firms could develop the 
capability of providing bundled solutions of CoPS and the capability is entrenched in certain 
firms. Second, CoPS are highly customized and vary wildly from project to project. Technology 
recipients in developing countries or new entrants in the industries tend to find limited scope for 
routinized learning between product generations and even within products. Third, technology 
transfer is less possible in CoPS than in mass-manufacturing because CoPS suppliers mainly 
count on incremental product improvement rather than on radical innovation. Innovation in 
                                                     
1  Though it can be the production of low value-added goods (such as clothes, toys, bolts and nuts), mass-
manufacturing in the research mainly refers to the assembly of more complicated products (such as solar PV, wind 
power generators, automobiles, mobile phones, TV sets and video players) because of the particular interest in 
technology systems. 
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CoPS is a continuous process throughout all stages of design, development, and construction, 
and sometimes proceeds long after the delivery of CoPS. The process tends to extend over 
protracted periods and repeat from one generation of products to another. Hobday (1998: 696) 
stressed the difficulties of transferring knowledge in CoPS through the following discussion. 
From an engineering perspective, the one-off nature of many CoPS, means that it is 
difficult to systematically capture and recall previous design and development 
experiences. The larger the project and the more systemic and complex the product, the 
more important tacit knowledge is likely to be in CoPS project design and execution. In 
some cases (e.g., passenger airports), overall concept knowledge may reside in a small 
number of well-known individuals worldwide. In other cases, there may be only a 
handful of engineering teams capable of designing and building new versions of 
complex products. 
4.2 Domestic-foreign business relationships 
Due to the complexity and “stickiness” of production capability in CoPS, firms from emerging 
economies tend to rely on well-established suppliers throughout the whole process. From the 
beginning, models and designs do not materialize into projects without the help of CoPS 
suppliers. This is so even when both sides have already agreed on technology transfer. There is 
a large gap between the so-called conceptual and detailed designs: CoPS users
2
 need suppliers 
to translate abstract concepts, diagrams and drawings into work packages identifying required 
equipment and inputs and providing sufficient instructions for construction at the plant site 
(Metzler and Steinfeld 2014). Aside from design, CoPS buyers also depend on international 
vendors for upstream supply networks in view of the wide range of components, technologies, 
skills and knowledge involved in the process. The reliance on CoPS suppliers is also reflected in 
project management capabilities for the sake of quality and reliability. Due to the one-off nature 
and extremely high cost of CoPS projects, quality control in production, delivery and operation 
is of high importance. In particular, users rely on their suppliers to provide related services and 
support for maintenance and operations. As the capabilities are not easily transferable among 
industrial players, it is difficult for firms from developing countries to become international 
vendors through cooperation with suppliers. 
On the other side of the cooperation, international vendors also need to collaborate with 
technology recipients in CoPS production for a variety of reasons. Above all else, the nature of 
innovation in CoPS determines that suppliers need to renew their skills and competitive 
advantage through market access and project builds around the world. Capabilities cannot be 
                                                     
2 For clarity, expressions such as CoPS users, buyers, technology recipients, new entrants, and late-comers will be 
used interchangeably in the chapter to represent firms from industrializing countries. These firms are normally 
owners and operators of the CoPS projects. Most of them rely on the technological capabilities of international 
suppliers from industrially advanced economies. Many bought designs or turn-key projects from international 
vendors and at the same time made great efforts to catch up with the global lead firms at the frontier of CoPS 
production.  
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turned into productivity and may deteriorate if there are not enough orders to work on. 
International bidding is necessary if the domestic market is limited. In order to win orders in a 
foreign market, international vendors have to team up with local project users because high-
intensity user involvement is required to develop and deliver CoPS. This is because components 
and subsystems are tailored for specific customers and markets. In gathering user requirements, 
suppliers need to negotiate with local users on technical issues to decide on architectural designs 
and make adjustments. The collaboration continues even after the delivery of CoPS because 
suppliers are motivated to move downstream into service-intensive partnerships “to expand 
revenue streams and increase profitability” (Hobday, Davies and Prencipe 2005: 1109). Despite 
the in-depth interactions, international vendors do not worry about losing competitiveness and 
being challenged by local users in the international market considering the difficulty of 
technology transfer in CoPS sectors.   
Because of the interdependence between them, CoPS suppliers and users are likely to 
develop strategic business partnerships and political coalitions that tend to persist and strengthen 
overtime. As CoPS projects are generally not relocatable and have to be implemented at the 
users’ site, suppliers and users are destined to work together; and if the users are from other 
countries, cross-border business cooperation is necessary throughout the production cycle, 
starting from design and development, production and delivery to maintenance and upgrading. 
As a project unfolds, the negotiations become an iterative and intricate process of consulting 
with users and adding new features in product systems. The coordination with users is 
complicated and deepened by “substantial feedback loops from later to earlier production stages 
which require alterations to overall system architectures or to the design of specific components” 
(Hobday 1998: 694). And the interdependence tends to last a long time, from project to project 
and from generation to generation. While the product lifecycle is long in itself, the need for 
technology upgrading makes the relationship even longer. There were cases that technology 
recipients eventually developed their own capabilities, but the process normally took a few 
decades, after which they might still rely on international vendors for core technologies.
3
 In 
view of the long-term strategic cooperation and confluence of interests, international vendors 
and domestic users tend to enter into transnational business coalitions. Therefore, domestic-
foreign coalitions are necessary to push for their common interests in the host government at 
critical points of time, especially at the biding stage.  
In comparison with the sectors engaging in CoPS production, mass-manufacturing tells a 
completely different story in terms of technology transferability and transnational business 
relationships. Due to the standardized production process, relatively simpler component 
                                                     
3 For a detailed discussion, see the case study on the Chinese nuclear energy industry (Chapter 4). 
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interfaces and the fewer skills required in traditional manufacturing sectors, late-comers have a 
better chance to acquire production capabilities than do those in CoPS sectors. And thanks to the 
relative ease of technology transfer, these firms have more options than in CoPS to start 
independent production, such as signing licensing agreements or buying automated production 
lines. Sometimes joint development or reverse engineering may help them develop independent 
know-how and free them from foreign control in business operations. Instead of skills in 
systems engineering and coordination, firms in high-volume production sectors mainly compete 
on economies of scale and cost minimization competencies. In this sense, firms from 
industrializing countries are sometimes in a better position to improve productivity than are 
foreign mature producers. In addition, relatively low entry barriers tend to deepen the 
competition for mass-production and further contribute to the cost advantage of late-
industrializers. 
Due to the relative ease of technology duplication in mass-manufacturing sectors, firms are 
likely to see each other as rivals in a technology race as well as in market competition. Being 
concerned about losing competitiveness, long-established producers wish to prevent knowledge 
sharing with others, especially new entrants. When entering an emerging market, incumbent 
producers from industrialized countries try to prevent local firms from involvement in their 
production and avoid partnerships where technology transfer is required. And because of the 
ease of technology transfer, there exists a particular type of technology supplier providing 
knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) in technologically advanced countries. These 
KIBS firms focus on product design and make a living by offering R&D services and selling 
licenses, and most importantly, they are not capable of or not interested in production (Miles et 
al. 1995; Muller 2001; Rodríguez and Nieto 2012; Strambach 2001). Due to the ready access to 
KIBS, late-comers could rapidly ramp up production through licensed production and become 
challenges to mature producers in a short period of time. Firms from industrializing countries do 
not have to seek partnership with top world producers but instead are inhospitable to foreign 
invested manufacturers who intend to grab a share of the local market. Unlike the strategic 
business cooperation in CoPS production, the relationships between firms from late-
industrializers and global top producers in mass-manufacturing are mutually exclusive and 
competitive.  
Drawing on the preceding discussion, we can expect different relationships between 
domestic and foreign firms in CoPS and mass-manufacturing sectors. While in CoPS production 
firms from emerging economies and global lead firms have shared interests and need to enter 
into long-standing business coalitions, in high-volume production they are likely to see each 
other as rivals and threats to their own businesses. The comparative analysis of CoPS and 
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mass-production sectors shows that the more complex the product system of a sector is, the 
more difficulty new entrants have in gaining access to technical capabilities in that sector. For 
that reason, technology duplication is less likely in CoPS than in mass-manufacturing. A key 
difference between the two ideal types of sectors is that when accessing an emerging market, 
internationally established CoPS producers have to partner and closely interact with local firms 
but do not have to worry about losing competitiveness in a short period of time, whereas top 
producers of high-volume commodities do not necessarily need to cooperate with local firms 
and at the same time are constantly on the alert against their own technical know-hows being 
copied by others. 
With respect to CoPS, late-comers tend to rely on international vendors for systems 
integration expertise, and because the projects are highly customized, negotiations and 
collaborations on all sorts of issues are indispensable between them throughout the stages of 
design, production, maintenance, and upgrade. They have to enter into strategic business 
partnerships to strive for their common interests, in which new entrants need global lead firms 
to start business whereas the latter need the former for market expansion, brushing up skills and 
strengthening competitiveness. And due to the long product lifecycle, the relationship tends to 
strengthen and stabilize over time. To the contrary in mass-manufacturing, newcomers are able 
to enter the market through a number of available choices in technology acquisition, and 
because of standardized and undifferentiated production they are engaged in cost-cutting 
competition with top world producers. Neither of the two sides is interested in partnering with 
each other: while newcomers do not necessarily need established producers for technologies and 
tend to be hostile towards them considering market share, the latter also do not need to 
cooperate with the former for market access (except for government restrictions) and tend to 
remain wary about technology transfer. As learning and catch-up could occur in a short period 
of time, the rivalry is always intense between new and incumbent producers, especially between 
local and foreign-invested manufacturers in an emerging economy. 
4.3 Transnational business relationships and firm behavior 
Knowing the link between industry attributes and domestic-foreign business relationships in a 
sector, it is necessary to see how these factors would affect domestic firms’ responses toward 
government intervention in a developing country. In order to understand firm behavior, the next 
step is to examine what domestic firms intend to do in relation to foreign firms and in response 
to state directions. Firms may or may not react actively toward the nationalist policies of 
developmental states depending on whether the policies of reducing foreign technology 
dependence meet their interests. In many cases, firms from late-industrializing economies 
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welcome policies discriminating against foreign firms because of domestic market competition. 
However, firms may resist nationalist initiatives if they share common interests and enter into 
business coalitions with global lead firms at the frontier of technologies and production. Under 
such circumstances, they may lobby for the inclusion of foreign players or the selection of 
foreign technologies in the national programs of industrial expansion. This is particularly true 
when firms are under foreign technology control and there is no way for them to sever the 
dependence on global lead firms in a short period of time. The intimate ties with foreign 
partners may distract them from focusing on independent R&D and developing their own IPRs. 
Proceeding to the explanation of firm behavior, the next part will investigate the two distinct 
types of industry sectors through the perspective discussed above.  
In sectors focusing on activities related to CoPS, firms from industrializing economies are 
likely to neglect state policies because of long-term strategic business coalitions with global 
lead firms. In view of the need to work closely with and rely on international vendors in daily 
business operations, domestic CoPS firms regard their foreign partners as an integral part of 
their own interests and hence tend to find nationalist policies unappealing. In that sense, when a 
developmental state aims to build a national industry by limiting the use of foreign technologies, 
it is likely to meet resistance from domestic firms. As for the national promotion of indigenous 
capabilities, domestic-foreign cooperation in CoPS tends to interfere with the process because 
both tend to find nationalist policies a potential threat to their common interests. For that reason, 
local firms are likely to act as their foreign partners’ representatives to the government and at 
the same time foreign firms might also lobby their home governments to exert influence on the 
host government. The transnational coalition is also reflected in international biddings and 
technology selections. As domestic CoPS users strive to win new orders through bundling 
together with international vendors, they tend to push the central government to choose the 
foreign models they preferred, which may impede the development of indigenous capabilities. 
With a tendency to go against the state, local CoPS firms are powerful enough to drive state 
efforts to deviate from a nationalist track or at least slow down the process. Due to the strategic 
nature and economic significance of CoPS production, these sectors are normally highly 
politicized and regulated. Government and regulatory agencies are often involved in individual 
transactions and coordination tasks for a number of reasons, including “safety (as in large scale 
human transportation systems and nuclear power plants), the need for international standards (as 
in telecommunications systems), the need to prevent monopolistic abuse, and other strategic and 
military reasons” (Hobday 1998: 702). And in consideration of the extremely high complexity 
and cost, the government may directly create institutional systems to mobilize resources for the 
development of CoPS industries. Therefore, sometimes “governments own, control or closely 
Pan, National champions or global partners? 
34 
oversee CoPS production and operation” in CoPS sectors (Hobday 1998: 702). On top of the 
close interactions with government and regulatory agencies, CoPS firms tend to derive political 
clout from a large company size: the sectors are normally concentrated amongst a few major 
industrial actors, mainly owners and operators of CoPS projects. Moreover, they can also 
borrow political influence from powerful coalitions with international vendors, which tend to 
make great efforts in persuading their home governments to put pressure on decision-makers in 
the host government. When the strategic transnational coalitions play into bilateral government 
relations, state policy is more likely to be driven by business interests.  
In comparison to CoPS producers, firms in mass-manufacturing sectors are more likely to 
support nationalist policies. Considering the competing relationship with foreign producers and 
especially foreign-invested local plants, local firms tend to embrace nationalist policies 
discriminating against foreign competitors. Even though firms in developing countries have 
access to technical know-how and can start independent production in a short period of time, 
they tend to lag behind global top producers in aspects such as production skills, quality control, 
and after-sales services, especially in the early stages of development. Considering the arms-
length competition in an emerging market, they need to cooperate with the national government 
in promoting independent capabilities and seizing market share. In terms of state-industry 
relationships, only some firms have direct access to the policy process and are able to influence 
national policies in mass-manufacturing sectors. Due to medium or low entry barriers, there are 
normally a large number of industrial players and the market tends to be highly contested. 
Except for the government-selected firms that can have their voices heard by the central 
government, most others are at the mercy of regular market mechanisms. As for domestic firms 
targeted for government support, their interests of becoming top producers are aligned with the 
government’s intention of building “national teams”.  
Based on the above discussion we can expect that distinct domestic-foreign business 
relationships lead to contrasting firm behavior in CoPS and mass-manufacturing sectors. 
Whereas CoPS firms are likely to be uncooperative with the state in order to defend the 
interests of their foreign partners, mass-manufacturers tend to respond actively to state 
directions due to fierce competition with global lead producers. In view of the need for long-
term strategic business coalitions with international vendors, CoPS firms prefer open policies 
and tend to resist the nationalist agenda of reducing foreign technology dependence; as CoPS 
sectors are not only highly politicized but also highly concentrated, domestic firms in coalitions 
with international vendors are so powerful that they may be able to interfere with the efforts of 
building up national industries and force state policy onto an integrationist path. Contrastingly, 
considering the rivalry with foreign competitors, producers in traditional mass-manufacturing 
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sectors favor nationalist policies and are likely to follow state directions of promoting 
indigenous capabilities; as mass-production sectors are highly competitive, local firms do not 
have the incentive to resist government support in competing with foreign producers.  
5. Empirical case studies 
No matter how plausible a theory is, hypotheses and causal mechanisms need to be investigated 
carefully in empirical studies. In order to achieve the defined objective of the study and test the 
hypotheses developed in the preceding section, this thesis carries out in-depth analyses of two 
distinct industry sectors representing CoPS and mass-manufacturing, respectively nuclear power 
and wind energy in China. The two industries differ in almost every aspect of industry 
characteristics, such as product complexity, production type, entry barriers, and product 
lifecycle. Civilian nuclear energy is a paradigmatic CoPS industry, which is typical of extremely 
complex product systems and multi-disciplinary technologies, production tailored to specific 
customers, very high entry barriers, and long product lifecycle. System integration is the core 
capability of nuclear vendors and their positions in the international market tend to stabilize 
over decades due to the “stickiness” of production capabilities. By contrast, the wind energy 
sector belongs to the category of mass-manufacturing, where product and component interface 
is relatively simple, production is highly standardized, entry barriers are relatively low and 
product lifecycle is relatively short.  
Each of the two industrial sectors will be analyzed in three steps developed in the theoretical 
framework. The first part of each case study focuses on the potential explanatory variable by 
identifying characteristics of the sectors in question and their implications for technology 
transferability. More specifically, the examination revolves around product complexity and 
production type, and their influence on core capabilities in nuclear and wind energy industries. 
Drawing on the hypothetical analyses from the theoretical framework, the first section explores 
the association between the types of production competencies, respectively systems integration 
and cost reduction in nuclear and wind, and the transferability of technological and productive 
capabilities. The second step of analysis in each case study then concentrates on what was the 
impact of industry attributes and technology transferability on cross-border industrial relations. 
In particular, studies of the two cases center on whether the distinct capabilities of firms in 
nuclear and wind energy industries led to different business interests and hence different types 
of business relationships between indigenous Chinese firms and long-established foreign firms.  
Continuing with the causal inferences, the third part of each case study examines the role of 
transnational business relationships in shaping firms’ responses to Beijing’s nationalist 
initiatives. This part of the investigation accounts for the largest details of the research and tests 
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the causal link between cross-border industrial relations and firm behavior in China’s new and 
renewable energy industries. For the nuclear industry, the study looks into transnational 
business coalitions and their interactions with the Chinese government with a special focus on 
firm behavior in the selection of nuclear reactors, localized development, and project approvals. 
For wind equipment production, the analysis dwells on domestic-foreign competition and 
government-business interactions through such lenses as public-private cooperation in R&D, 
joint venture partnerships, and national bidding projects. In each case, the exploration starts 
from whether the interests of Chinese firms and their foreign counterparts were converging or 
diverging in the policy issue areas. It then proceeds to ask whether the incentives system of 
nuclear and wind firms individually shape their reactions to state policies in the two industrial 
sectors in China. With a brief review reaching back to the 1980s, the investigation focuses its 
attention on the post-WTO period, especially after the leadership change in 2003.  
Throughout the two case studies, the research employs process tracing by looking into 
multiple data points in a sequence consistent with the theoretical framework. Between the 
independent variable and ultimate outcomes, the research links a few other factors, including 
industry characteristics such as technology transferability, motivations on the part of major 
industrial actors, and cross-border industrial relations. Before reaching the final point of firm 
behavior in each case, a wealth of data is taken into account to evaluate the decisional process 
involving all the intermediary dependent variables. By doing this, generalizations on each causal 
mechanism are made to develop hypotheses that can be linked together and contribute to the 
theory. The within-case analysis by providing more observations is expected to offset the 
deficiencies of a research with only two case studies. Before ending each case study, the 
research briefly assesses the impact of firm behavior on the Chinese state’s ability to make and 
implement decisions in pursuit of national interests. In order to have a primary understanding of 
policy effectiveness, the last part also considers the progress of independent technological 
capabilities in the two industries and the adventures of indigenous Chinese firms in overseas 
market.  
6. Conclusion 
Highlighting the fundamental role of technological competence in national interests, techno-
nationalism was first used to stand for the protective policies found in industrialized countries 
but has since been mainly associated with neo-mercantilism in late-industrializing economies. In 
this research, techno-nationalism follows the mainstream studies and focuses on the emerging 
economies that aim to achieve developmental goals through the pursuit of technological 
capabilities and autonomy. With a special interest in industrial policy, the research revolves 
Chapter 2: A theory of firm responses to state policy 
37 
around state directions and particularly state-industry cooperation in reducing the dependence 
on foreign technologies. The literature shows that concerns such as security concerns and 
economic “backwardness” have long been considered to be the major sources of techno-
nationalist ideology and developmental institutions, which are expected to dominate a country 
facing vulnerable situations. However, in real life the relationship between government and 
business is not always cooperative, and industry does not always respond positively to the 
state’s nationalist agenda. State policy is sometimes driven by business interests and policy 
performance depends on whether an industry is cooperative or uncooperative with the state. 
Therefore, it is necessary to know why firms in some sectors are willing to cooperate with the 
state in the implementation of nationalist policies, but why those in other sectors are not willing 
to do so.  
In order to explain business reactions toward state directions across sectors, the chapter 
developed a theoretical framework based on industry characteristics. It sought to add to the 
literature of techno-nationalism and especially industrial policy from a sectoral perspective. 
Compared with the studies centering on state capacity and bureaucratic rivalries within the state, 
this research mainly deals with state-industry relations with a special focus on business interests 
and their influence on national policy implementation. The theory unfolded based on three sets 
of sub-questions, with the first probing industry attributes and technology transferability, the 
second querying the associations between nature of industry and nature of domestic-foreign 
business relationships, and the third assessing the influence of transnational industrial relations 
on domestic business interests and behavior in relation to state policy. The inferential analysis 
produced two linked hypotheses: firms from CoPS sectors tend to develop strategic business 
coalitions with foreign firms whereas those undertaking mass-production are inherently hostile 
to each other; and because of the contrasting cross-border business relationships, CoPS 
producers are likely to be unresponsive to the nationalist efforts and interfere with the 
implementation of state policy, but mass-producers tend to cooperate with the state and follow 
state directions in carrying out industrial policy.  
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Chapter 3  
Techno-nationalism in China’s new energy industries 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A nationalist ideology has been deeply rooted in China’s post-war history of technological and 
industrial development. Originated from the military techno-nationalism since the 1950s, a self-
reliance complex ebbs and flows with the political and socio-economic situations but persevered 
to the present day in China’s techno-economic strategies. Notwithstanding a general retreat in 
the 1980s, the ideology underwent a remarkable revival in China’s civilian technology 
development in the 1990s, particularly after its WTO accession in the end of 2001. With 
technology-driven and sustainable development becoming the main theme of economic reforms, 
the Chinese state strengthened its commitment to national innovation capacity and placed a 
stronger emphasis on the role of “indigenous innovation (Zizhu Chuangxin)” in industrial 
upgrading. Under the circumstances, Beijing designated a wide range of industry sectors as the 
future areas for industrial upgrading and achieving technological prowess in the world. New 
energy sectors, mainly nuclear, wind, solar, hydro and biomass, were selected. They were 
selected not only for techno-nationalist goals but also for such considerations as energy 
shortages, climate changes and future growth. While the Chinese government was committed to 
building a national new energy industry, the efforts came out with different results in different 
sectors. The nuclear and wind energy sectors represent two distinct directions in response to 
Beijing’s nationalist initiatives.  
With a particular focus on changing state-industry relations, the chapter bridges Chapter 2 
with Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. In the context of China’s new energy industry, it introduces the 
central question that was brought forward in the theory chapter and will be examined in the 
following empirical chapters. The next section investigates the evolution of techno-nationalism 
at different stages, covering the early development of modern defense industries, civilian 
industrialization during the economic transformation, and the resurgence of a nationalist 
ideology in the new century. Section three concentrates on the situational imperatives that 
caused the Chinese government to target new energy sectors, and the heavy-handed approach it 
adopted to promote domestic production as well as indigenous innovation in the sectors. The 
section pays special attention to Beijing’s nationalist agenda in the nuclear and wind energy 
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sectors, and the strategic targeting of the two sectors in China’s technological and industrial 
upgrading. The concluding section reviews the chapter and sets up the puzzle to be examined in 
the following empirical chapters.  
2. The continuity and change of techno-nationalism in China 
Techno-nationalism in contemporary China originated from the late 19th century and 
experienced important manifestations in the post-war era. Gaining technological capability has 
been the overarching theme in the country’s struggles of constructing modern economic and 
defense systems. At the time of foreign aggression and consequent humiliations, a strong state 
was essential to the survival of the Chinese nation and the Chinese state’s priority was given to 
building a military force relying on modern technologies (Zheng 1999: 23-5). Since the People’s 
Republic was established, a techno-nationalist rationale has been embedded in the ideologies of 
China’s political leadership and circulating within the Chinese state and industry. Stemming 
from a period of great external threat, techno-nationalism persists to the present time of peace 
and has played a significant role in the country’s strivings for national security and economic 
development (Feigenbaum 2003). Even though the distinctive institutional arrangements 
developed in the 1950-60s became less relevant after China’s liberal reforms at the end of the 
1970s, the ideology has been deeply rooted in the economic and institutional development of the 
country. As a result of the changing conditions internally and externally, nationalist practices in 
China’s industrial development underwent a general retreat in the 1990s and a remarkable 
renaissance in the 2000s. Since then, the Chinese state attached greater emphasis on 
technological upgrading and particularly on the promotion of indigenous technological 
capabilities of domestic firms.  
The rise of techno-nationalism in China has been closely linked to the vulnerabilities of the 
state caused by internal and external factors at different stages. Throughout modern Chinese 
history, a “strong state complex” has been the main stream of Chinese nationalism, which arose 
whenever the state was challenged (Zheng 1999: 17). In the Maoist period, the presence of 
external threat and the need for national unity made a strong state necessary to catch up with 
Western powers in technological capability, and this led to the militarization of science and 
technology (S&T) and the mobilization of all domestic resources to develop nuclear weapons. 
Under the auspices of Deng Xiaoping, the pursuit of technological self-sufficiency gave way to 
the creation of economic wealth, and national economic policy transformed from central 
planning to market reform and opening to the outside world. As a result, the dominion of the 
state was compromised by marketization, decentralization, and globalization. At the beginning 
of the new century, reforms from the previous two decades had released many forces that went 
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beyond the control of the state. In response to the declining capacity, the Chinese state made 
attempts to regain its control over industry, departmental and local interests, and international 
forces. It was against the backdrop that China entertained a renewed interest in technological 
self-sufficiency while accommodating the needs of integrating in to the world economy.  
2.1 Military techno-nationalism (1950-1978) 
An aspiration of national security propelled China onto a techno-nationalist path after its 
establishment in 1949. With a long history of civil war and foreign aggression, one of the most 
pressing tasks of the war-torn country at that time was to strive for peace and stability, and ward 
off the threat of nuclear weapons amid an international arms race.  And the most pressing task 
for the Chinese state to prevent foreign aggression was to build a modernized military force. 
The Chinese leaders led by Mao Zedong decided on a strategy of “active defense” through the 
development of cutting-edge military technologies, especially nuclear weapons, missiles and 
nuclear-powered submarines. This took place within the political and economic institutions 
derived from the Soviet model, in which the party maintained a commanding height in political 
power and the central state a strong control over economic planning and management. The 
efforts finally led to the successful development of “Two Bombs and One Satellite”, which were 
crystallized into the “spiritual monument” of self-reliance for the country (CAST 2009).1 Under 
the conditions of external threats, weak industrial base and backward economy back in the 
1960s, success in the strategic weapons programs represented a great achievement that was later 
acknowledged by Deng Xiaoping as a proof of China’s capability and international position 
(CAST 2009).  
China’s nationalist strategy in techno-military industries gained prominence because of the 
weakness related to the technology dependence on other countries. Initially China received 
technical assistance from the Soviet Union to build a national nuclear program, but an 
ideological divergence between the two countries resulted in the Sino-Soviet Split and the 
discontinuation of the aid. According to the accords signed between 1955 and 1958, the Soviets 
were to help China construct an experimental nuclear reactor and a cyclotron, and to supply a 
prototype of the atomic bomb, missiles, and related technical data to the Chinese (Lewis and 
Xue 1988: Chapter 3; Liu and Liu 2009: 71-73). However, the joint defense projects did not go 
smoothly because of ideological conflict between the two countries: the radicalization of 
China’s domestic politics and drastic left-turn of foreign policy conflicted with Soviet proposals 
for peaceful co-existence with the capitalist world led by the United States (Li 2012: 53). As a 
result of the deteriorating relations, in the mid-1960 the Soviet Union withdrew its experts 
                                                     
1 “Two Bombs and One Satellite” refer to the successful development of atomic and hydrogen bombs in the 1960s as 
well as the “Dongfanghong No. 1” Satellite in 1970.  
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working in China and cut off the supply of key equipment and components, which left many 
civilian projects unfinished and stalled the defense programs. To break the “nuclear monopoly” 
of its adversaries, China continued the strategic weapons programs on its own and its 
technology community had to make overall adjustments to the original schedule. The 
termination of technical assistance reaffirmed the Chinese belief in not relying on others and the 
negative memory became an alarm bell ringing all the time. For Chinese leaders before 
economic transformation, foreign technology dependence went hand in hand with potential 
national security risks, and autonomy was a major theme in China’s technological and industrial 
revitalization particularly in the post-independence era.  
The strivings for technology independence created distinctive institutional arrangements that 
helped the implementation of the defense programs in China from the late 1950s to the 1970s. 
As the epitome of central planning, a radical mass-based system was believed to play a 
significant part in China’s defense industrialization such as the development of “Two Bombs 
and One Satellite”. It involved the intense mobilization of resources according to Mao’s 
instruction of a “great synergy” (Dali Xietong), including major commitments of financial 
resources, and the organization of technical expertise and equipment supply across the whole 
country (Zhang 1999). A central committee within the party was established to lead the 
technocratic coalitions in carrying out the strategic programs. Despite dissenting voices in the 
leadership and disruptions to civilian industrialization, the programs continued even during the 
tumultuous years of class revolutions and natural disasters. China finished the first nuclear test 
in 1964 and became the fifth country that had nuclear weapons after US, Soviet Union, UK and 
France. Subsequently, the country launched the first Hydrogen bomb in 1967 and the first 
satellite named “Dongfanghong-1” in 1970. According to a People’s Daily article in 1999, these 
achievements were attributed to a centralized authority as well as the “institutional advantages” 
that enable the socialist China to “mobilize resources to get great things done” (Jizhong Liliang 
Ban Dashi) (People's Daily Online 1999).  
In spite of distinct discontinuities in China’s scientific and technological development 
before 1978, nationalism as conception and practice were in full play in China’s initial military 
modernization as well as civilian industrialization at this stage. Admittedly, the understanding of 
China’s R&D experience is not limited to a consistent image considering the disorderly 
development and distinct discontinuities in the first three decades of its founding. At the stage of 
economic start-up, a developmental goal and ideological indoctrination were intertwined with 
periodic interruptions to the progress because of factional competitions and policy shifts 
Chapter 3: Techno-nationalism in China’s new energy industries 
43 
between periods.
2
 Suttmeier (1974) emphasized the varying strategies from one period to 
another, mainly represented by the “bureaucratic-professional model” and the “mobilization 
model”. However, the disruptions and policy changes did not eclipse the need for national 
security and the subservience of scientific competence to the goal. Even though little progress 
occurred if the national economy was examined as a whole, China’s scientific and technological 
plans nonetheless reflected the theme of self-reliance and catch-up throughout the stage, and the 
ideology was deeply rooted and carried along over the following decades.  
2.2 Changes in techno-nationalism (1978-1999) 
Along with the easing domestic and global environment, techno-nationalism in China gradually 
moved behind the curtain and liberal reforms came onto the scene in the late 1970s. When 
global environment became less hostile and the civil unrest came to an end in 1976, China under 
the Deng leadership shifted its priority from military modernization to economic construction. 
Through the demilitarization of its science and technology agenda, China sought to implement a 
developmental strategy for the modernization of civilian industries. With the new focus on 
economic prosperity, the Chinese state inaugurated a massive economic transformation that 
involved releasing control to market mechanisms and opening to the outside world. It deepened 
the market-oriented economic reform and global economic integration particularly after the 
Cold War. As a result of administrative decentralization and economic privatization, the balance 
between state and market was tilted toward the latter. And because of the open policies toward 
foreign trade and capital, the approaches to industrialization shifted from self-reliance to the 
encouragement of foreign technology transfer, which were known as “trading market for 
technology”. As the liberal policies were adopted for the sake of “learning” foreign advanced 
technologies and establishing national industries, sometimes expedient measures with liberal 
elements were taken for long-term nationalist ends (Amsden 2001).  
One direct result of the liberal reforms was a scaled-back state relative to the rise of 
industrial enterprises and the increasing role of business interests in policy process. The state-
industry relationship in strategic defense industries did not change much but experienced 
dramatic changes in civilian industries as the market was maturing. In addition to bureaucratic 
contentions and local government interests, the emergence of business interests, state-owned or 
private, became another major force that could deflect the developmental goals at the center. 
Even though the state was far from disintegration and demise, its capacity was eroded by the 
pressures of market forces and transnational corporations (Naughton and Yang 2004; Zheng 
                                                     
2 These mainly refer to the Maoist radical politics in the Anti-Rightist campaign (1957-1959) to purge “rightists” 
within the party, the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) for rapid industrialization and prohibition of private farming, 
the ensuing great famine (1959-1961), and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) purging remnants of capitalist and 
feudalist elements in China.  
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2004). The commercial nature of the market and the profit-maximization preference of firms 
sometimes deviated from national long-term goals. More often than not, the deviation went 
beyond the country’s security concerns as well as the ambitions of economic prosperity and 
better standards of living. In other words, the pursuit of public good by the Chinese state was 
sometimes subverted by industry’s quest for economic competitiveness. Therefore, the “great 
synergy” in the 1950s and 1960s was no longer realistic especially in civilian industries after the 
economic transition in the 1970s. While the state-led coordination might be still possible in 
strategic defense industries supported by substantial investment, it met challenges from a 
stronger industry and the need to make profit in commercial production.  
In addition to a stronger industry during the post-Mao era, the implementation of 
developmental policies was also compromised by bureaucratic fragmentation. The Chinese state 
has become less monolithic and more decentralized than in the earlier stage: institutional 
adaptation, proliferation and diversification created a complex system of state institutions 
(White 1991); and authority below the peak of Chinese politics is fragmented, segmented and 
stratified among ministries and regions (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988; Shirk 1994). The decision-making fragmentation was reflected in and derived 
from conflicting interests among functionally specific clusters of bureaucracies, which 
hampered the state to translate national grand visions into policy outcomes. The ramification of 
goals and interests among agencies made the process not as neat and consistent as suggested by 
the late-industrialization literature. In particular, a misalignment emerged between the S&T 
policy structure and the industrial development system led by the NDRC. While on the one hand 
the S&T system represented by the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) was 
keen on technology advancement, the NDRC on the other hand put great emphasis on a 
balanced development as well as economic ties with other countries, and tend to give priority to 
efficiency and economy of scale over other considerations. This was referred to as “two separate 
pieces of skin” by Premier Wen, indicating a disjunction between S&T and economy, and the 
inconsistent support of moving up technological ladders and commercializing innovations (Wen 
2011). 
Due to the changes in political and economic institutions, techno-nationalism in China 
evolved into a complementary blend of a self-reliant legacy and the key elements of an open 
economy. The central government’s efforts of building up domestic innovation and production 
capabilities were integrated into the global economy by opening up the economy to foreign 
investment and encouraging technology transfers through selective partnering with 
multinational corporations. The developmental goals of nurturing indigenous producers and 
achieving technology autonomy were pursued at the cost of giving control over domestic assets 
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to foreign firms at the initial stage. On the one hand, foreign direct investment was welcomed 
and advanced foreign technologies and equipment are imported; and on the other hand, home-
grown innovations and improvement were encouraged through the “introduction, digestion, 
absorption and re-innovation” of foreign technologies. In Chinese terms the practice was known 
as “walking on two legs”, and in Japan’s experiences was called “the paradox of autonomy 
through dependence” (Samuels 1994: 271). In the eyes of some political scientists, China could 
only be seen as a techno-hybrid embracing a limited form of techno-globalism: through global 
economic integration it managed to “position domestic firms to capture some portion of added 
value in the production process” (Keller and Samuels 2003: 12). This is echoed by the notice of 
“neo-technonationalism” in China where national interest “is pursued through leveraging the 
opportunities presented by globalization” (Suttmeier and Yao 2004: 3).  
At this stage, S&T was regarded as the “primary productive force” in revitalizing China’s 
national economy (Xinhua News Agency 2009b). Research and development policies were 
made to address the institutional barriers to development. This involved a portfolio of policies 
promoting research capacity and financial, tax and fiscal instruments to implement the policies. 
In addition to rectify the regulatory environment that was antagonistic to innovation left from 
the earlier stage, the Chinese government started to reconstruct the R&D system in the mid-
1980s (IDRC and SSTC 1997; Simon 1989; Suttmeier and Cao 1999; Xue 1997). At the center 
of the transformation were a number of national research programs, of which the most 
significant one was the 863 Program, a comprehensive program to develop critical technologies 
and close the technological gap with the rest of the world. To ensure economic and national 
security, these areas of technologies were selected for the localization, diffusion and nurturance 
of innovation capabilities, which incorporated the same elements as seen in Japanese techno-
nationalism. Apart from cutting-edge technologies, a series of other programs, for example the 
973 Program (the National Basic Research Program), were launched focusing on other areas, 
especially basic research, innovations and technologies to promote industrialization. By the end 
of the 1990s, Chinese S&T decision-makers started to emphasize the role of the state in building 
a national innovation system and promoting domestic innovative capacity (Shi and Liu 1999).   
2.3 Revival of techno-nationalism in the new century (post-2000) 
Entering the new Millennium, the risks associated with liberal reforms became increasingly 
prominent in China and brought techno-nationalism back to the fore again. While the traditional 
facilitating conditions for nationalist strategies in the post-war era were no longer relevant, a 
different set of concerns following the opening efforts imbued the ideological heritage new life 
and vitality in the country. As a consequence of the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis, the Chinese 
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policy-makers became aware of the challenges that globalization and economic liberalization 
might bring to the country. They sensed the threat of international capital to national economic 
security and were concerned about the institutional problems that China shared with other East 
Asian economies (Wang 2000; Zheng 2004). They attributed the malaise of the crisis-stricken 
countries to deregulation and privatization under the pressure of the United States, which 
dominated the major international organizations including the WTO and the World Bank. In 
addition, the preparations China had made for WTO accession exposed its economy further to 
the associations with foreign investment. Along with the great opportunities that WTO entry 
was expected to bring about, anxieties abounded among Chinese about China’s WTO 
commitments and its capability to respond to the new competitive challenges. 
In addition to the exposure to an open market, the concern over foreign technology 
dependence also pushed China toward a knowledge-intensive developmental trajectory with 
renewing interest in nationalist policies. Despite its remarkable economic achievements, China 
entered the new century remaining at the low end of the industrial chain, and high technology 
has yet to become the major driver for industrial growth. By the end 1990s, China had seized 
opportunities in the global production networks where low labor costs mattered the most, and an 
input-driven type of growth dominated the entire economy. The structure of China’s technology 
economy was “not so high-tech, nor so Chinese”: for the most part the country was a low value-
added assembler of imported high-tech components and most technology-intensive 
manufacturing is set up and managed by foreign investors (Rosen 2003). According to the 
statistics provided by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises (WFOEs) and joint ventures (JVs) accounted for the largest proportion of China’s 
total exports of high-tech products (see Figure 3-1). As a result, most Chinese firms were stuck 
in low end commodity manufacturing, undifferentiated activities, and cost-cutting competition 
(Steinfeld 2004).  
In stark contrast to the breakthroughs China made in spaceships and submarines, its record 
of innovation in commercial technologies had been weak. China can now stretch ‘from the 
faraway heavens to the depths of the sea’ with its successful launches of Shenjiu (space-crafts) 
and Jiaolong (manned deep-sea submarines) (Shen 2012), but this does not necessarily translate 
into a high-tech market share, because the approach to develop defense programs is not 
replicable in civilian industries where technological upgrading should be driven by industry 
actors. As Pye (2003) pointed out in a review, “The close linkage between technological 
development and security has meant that substantial resources have gone into a few key fields 
of science where China could claim world-class status, but the rest of its science lags far behind.” 
Similarly in ‘Low-tech bed, high-tech dreams’, Rosen (2003: 27) suggested that commercial 
Chapter 3: Techno-nationalism in China’s new energy industries 
47 
technology had little in common with these sensational projects, which were ‘the result of 
command-and-control policy with no budget constraints’, because ‘the object of commerce is 
not just to produce the most impressive product, but to do so profitably, and hence sustainably’. 
Most of the studies pointed to the same fact that in the beginning of the new century China was 
still left with limited capability in civilian industrial technology and the national innovation 
system in general. 
Figure 3-1 Share of high-technology export by ownership types, 2002-2013 
 
Source: Table 2-10 Exports of high-tech products by ownership, in China High-Tech Industry Data Book, available at 
http://www.sts.org.cn/sjkl/gjscy/data2014/data14.pdf, accessed on 15 May 2015 
Seen as the country’s Achilles’ heel, S&T was elevated to the central place in national 
development strategy. China’s leadership recognized the “world factory” role that the country 
played in the global production network, where domestic producers depended on foreign 
innovation and had to pay royalty fees to technology suppliers. Considering the foreign control 
over China’s technological future and vulnerability related to the reliance, the Chinese state 
determined to play a dominant role in the promotion of national innovation capabilities and 
pursue technological strategies motivated by nationalism. The resumed strong-handed approach 
of the state tilted the balance away from market but did not fundamentally depart from the 
existing open trajectory and market reforms. As discussed later, the issuance of a national S&T 
plan in 2006 reflected the combination of top-down, state-directed initiatives and bottom-up, 
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multifaceted efforts creating a business environment supportive of entrepreneurship (Segal 
2011). 
At the same time, some other factors within the country also led the Chinese state to 
engineer a more activist approach to economic management. The “new state activism” 
originated from a “reform fatigue” in the early 2000s when market-oriented economic reform in 
China gradually lost steam and was accompanied by problems associated with the heavy 
reliance on energy and resources, the risks of domestic instability due to high unemployment, 
and the concerns about social insecurity because of the inefficient public welfare system 
(Naughton 2011). Since the change to Hu-Wen administration in 2003, China experienced a 
“left tilt” (Naughton 2008) and witnessed a general reorientation that set the development path 
apart from one single-mindedly focusing on building market institutions in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Two major concepts came out to underscore the importance of a technology-driven and more 
inclusive type of growth, respectively “harmonious society (Hexie Shehui)” for building social 
institutions and “scientific development concept (Kexue Fazhan Guan)” for encouraging 
indigenous innovation and sustainable development. In order to achieve the goals, the Chinese 
state aimed to play a controlling role in addressing the identified problems such as foreign 
technology dependence, environmental deterioration, energy shortage and social issues. In place 
of a fading socialist ideology, economic nationalism became an alternative to justify the 
continuing role for the government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in economic policy 
(Naughton and Segal 2003: 160-61).  
This strategic shift was embedded in a spate of scholarly debates within China over what 
kind of strategy China should pursue to elevate the industrialization to a higher level. Leading 
the nation-wide discussion was the Lin-Guo debate published in the International Economic 
Review, a bimonthly by the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS) (Guo 2003a; Lin and Sun 2003). Guo Kesha, former researcher in 
CASS and currently working in the State Council Research Office, argued that the comparative 
advantage of labor- and resource-intensive industries would put developing countries in an 
inferior position within the international trading system. He believed that government 
intervention and strategic trade policies would facilitate the development of technology-
intensive industries and industrial upgrading. In response to Guo, Lin Yifu Justin, former 
professor at Peking University and currently Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the 
World Bank, reiterated the significance of comparative advantage strategy in economic growth. 
He and his colleague contended that Comparative Advantage-Following (CAF) strategy would 
lead naturally to upgrading in industrial and technological structures but Comparative 
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Advantage-Defying (CAD) strategy would result in misallocation of resources to inefficient 
industries.  
Alongside the big debate on economic growth were contending visions about achieving 
technological excellence. While some Chinese economists maintained that the most effective 
way would be to continue technology transfers from multinational corporations, some others, 
particularly those in the technical community, argued that technological spill-overs from 
multinationals were disappointing (Cao, Suttmeier and Simon 2009). Since China’s WTO 
accession in 2001, the advocates of strategic industrial policies have published reports claiming 
that foreign dependence snuffed out the technological innovation capacity of the firms in 
Chinese “backbone” industries, such as automobiles, civil aircrafts and nuclear power (Gao 
2001a; Gao 2001b; Gao 2011; Lu 2005; Lu 2006a; Lu 2006b; Lu and Feng 2004). Despite the 
focuses on diverse industries, one common point that the reports made was that the use of 
foreign investment and technologies did not assist but instead impeded the formation of 
domestic technological capabilities, and without intervention the situation was self-perpetuating 
and tended to reinforce the dependence on foreign technologies. 
The nationalist voice finally took hold, and an ambitious plan was put into place to 
encourage and reward indigenous innovative technologies. In January 2006, the Medium and 
Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020) was issued by the State 
Council, and the “indigenous innovation” strategy was officially incorporated to guide 
technological and industrial development in China. The fifteen-year plan demonstrated the 
Chinese states’ commitment to promote indigenous innovation, and to transform China into an 
“innovation-oriented” country by 2020 and a technological leader in the world by 2050 (Cao, 
Suttmeier and Simon 2006; Serger and Breidne 2007). One major target of the plan was to 
reduce China’s foreign technology dependency to less than 30 percent by 2020, down from 50 
percent in 2005.
3
 Another objective of the plan was to increase the contribution of S&T in 
China’s economic growth to 60 percent by the year 2020. Aside from the designation of national 
megaprojects, the Chinese government had adopted a set of techno-economic policies to 
enhance the competitiveness of indigenous firms. In addition, the State Council designated 
seven “Strategic Emerging Industries” (SEIs) in 2010 to intensify the support of indigenous 
firms engaging in high-technology innovation activities (The State Council 2010; Xinhua News 
Agency 2010). By fostering the future backbone industries, Beijing was meant to work toward 
sustainable national development backed by overall improvement in technological capability 
                                                     
3 Foreign technology dependency in China is measured as the ratio of technology imports to the sum of technology 
imports and national R&D expenditures. Other goals of the MLP for S&T development include raising the 
contribution of science of technology to China’s economy to 60% and moving into the world’s top five countries in 
terms of invention patents granted to Chinese and international citations for Chinese scientific papers. 
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and industrial upgrading. In addition to the traditional policies, the government designed policy 
instruments to create a demand-pull effect on domestic innovation, including government 
procurement of innovative products and services, financial subsidies to end users, and 
establishment of technical standards (Duan and Pan 2014).  
3. A nationalist agenda in new energy development 
The Chinese state made alternative energy
4
 a prominent part of the broader techno-nationalist 
initiative and a new frontier to achieve the developmental goals in the new era. Even though the 
exploration of non-fossil energy resources in China began early in the 1980s, production in the 
sectors was not commercialized and did not receive massive government support until the Tenth 
Five-Year-Plan (FYP, 2000-2005). This was because of the internal and external pressures 
China faced at that time, mainly energy supply shortage, dependence on energy import, 
environmental deterioration and risks related to foreign competition. As in the early 2000s the 
commercial use of new energies was new to China and most other countries, the Chinese 
government regarded it as an opportunity for the country to grab the “first-mover advantage” 
and take a leading position in the world. Starting from 2003, the Chinese government adopted a 
strong-handed approach to help domestic firms to thrive in the commercialization of new energy 
technologies, seeking to build them into important players in the international market, in terms 
of not only production and sales but also innovation and designs. It increased R&D support for 
the technological innovation of new energies through national science and technology programs. 
In addition to the traditional policy instruments focusing on incentives and input, market-
creation methods have been employed to encourage local production by providing sales outlets 
for domestic firms. Since then, China’s new energy sectors became a new growth engine for the 
country and commanded an increasingly large share of global new energy manufacturing. 
3.1 Situational imperatives 
New and renewable energies were put onto China’s national agenda of technological upgrading 
in view of the vulnerabilities accompanying its economic success. Aside from the consideration 
of rich clean energy resources and huge market potential, new energy sectors ascended to a 
prominent position in the country’s long-term plan of industrialization due to the challenges 
stemmed from growing demand for energy, worsening environmental pollution, and opening to 
                                                     
4 There is no one agreed definition for “alternative energy”. This research uses this term interchangeably with “non-
fossil energy”, “clean energy”, “green energy”, “new energy” or “new and renewable energy”. In China, the term 
generally refers to energy resources alternative to fossil fuels, including both renewables (such as solar, wind, 
hydroelectric, tidal waves and biofuels) and non-renewables (such as nuclear, geothermal, and hydrogen). Similarly 
in the China Energy Statistical Yearbook, the category of “non-fossil energy” encompasses nuclear energy in addition 
to the “renewable energies”, which means energies that come from naturally replenishable resources. 
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the global economy. China entered the new century with two decades of rapid economic growth, 
which brought with it a huge cost in the form of environmental degradation. In addition, the 
growing appetite for energy to fuel its accelerating economic growth became a major concern 
looking to the future. Energy security was becoming increasingly a critical issue in China as its 
dependence on foreign oil increased over years after its oil self-sufficiency ended in 1993. In 
order to mitigate the problems related to energy supply and environmental protection, China 
joined many other countries in making the energy resources with little or zero emission a major 
component of its energy strategies. In doing so, the targeting of new energy sectors provided a 
new source of growth that might help buffer the negative impact of foreign competition on 
Chinese companies in traditional energy industries after WTO accession.  
Among all the factors the concern over energy security was the major driving force for new 
energy development in China. Considering the oil crises in the twentieth century, the Chinese 
government regarded the possible interruption of sufficient supply of energy sources as one of 
the greatest challenge for the country to maintain sustainable economic growth in the new 
century. Along with the rapid economic growth was a surging demand for energy and other 
natural resources. Despite the improvement of energy efficiency, energy consumption in China 
increased annually by 15.3%, 16.1% and 10.6% in three consecutive years from 2003 to 2005, 
and the increase rate in 2003 surpassed that of GDP growth of 12.9% in the same year (NBSC 
2014).
5
 In the year 2003, fossil fuels accounted for 93.5% of total energy consumption in China, 
of which roughly 70% came from coal, 21% from oil and 2.5% from natural gas (Figure 3-2). 
Because of the heavy dependence on fossil fuels, China was vulnerable to the uncertainty of 
energy markets and political instability of energy producing countries (Andrews-Speed, Liao 
and Dannreuther 2002; Andrews-Speed, Liao and Dannreuther 2005; Downs 2000; Downs 2004; 
Downs 2006; Harris and Naughten 2007; Lieberthal and Herberg 2006; Zha 2005a; Zha 2005b; 
Zha 2006). Therefore, aside from the effort of securing traditional energy supply, the 
government made concrete steps to diversify the energy structure and buffer against fluctuations 
in global energy prices by promoting alternative sources of energy. In 2003, a decade after 
becoming a net importer of oil, China made a long-term strategic decision to reduce the 
dependence on energy import by developing alternative sources of energy, which are expected 
to become the mainstream power supply in China by 2050 (Sun 2009).  
The pressing task of environment protection also pressed China to move toward a low-
carbon economy fueled by clean energies. Apart from energy security, another concern related 
to the fossil-based energy structure was greenhouse gas emissions mainly from coal and oil. In 
China, the burning of coal contributed to around 85 percent of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, 
                                                     
5 Calculated based on Table 9-2: Total Consumption of Energy and Its Composition, and Table 3-1: Gross Domestic 
Product. 
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74 percent of Sulphur dioxide (SO2), 60 percent of Nitrogen oxides (NOx) and 70 percent of soot 
in the air (Shi 2009). As coal consumption continued to grow, oil consumption also increased as 
a result of the rapid expansion of automobile production and sales since the 2000s, which made 
China the largest automobile market in the world. One direct result of the rising energy demand 
was deteriorating air quality that exceeded safe levels and put people at health risks. As shown 
in Figure 3-3, China’s CO2 emissions more than quadrupled from 2,473 million tons in 1990 to 
10,281 million tons in 2013, and the share of global total CO2 emissions increased from 10.9 
percent to 29.1 percent during the same period. Environmental problems became politically 
sensitive and incited growing mass protests, especially against the building of coal-fired power 
plants, chemical plants, oil refineries, and so on. The number of complaints to the environment 
authorities increased by 30 percent annually from 2002 to 2007 (Ma 2007),
6
 and pollution 
replaced land disputes as the main cause of social unrest in China since 2013 (Bloomberg News 
2013). In order to “maintain stability”, the Chinese government had to decarbonize its energy 
consumption structure by encouraging the use of non-fossil fuels in power generation, 
residential heating, industrial production and transport. 
Figure 3-2 Structure of China’s energy consumption, 1990-2013 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), China Statistical Yearbook 2014, available at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/indexeh.htm, accessed on 25 May 25, 2015. See Table 9-2: Total Consumption 
of Energy and Its Composition. 
 
                                                     
6 Ma Jun is a Beijing-based environmentalist and founder of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs. 
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Figure 3-3 CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use and cement production, 1970-2013 
 
Source: Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research, release version 4.2 (EDGARv4.2), European 
Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC) and PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, available at 
http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=CO2ts1990-2013, accessed on 25 May 2015. 
Aside from domestic environmental crisis, China has been under enormous external 
pressure to cut CO2 emissions because of the new agenda on global climate change. With a 
succession of double-digit growth rates since the 2000s, China overtook the United States to 
become the world’s biggest CO2 emitter in 2006 and the top energy consumer in 2009.7 While 
greenhouse gas emissions were believed to be responsible for global warming, China “has 
become the focus of scrutiny as climate change has become ever more important as a global 
issue” (Dai and Ren 2005: 6; Lewis 2008). As a result of the increased international attention, 
the Chinese government had to take on onerous targets of emission cuts through international 
negotiations surrounding the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). China has ratified the primary international treaties including the Kyoto Protocol in 
1998 and the Copenhagen climate change conference in 2009. In particular, the country pledged 
in the Copenhagen summit to reduce its “carbon intensity” (carbon emission per unit of GDP) 
by 40-45 percent by the year 2020 based on the 2005 level (Eilperin 2009). In order to achieve 
the goals, the Chinese government adopted measures to enhance energy efficiency and green the 
energy structure through the use of clean energy. 
                                                     
7 According to the data from PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and the International Energy 
Agency.  
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Most importantly, clean energy was a new growth point to make up for, at least partially, the 
opportunity cost related to alleviating environmental damages. The greatest predicament of the 
Chinese state was seeking to implement the obligations and fulfil the commitments without 
sacrificing economic growth. A “growth-first” philosophy was at work here because “a major 
slowdown could incite social unrest, alienate business interests and threaten the party’s rule” 
(Kahn and Yardley 2007). And the development of alternative energy resources was a potential 
way out. For Beijing, the commercialization of new energies was expected to help reduce the 
reliance on fossil fuels and rein in the damaging environmental effect, and more importantly, it 
had the potential to become a powerful new boost to industrial upgrading and economic growth. 
At a time when industries were largely driven by inefficient energy consumption and low value-
added production activities, emerging industries such as new energies could increase the chance 
of making breakthroughs in this sense, let alone the other effects such as job creation and 
revenue generation (Dai and Ren 2005: 7; Zhang 2011). In particular, these industries were 
expected to facilitate the “Western Development Program” because the western regions of 
China accounted for over 70 percent of the country’s renewable energy resources, and 
development of the industries would bring stimulus to the region’s economy (Zhou 2005). 
Improving living standards through electrification was another consideration: renewable power 
generation would help make electricity available in remote areas where there was no access to 
electricity (Wang 2002). 
Like other emerging industries, new energies were expected to provide a cushion to absorb 
the impact of WTO entry on traditional energy sectors. With opening to the outside world, 
barriers were gradually removed and domestic energy markets were exposed to the increasing 
pressures of competition from transnational oil corporations. Chinese production of coal, oil and 
natural gas was not competitive compared to other countries because of outdated technologies, 
low productivity and poor management (Zhang et al. 2002). While the loss of industrial 
competitiveness might be the cost, the commercialization of new energies could be a cure to the 
problems during the transitions. It might bring new job opportunities and close the gap with 
industrialized countries by diverting the focus of competition to something new (Li et al. 2004). 
Admittedly, in a short period of time the country could not count on new energies as a panacea 
for all the tasks of climate change mitigation, energy mix optimization, and sustainable 
economic growth. However, these adverse circumstances were indeed the considerations that 
drove China onto the national development of new and renewable energy sectors: the Chinese 
government expected that these sectors would make significant contributions to the country by 
addressing the above-mentioned problems (NDRC 2007b; SETC 2001b).  
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3.2 Beijing’s commitment to a nationalist agenda with regard to new energy industries 
Considering the vulnerabilities discussed above, the Chinese government selected new energy 
as one of the key industries for support. Because of its prospects for energy self-sufficiency, 
energy mix optimization and climate change mitigation, new energy was targeted to push 
forward a low carbon economy that was oriented to “resource-conserving” (Ziyuan Jieyue) and 
“environment-friendly” (Huanjing Youhao). This happened against the background of a 
resurgence of techno-nationalism and new energies occupied an important part in the visions of 
China’s technological future (Kennedy 2013). Accordingly, the Chinese state under Hu-Wen 
leadership launched a green campaign to integrate the task of modifying its polluting economic 
structure into that of building China into a technological power in future. In making new energy 
a strategic priority, the Chinese government sought to reduce its dependence on foreign energy 
technology and build a new growth engine driven by domestic firms with indigenous 
technology and production capabilities. The Chinese state has tried to dominate the process 
through the continuous efforts of centralizing the fragmented energy policy-making. In addition, 
Beijing unveiled a multitude of programs and policies to support the growth of domestic firms 
and their control of market share, domestically and internationally. Despite the liberal practices 
in consequence of decades’ opening up, a nationalist legacy persisted in national energy policy-
making and served as a fundamental guideline for China’s energy planning.  
In order to turn the fossil fuel dependent energy system to a healthier one, China resumed 
the efforts to establish a centralized authority over the energy sector. For a few decades China’s 
energy governance was splintered among over a dozen government agencies and several 
attempts to create a ministry of energy failed. The first and the only one established in 1988 was 
dissolved only five years after its creation. The major obstacle had been inter-agency conflict as 
a result of overlapping bureaucratic functions and bickering group interests among state-owned 
energy companies (Liu 2012; Xu 2010: 78-82). There was a new round of efforts consolidating 
energy governance since 2003: out of the institutional restructuring came the NDRC’s Energy 
Bureau that was later upgraded to a vice-ministerial body in 2008, but it remained constrained in 
the authority of coordinating the interests of state-owned energy companies and various 
agencies with jurisdictions over the energy sector (Downs 2008). The wrestling interests fueled 
a step further toward centralization in 2010 when National Energy Commission (NEC) was 
established under the State Council in 2010. Since then attempts have been made to include 
other agencies under the NEC’s umbrella and move toward an energy “super ministry”, but the 
process met with challenges from powerful players in the sector. Despite the tortuous path of 
China’s energy institutions, the country have been generally working toward a centralized 
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energy monitoring system with a greater level of control and regulatory efficiency than before 
(Liu 2012). 
On top of streamlining energy governance, China established the strategic importance of 
new energy in industrial upgrading and national energy strategy through legislations, regulations 
and plans. The first legislation for new energy, the Renewable Energy Law (REL) was passed in 
2005 and put into effect in 2006. The comprehensive law was designed to establish a framework 
of strategic plans, development targets, financial support, and economic incentives for the 
development of renewable energies. It was the landmark of new energy becoming a national 
energy strategy and served as an overall guidance for the industry’s future development. In the 
Medium and Long-Term Plan for Renewable Energy Development (2007-2020), China aimed 
to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy needs to 15 percent by 2020; and later 
the target was raised to 15 percent of final energy, meaning a larger increase compared to the 
share of primary energy (Martinot and Li 2010; NDRC 2007b). Later in 2010, the State Council 
listed new energy, including wind, nuclear, solar and biomass, as one of the seven Strategic 
Emerging Industries (SEIs) and a potential “pillar industry” in the ten-year program (2010-
2020) (The State Council 2010).
8
 Through the national legislations and plans new energy was 
elevated to a strategic height in China’s energy policy as well as technology-driven 
industrialization.  
In consequence of a historical legacy and new trends in the 2000s, a nationalist theme ran 
through the policies, standards, laws and regulations that China have used to promote new 
energy. Even though the Chinese government generally welcomes an open market for trade and 
investment, it attaches greater emphasis on self-sufficiency and formation of national industries, 
which was known as “green mercantilism” (Stepp and Atkinson 2012). As in most 
industrializing countries, industrial policies commonly seen across the whole economy were 
applied to promote the development of new energies in China. Many of them directly supported 
domestic production, including subsidies, low-interest loans, tax incentives, and discount in the 
use of resources such as land, electricity, water and raw materials. Some others were policies 
related to trade and investment, where customs duty exemption or reduction was applied to 
facilitate key component import or whole unit export. Sometimes restrictions on imports and 
foreign investment were applied to limit foreign competition. In addition to the traditional 
industrial policies and government R&D funding, other programs and policies were unveiled to 
encourage local manufacturing, purchase of locally manufactured parts, indigenization of 
                                                     
8  Energy saving and environment protection, next generation information technology, biotechnology, advanced 
equipment manufacturing, new energy, new materials, and new-energy vehicles were identified as the seven 
emerging industries of strategic importance in the future. It is expected that the industrial added value of these 
industries will contribute 8% to China’s overall GDP by 2015 and 15% by 2020. 
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foreign technologies, and promotion of domestic technology products through government 
procurement (Buijs 2012).  
The Renewable Energy Law (REL) set the foundation of supporting local companies in new 
energy sectors through the provisions related to financial support, independent research and 
market creation. One important part of the REL was the establishment of a financial system and 
the commitment to a 1.5 trillion-yuan investment to new energy development, to support 
research, pilot projects, commercialization, and equipment production. A dedicated fund for 
renewable energy was established under the Ministry of Finance in 2006 and allocated in the 
form of grants and subsidized loans. In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the Chinese 
government also developed a 5-trillion-yuan stimulus package (2011-2020) to promote 
alternative energy, including nuclear power (People's Daily Online 2010). In addition, Beijing 
has devoted massive financial resources to research and innovation in new energy sectors, and 
the R&D funding was meant to equip domestic companies for a future in the international 
market. In 2006, new energy technology and its utility-scale use were incorporated in China’s 
Medium and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020) as one of 
the principle areas and priority subjects (MOST 2006). The plan’s guideline spelled out policy 
incentives encouraging innovations by domestic firms, such as pre-tax deductions for R&D 
investment, depreciation of R&D facilities, and loans to encourage innovation-related activities.  
Another important element of the REL was to create a demand pull for the new energy 
sectors by ordering mandatory connection to the state grid. There was a mandate that state 
utility companies purchase the full amount of renewable power generated within the coverage of 
their grids and generate specific share of their total power from renewable sources. The 
mandatory grid connection has been supported by national feed-in-tariffs, a pricing mechanism 
that set fixed premiums above conventional electricity production costs so as to subsidize new 
energy power producers for the amount of electricity they contribute to the grid. It equals to a 
national cost sharing system through which the extra costs of new energy power are distributed 
over all electricity users. The follow-on measures of the REL required utilities to pay renewable 
energy developers full price for their electricity and gave consumers of renewable-generated 
electricity discounted rates. In addition, the 2009 update of REL strengthened the provision that 
state utilities must purchase all power generated from non-fossil fuel sources. These measures 
are meant to support production indirectly by boosting domestic market demand and 
deployment of new energy power generation facilities. Some of these policies are also prevalent 
in other countries engaged in the development of alternative energies, particularly Europe, 
Canada, and Japan (González 2008; SETC 2001a; Stokes 2013; Zhou 2005). 
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  There were also mandates and incentives to encourage the use of domestically 
manufactured components and support the development of indigenous technologies. Despite the 
fact that local content requirement was mandatory in some sectors (wind) but not in others 
(nuclear) and even mandates were later abolished because of external pressure and compliance 
with WTO rules, local sourcing became a norm in the industry society and was acclaimed by 
domestic companies.
9
 It has been popular among domestic firms to boast their local content rate, 
for which they could sharpen their edges by building a “national image” in addition to 
competing on price. This was because a “national champion” was more likely to attract attention 
and preferential treatment from the government. Therefore, no matter local content requirement 
is an obligation or not, it has been an important incentive scheme that the Chinese government 
uses to nurture domestic producers of components and parts. The bias toward “buying local” did 
not only protect domestic firms from foreign competition but also forced foreign firms to train 
local firms in providing quality products. In order to secure market access, foreign firms were 
forced to source components and parts locally and develop networks of local suppliers with 
desirable capabilities.  
In addition to independent research, the indigenization of foreign technologies has been 
another important approach to technology acquisition in China’s new energy sector. In most 
emerging industries, the Chines government has emphasized the role of introducing foreign 
technologies in the formation of Chinese IPRs, or re-innovation. New energy is not an exception. 
In the initial stage of clean energy development, especially in the 1990s, the Chinese 
government required overseas producers to be paired with Chinese companies in exchange for 
market access, which was normally followed by technology sharing with local partners.
10
 More 
often than not, the government imposed foreign investment restrictions by limiting total 
ownership of foreign firms in domestic firms. By equipping Chinese new energy firms with 
know-how they otherwise would not have access to, Beijing sought to promote the development 
of independent IPRs and prepare indigenous firms for gaining global market share. Throughout 
the process, the Chinese state aimed to direct domestic firms’ learning-by-doing through the 
nurturance of upstream and downstream capabilities.  
Preferences were also given to local innovations in the new energy sector by limiting 
government procurement to products with full Chinese IPRs. Early in 2002 when the 
Government Procurement Law was issued, a link had already been established to prefer 
                                                     
9 For a detailed discussion of local content requirement, refer to Kuntze and Moerenhout (2013). Their definition for 
local content requirements is “policy measures that require foreign or domestic investors to source a certain 
percentage of intermediate goods from local manufacturers or producers. These local producers can be either 
domestic firms or localized foreign-owned enterprises”, p.5. 
10 This is what has been done in China’s infant industries at different stages, such as auto and wind power sectors. For 
detailed discussion, see Chapter 5.    
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domestic production in the purchases made by government agencies, institutions, SOEs and 
other public entities. As techno-nationalism received increasingly prominent place in the 
country as a whole and also in the new energy sector, China had made government procurement 
an important part to promote domestic technology products since 2006 (USCBC 2011). A series 
of administrative measures surrounding the linkage between government procurement and 
“indigenous innovation products” were announced during that period (MOF 2007a; MOF 2007b; 
MOF 2007c; MOF 2007d; MOF 2007e; MOST, NDRC and MOF 2006). The strategy 
culminated in the National Indigenous Innovation Product (NIIP) catalogue announced in 2009, 
which required that only products accredited as indigenous innovation products can have access 
to the government procurement market (MOST, NDRC and MOF 2009). To be qualified for the 
accreditation, the intellectual property associated with the products must be Chinese, and the 
trademark of the products had to be owned by a Chinese company. Foreign-invested enterprises 
might qualify but had to be wholly owned or majority controlled by Chinese nationals. Together 
with other SEIs, new energy and equipment were also included in the catalogue, where NIIP 
recognition promised priority in government procurement projects. Even though later the 
accreditation system was cancelled in 2011 due to external pressure, it set up a barrier for 
foreign owned companies to compete for clean energy procurement contracts in the years that 
Chinese new energy firms developed the fastest and domestically-developed technologies 
gradually came into being.  
Apart from the mandate link between indigenous innovation and procurement policies, 
national energy projects have played a pivotal role in facilitating the sales of clean energy 
products. Under the direction of the Chinese state, these projects aimed to create opportunities 
for local producers and build up a national new energy industry. Early in the 1980s, the Chinese 
government launched off-grid projects in remote areas, such as the Brightness Program and the 
Township/Village Electrification Program (Yang and Pan 2011). In the 2000s, Beijing shifted 
the focus of new energy development from rural electrification to the commercialization 
programs for grid-connected power generation. Since then, China has approved a lot of massive 
scale-up projects to promote electricity generation from new energy sources as well as new 
energy equipment production, mostly remarkably in nuclear, wind and solar PV sectors. As for 
nuclear power projects, China has the world’s largest foreseeable nuclear power capacity if 
counting in the operational projects and those under construction. In the wind energy sector, the 
Chinese government launched a few rounds of on-grid wind power projects under the national 
“Wind Concession Program” between 2003 and 2007. Similarly, Beijing unveiled several 
national programs to expand the use of solar PV, mainly building-integrated PV projects (BIPV 
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including the Solar Rooftop Plan and the Golden Sun Program) and large-scale PV projects 
(LSPV under the Western Development Strategy).  
3.3 The targeted support of nuclear and wind power sectors 
Nuclear and wind energy were the two most important sectors targeted for strategic 
considerations in the Chinese state’s initiative of building up a national new energy industry. 
The two sectors’ development has been knitted into China’s strategic move toward self-reliance 
in energy supply, technology, and equipment production during the same period. Both received 
massive national support in view of their great potentials in turning into backbone industries and 
contributing to energy security and environmental protection in future. Both sectors saw 
regional sporadic projects starting from the 1980s but entered into large-scale commercial 
development for national electricity generation around the same time. In terms of technology 
capability, both nuclear and wind energy sectors in China were at infant stage and relied on 
technology and equipment import in the beginning of the 2000s. Both became a strategic focus 
and experienced take-offs at the time when the techno-nationalist ideology underwent 
rejuvenation in China.  
With respect to government administration, the nuclear and wind sectors share similar state 
structure especially after the institutional restructuring in 2003. From the first civilian use of 
nuclear technologies in the 1980s until 1998, the authority over the nuclear energy sector had 
gone through several changes and been diffused in many bureaucratic agencies. However, since 
then the sector largely remained under the auspice of SPC and later its successor NDRC until 
the National Energy Commission (NEC) was established under the State Council in 2010. As 
for the Chinese wind power sector, it experienced less bureaucratic changes and more consistent 
administration than the nuclear power sector. Despite a few changes in the authority, the wind 
sector has generally been in the hands of NDRC after 2003. Since 2005, both have witnessed 
strengthening state control as a result of the re-centralization of energy governance, and finally 
came under the NEC in 2010. Therefore, the nuclear and wind sectors are comparable in the 
sense that they are overseen by the same bureaucratic agencies. 
The strategic targeting for national support was also not differentiated despite the fact that 
nuclear and wind energy sectors were promoted in separate initiatives. Because of the 
controversies of whether it is renewable energy, nuclear power generation was initially not 
included in the plans of renewable energy development until it was incorporated into the REL in 
2009.
11
 However, considering its low carbon emission, nuclear energy has been regarded as an 
industry of strategic importance along with renewable energies. Not in any sense receiving less 
                                                     
11 There is a controversy with regard to whether nuclear power is renewable energy. For a detailed discussion, see 
Chowdhury (2012).  
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attention, nuclear energy was given equal weight, if not greater significance than wind and other 
renewables in China’s energy strategy. As a counterpart to the Medium and Long-Term Plan for 
Renewable Energy Development (2007-2020), there was a similar ambitious plan purposely for 
the nuclear energy sector, namely the Medium and Long-Term Plan for Nuclear Energy 
Development (2005-2020) (NDRC 2007a). During the policy changes between 2008 and 2009, 
nuclear was included in the target share of alternative sources of energy, including both nuclear 
and renewables, in the final energy mix. According to the two medium and long-term plans, the 
total installed capacities of nuclear and wind are expected to increase respectively from 9.1GW 
and 4.2GW in 2007 to 40GW and 30GW by the year 2020.
12
  
In addition to elevating nuclear, wind, and other renewable sectors to a strategic height, 
Beijing also initiated a national campaign of building large-scale energy projects to promote 
development in the two sectors. Since 2003, the NDRC launched several rounds of wind farm 
bidding projects under the “Wind Power Concession Program” for wind power 
commercialization and localization of equipment production in the sector, which was later 
extended from land-based to offshore projects (Lewis 2013: 52-58). For these projects, a 
particular rule was that wind farms had to source at least 70 percent of products from local 
producers, and those not meeting the requirement would not be approved (NDRC 2005). In 
2009, the Chinese government started the “Wind Base Program” to establish seven wind power 
bases (Shandong base was added later), each with a capacity of over 10GW (IEA 2011). 
Comparatively in the nuclear energy industry there were not such programs, but during the same 
period the Chinese government had approved a large number of nuclear power plants with 
substantial power generation capacity. Since 2003, China nuclear energy sector experienced a 
new wave of plant construction, among which around 17.5GW has been connected to grid, 
26GW is now still under construction, and 50GW in planning (WNA 2015a). Even though local 
content requirement is not obligatory in the nuclear energy sector, it has been a paramount 
mission that Beijing imposes on the nuclear energy firms since beginning (Hu 2005).  
4. Conclusion 
Security concerns and economic prosperity have long been the major sources of a nationalist 
strategy in China’s techno-economic development. With different sets of situational imperatives 
setting in, the techno-nationalist ideology became more or less prominent at different stages. In 
                                                     
12 For the figure in 2007, see NBSC (2014). The 2020 target of wind power capacity was already met in 2010 as a 
result of rapid expansion in the sector. This is not expected to happen in the nuclear energy sector in a short period of 
time due to long product lifecycle, see Chapter 4. The estimate of World Nuclear Association is that nuclear power 
capacity in China will reach 58GW by 2020, and some 150GW by 2030 (WNA 2015a). According to Shi Lishan, 
deputy director of the new energy department under the National Energy Administration (NEA), wind power capacity 
was expected to reach 100GW by 2020 (Wan 2009).  
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the early 2000s, the ideology experienced a revival in China when the country had to face the 
risks associated with an open market and the dependence on foreign technologies owing to the 
two decades of liberal economic reforms. Foreseeing a future relying on foreign technologies 
and an imminent threat related to the dependence, the Chinese state stepped up efforts to make a 
change to the status. The focus of the state activism has been mainly on promoting the 
development of home-grown technologies or the indigenization of foreign technologies through 
a faster pace of industrialization across the economy. In this sense, technology acquisition and 
industrial upgrading become crucial to China’s sustainable development in the new century. In 
order to make China into a technological powerhouse in the world, the Chinese government has 
made long-term plans and launched national megaprojects to accelerate the process. This 
includes a broad range of industrial policies providing traditional support and those 
concentrating on market creation, especially national programs with a bias toward “buying 
local”. 
China has included many new emerging industries into the techno-nationalist initiative with 
an aim to build them into national industries of indigenous firms and independent technology 
capabilities. In particular, new and renewable energies are one of the industries targeted with 
strategic importance. Similar to the vulnerabilities related to technological dependence, the 
country has been under the pressure to address such problems as energy supply shortage, 
dependence on energy import and environmental degradation in the new century. Therefore, a 
mixed pursuit of self-sufficiency in energy, technology and production impelled Beijing to 
adopt a nationalist approach in developing industries of alternative sources of energies. Since 
2003, the Chinese state began to advance in economic activities and aimed to dominate the 
development of new energy sectors by playing an increasingly stronger role in the process. In 
order to support indigenous R&D and production in the sectors, Beijing made efforts to 
centralize energy governance, establish the strategic role of new energy in the national energy 
strategy, and put a wide range of industrial policies into force. Nuclear and wind power are of 
particular importance among all the new energy sectors. Even though the two sectors have been 
promoted in separate initiatives, both receive a high level of political attention from Beijing: the 
Chinese government attaches strategic significance to the two sectors in achieving its techno-
nationalist goals and provided almost all traditional and innovative means of industrial support 
to them.  
The enormous push toward building a national new energy industry, however, may not 
translate into consistent business practices across sectors at the firm level. Nuclear and wind 
energy sectors under investigation are two cases in point. Firms in the Chinese nuclear energy 
industry were uncooperative with Beijing in its nationalist initiatives and in fact acted as barriers 
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to the goal of technology autonomy; but those in wind turbine equipment production responded 
positively to Beijing’s protective policies and were devoted to the formation of independent 
technology capabilities. It is as interesting as puzzling that while both were targeted for national 
support, the two sectors saw distinct business responses to Beijing’s guidance. So what 
happened between the national initiatives and implementations at the firm level in different 
sectors? Or what factors related to the sectors were accountable for the varying incentive 
systems and domestic-foreign business relationships? Concerns over national security and 
economic wellbeing justified the nationalist approach to new energy development at the national 
level, but did not explain diverging firm behavior across sectors. The next two chapters are 
dedicated to answer these questions. Respectively looking into the nuclear and wind energy 
sectors, the two case studies attempt to explain why firms in some sectors cooperated with 
whereas those in others went against the central state’s promotion of technology autonomy. 
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Chapter 4  
The shaping of “global partners” in the nuclear energy industry 
 
“While foreign giants are feasting on the Chinese nuclear power construction market worth 
tens of billions of dollars, our intellectual property rights of proprietary nuclear 
technologies are increasingly marginalized. Why does China’s indigenous innovation path 
become more restricted while the whole nation is hailing indigenous innovation?” 
-- Feng Lu (2009) 
Exiled “Chinese Innovation”: Cracking the Chinese Nuclear Power Puzzle 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite the prevailing tone of fostering indigenous technology capability across the nation, the 
Chinese government met resistance from the nuclear energy industry. In general, indigenous 
Chinese firms in the sector were keen on an open approach and unresponsive to Beijing’s 
directions in the selection of technologies and the formation of indigenous capabilities. Even 
though they all claimed that they were national champions devoted to local production, in fact 
they preferred collaborating with international nuclear firms and helped promoting foreign 
nuclear reactors to Beijing. With respect to indigenous capabilities, they relied on their foreign 
partners and obstructed the central effort of building a technology platform based on domestic 
technologies. The resistance from nuclear firms was exacerbated in the early 2000s when 
Beijing pushed forward with a future of rapid growth of nuclear power capacity and decided to 
base the national grand program on a standardized reactor design. Divergent practices prevail in 
newly approved nuclear projects and the sector witnessed greater diversity in the deployment of 
reactor types, which in fact opened the gate wider for foreign vendors and technologies. Some 
Chinese scholars believed that similar to the experiences of the automobile and the civilian 
aircraft industries in China, the repeated introduction of foreign reactors suffocated domestic 
technological progress in the nuclear energy sector (Lu 2005; Lu 2009; Lu and Feng 2004). 
Why did Chinese firms in the nuclear energy sector behave in an integrationist way while 
Beijing was trying to push through a nationalist agenda? Considering its links to military 
technologies and defense production, the nuclear energy industry should have seen a great 
chance for the presence of nationalist practices. However, findings from the chapter suggest that 
due to the special nature of nuclear power plants (NPPs), Chinese technology recipients formed 
long-term strategic business relationship with international nuclear vendors, which drove the 
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Chinese nuclear energy sector onto an integrationist path. First, nuclear energy is a typical 
industry featuring complex product systems (CoPS), where technologies centering on system 
engineering are not easily transferable among industrial actors and core capabilities are 
entrenched in a few long-established firms. Second, because of the stickiness of technology and 
production, Chinese nuclear firms and their foreign partners have to collaborate closely with 
each other not only in daily business activities but also in winning orders, and the relationships 
last long and strengthen overtime. Third, the convergence of domestic and foreign business 
interest results in rebellious business responses to nationalist initiatives at the center: Chinese 
firms have acted as the de facto sales representatives of foreign nuclear reactors and paid limited 
attention to the formation of indigenous design.  
This chapter investigates the Chinese nuclear energy sector by largely following the 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2. The next section delineates how nuclear energy 
differs from mass-production industries in terms of system complexity, types of production 
capability, and technology transferability. Section three discusses how the CoPS nature of 
nuclear energy technology leads to the interdependence between Chinese technology recipients 
and international vendors, and how the intimate interactions translate into strategic business 
partnerships between them. Sections four and five look into the lobbying by the Chinese nuclear 
firms in the interest of transnational business coalitions but against the will of Beijing. The 
fourth section focuses on the Sino-French, Sino-Russian and Sino-Canadian nuclear energy 
collaborations in the first two decades, and the fifth dwells on the cooperation between Chinese 
and American nuclear energy firms in the recent decade. Section six reflects on the resistance of 
Chinese nuclear firms in their interactions with Beijing regarding technology selection and 
independent research. The last section reviews the findings from the Chinese nuclear energy 
industry and argues that the case study supports the hypotheses in the theory chapter. 
2. Nature of the nuclear energy sector 
Nuclear energy is a civilian high-cost industry sector distinct from most others based on mass-
manufacturing. The differences are multifaceted and reflected in technological, economic and 
political aspects as well as in business management. This has been studied thoroughly in a 
particular body of work on “complex product systems” (CoPS), which resulted from a project 
lasting over a decade to examine the implications of the special group of industries (Hobday 
1998; Metzler and Steinfeld 2014). The most significant features of the industries are that they 
are high in value, large in scale, long in product cycles, and cross-disciplinary technologies in 
use. In most cases, these industries have a particular focus on customized one-off projects in 
small batches and the emphasis of production is on the integration of multiple technologies, 
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subsystems, and expertise. Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are known as having the characters of 
CoPS seen in some other industry sectors such as high-speed railway, telecommunications 
exchanges, offshore oil and gas drilling platforms. There is normally a very high requirement of 
safety and reliability for the delivery of CoPS projects, which is also typical of NPP projects.   
The nature of nuclear energy as CoPS distinguishes itself from mass-production industries 
in the patterns of production, coordination, and competition. First, in the nuclear industry 
suppliers and users tend to develop long-standing strategic business partnerships. Because 
designs are tailored for individual users and markets, users are intensely involved in project 
implementation to convey their final requirements to the suppliers. Unlike conventional 
industries where the production process is highly standardized, innovation in NPP building is 
mainly user-driven and customized. In other words, there is normally a high-level of industrial 
coordination between vendors and customers in the sector with complex products and systems. 
With the need for “perfect or near perfect reliability, safety and timely delivery” (Metzler and 
Steinfeld 2014: 175), nuclear vendors require continuous feedback from users that needs to be 
done “on an ongoing, iterated basis” to make alterations to the overall or partial designs 
(Hobday 1998: 694). Due to the long lifecycle of nuclear power projects, the intimate 
interactions between suppliers and users tend to last over protracted periods. In addition, the 
“ever-rising demands on performance, capacity and reliability” and as a result the increasing 
complexity of the project system toward higher generations leads to long-lasting cooperation 
between buyers and sellers.  
Second, the buyer-seller coalitions tend to strengthen and stabilize over time in the industry 
due to technology lock-in. As in many other CoPS industries, competition in the nuclear 
industry is not based on technology-based manufacturing, but rather on engineering-based 
systems integration capabilities. And the emphasis of competitiveness is on plant design, overall 
project management and systems integration. According to Metzler and Steinfeld (2014), these 
are still “the most difficult-to-duplicate skills” due to a distinction between conceptual designs 
and detailed designs: while the vendors are able to break conceptual designs down into 
workable packages, it does not necessarily mean that the recipients could be able to reverse the 
process. Therefore, technology transfer does not translate into the formation of capabilities at 
the user side, and nuclear vendors do not have to worry about creating their own competitors 
after they enter into such agreements with their local partners. This is why despite a high degree 
of user involvement in the process major nuclear vendors’ positions in the global market are not 
shaken. As pointed out by Metzler and Steinfeld (2014), only a handful of incumbent systems 
integrators compete in the world: even the successful new entrants such as Korea and Japan 
either rely on their technology transferors or lags internationally. In the case of Korea Electric 
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Power Corporation (KEPCO),
1
 even though it has developed important capabilities of its own, it 
still relied on Westinghouse to provide intellectual property and engineering services related to 
the reactors’ conceptual design (Metzler and Steinfeld 2014: 184; 187). In summary, the 
“stickiness” of systems integration capabilities determines that technology transfer is not easily 
achievable, and as a result recipients of nuclear designs tend to be tied to established vendors for 
future growth. 
The deepening relationships between nuclear vendors and recipients are also reflected by the 
fact that the former also benefit from the latter through long-term commercial partnerships. By 
developing a presence and moving forward into service deployment in another country, lead 
firms could enhance conceptual design capabilities through the feedback loops in a different 
environment. Aside from the ambition of business expansion, they could brush up on systems 
integration skills and maintain their competitiveness in future growth areas. Metzler and 
Steinfeld (2013) argued that this will “insure themselves against the emergence of lower cost 
and often substantially state-supported entrants in their traditional areas of business”. Therefore, 
it is necessary for them to be involved as much as possible in worldwide project builds so that 
systems integration skills “remain fresh, up-to-date, and increasingly tied to the kinds of 
knowledge-intensive, follow-on services that will be demanded for decades to come.” 
Heterogeneity of capabilities in the sector also reinforces the interdependence within the 
industrial networks. A closer look at the nuclear industry reveals that competitiveness in one 
particular area within the CoPS does not mean competitiveness in another. In a typical NPP 
project, a variety of firms, capabilities and services are involved, including conceptual design 
and engineering-based services, project management, construction, and equipment 
manufacturing. Research shows that even the most sophisticated global leaders in the nuclear 
power industry may not meet the challenges posed by project management (Metzler and 
Steinfeld 2014). While lead firms become less focused on large-scale infrastructure expansion 
in their home countries, they increasingly find themselves relying on the construction 
capabilities of their local partners. And even though manufacturing accounts for a large share in 
the nuclear value chain, equipment suppliers do not have the capability to manage and integrate 
the overall technology system. In addition, high entry barriers derived from the technology- and 
capital-intensive nature of the industry ensure that the positions of industrial incumbents remain 
unchallenged and industrial structure fixed over a long period of time. 
The multidimensional nature of capabilities in NPP projects gives rise to the need for 
industrial actors to team up with each other to win new contracts. In CoPS such as those in the 
nuclear industry, “competition occurs among rival coalitions of firms at the bidding stage of 
                                                     
1 KEPCO is a nuclear power design and engineering company in South Korea, formerly known as KOPEC. 
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projects” (Hobday 1998: 707). In the case of international bidding, nuclear vendors tend to unite 
with their local partners individually to enter the tournament for a limited number of NPP sites. 
Sellers and buyers pool their resources together to compete with their rival sellers and buyers in 
order to win the NPP projects in bid. While at the global level nuclear leaders compete with 
each other through the help of their own home governments, buyers in the same country are in a 
battle to gain favor from the central decision-makers. Therefore, the coalitional competition is 
between international vendors as well as between local recipients. In order to win bids, 
transnational coalitions are formed to mobilize political resources that are available to both 
sellers and buyers. 
Third, transnational coalitions in the nuclear industry boast political clout in both supplier 
and recipient countries, and have access to the policymaking process. The CoPS literature 
shows that industries are largely concentrated in a few large firms that are partially contested, 
and the market tends to be highly politicized. Due to the significance of industrial output and 
“the need to prevent monopolistic abuse, and other strategic and military reasons”, governments 
tend to “own, control or closely oversee” nuclear production, operation and transnational 
cooperation (Hobday 1998: 702). For that reason, governments tend to maintain a strong hand in 
CoPS projects such as NPPs, and markets in the sectors are likely to be bureaucratically 
administered. As Hobday (1998: 702) argued, “[T]the more complex and higher cost the 
product, the more coordination is likely to be based on fewer, more irregular market transactions, 
non-market pricing, biased purchasing policies and administered, regulated competition”. This 
is particularly true for nuclear energy, where only a few large company groups are in play and 
have close links to the government. This is because of their strategic importance to the local 
economy as well as the military origin of nuclear power generation. In addition, safety and 
reliability are top priority, and as a result regulatory agencies are highly involved in the 
innovation and negotiation processes. 
The positions of nuclear vendors and users respectively in their own countries make the 
partnership a significant part of bilateral relations. Since both governments place a high value 
on the stake of nuclear industry and both buyers and sellers have powerful influence over 
domestic politics, the strong will of coalitions at the firm level is readily reflected onto the state 
level. As for China, nuclear energy is envisaged as one of the future “pillar industries” that are 
aimed to address issues such as energy security, environmental protection and sustainable 
economic development. Similar to national oil and power companies, nuclear conglomerates 
actually came out from the government and are now directly owned by the state. Their proposed 
transactions with western nuclear vendors always fall within the purview of the central 
government. This in turn translates commercial deals into deeper diplomatic ties with supplier 
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countries, in which nuclear firms enjoy enormous political influence that they can wield to 
lobby high-level decision-makers. Therefore, transnational nuclear coalitions politicize bid 
selection in the recipient as well as in the supplier country, which as a result elevates the 
negotiations to the state level.  
Associated with the strategic role and potential contribution of the nuclear industry in each 
country, governments from both sides are influenced by business interests. On the one hand, 
nuclear reactor users want their preferred business partners to win a bid and package the deals 
into one that is consistent with national interests. They need to persuade the government that the 
deal is beneficial to the formation of a national industry, with such expectations that indigenous 
capabilities can be increased through the interactions with foreign partners and the construction 
of a national nuclear fleet. On the other hand, nuclear vendors also need to gain favor from their 
home governments, which in turn exert influence over decision-making in the host country. This 
is particularly true when there is a strategic yet sensitive relationship between the two 
governments and the supply side knows how to play the cards well under certain circumstances. 
As will be discussed later, almost all Sino-foreign nuclear power deals were signed along with 
other major economic and technological cooperation agreements during state meetings, and 
most of the business visits of nuclear venders accompanied government officials’ state visits. 
More often than not, bid selection is made under the joint forces of domestic users, international 
vendors and their home governments. 
3. Nature of cross-border business coalitions 
The fact that nuclear energy differs from conventional industries bears meaning in the patterns 
of industrial relations and the formation of interest groups. Empirical studies in this section 
reveal that the CoPS nature of the nuclear energy industry leads to the formation of self-
reinforcing business partnerships and policy coalitions. Because of the high intensity of user 
involvement, long product cycles and continuous feedback loops in NPP projects, nuclear 
vendors and recipients are likely to build up an intimate and long-lasting relationship with each 
other. And as a result of technology lock-in and the diversity of skills involved, nuclear firms 
need to join their forces for mutual benefit. While users rely on vendors for such skills as 
conceptual design and system integration, the latter also need the former to renew their 
capabilities through market expansion. Mutual reliance leads to the convergence of interests that 
reinforce the buyer-seller teamwork in existing and new projects. Cross-border cooperation like 
this means the formation of political coalitions intended to pursue mutual interests. As another 
attribute linked to the nature of the CoPS, they all enjoy high economic and political influence 
thanks to high industry concentration and direct channels to political power at the center.  
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3.1 Formation of transnational alliances 
Transnational coalitions between domestic recipients and international vendors feature 
prominently in the three-decade history of the Chinese nuclear energy development. Key 
Chinese industry players have established long-term strategic business partnerships with world 
nuclear leaders through a few large transactions over the years. Starting from the Daya Bay 
project, the first large commercial NPP as well as the largest Sino-foreign joint venture at that 
time, China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (CGNPC, now China General Nuclear 
Power Group, known as CGN) tied the knot with Framatome (now controlled by Areva) and 
went through thick and thin in the exploration of Chinese nuclear market. China National 
Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), despite being a company driven by the spirit of self-reliance, also 
entered into a similar type of relationships with AECL from Canada and ASE from Russia. The 
two powerful alliances had been the only rivals in the Chinese market until the formation of the 
State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC), a nuclear technology company created 
by the central government in collaboration with the US-based Westinghouse Electric Company. 
They are tied up in the same project but with different goals: while SNPTC was born with a 
mission to indigenize American reactors, Westinghouse intended to tap into a potential market 
as substantial as China, which now has the world’s largest nuclear power capacity under 
construction.
2
 History shows that these alliances need to do this to make NPPs commercially 
viable and sustainable, and work toward greater competitiveness vis-à-vis other alliances. 
The extended transnational partnership in the Chinese nuclear energy industry is without 
exception attributed to the complexity of NPP projects. All of the three Chinese nuclear 
companies worked closely with their foreign partners in daily routines, and the high level of 
user involvement is also seen even in turnkey projects. In each project technological experts 
from both sides need to work together to remodel the abstract diagrams, drawings and 
calculations to a set of specific instructions for engineers and workers at the plant site. Cross-
disciplinary knowledge and diverse subsystems make the process a tedious one, which was 
further exacerbated by the need for translating documents from a different language. A 
multitude of documents and human resources are needed to make this happen. In the selection 
of Gen-III reactors, China received over a hundred boxes of tender documents from each bidder, 
all transported by trucks; and some two hundred experts were assigned to evaluate the bids. 
According to a leader of the selection group, after winning the bid Westinghouse transferred 20 
tons of materials, 320 software programs and a huge amount of electronic documents, making 
                                                     
2 According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), China is likely to have the world’s largest nuclear power 
capacity in operation starting from 2030, and probably remains the number one for the rest of the century. 
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the Westinghouse deal the largest ever in China’s history of technology introduction (Chen and 
Li 2014: 42).  
The interactions between foreign vendors and Chinese recipients are further intensified by 
the need to materialize reactor designs into workable ones according to local conditions. The 
most remarkable fact is that local NPP sites may differ from those in the country where reactors 
come from, and local adaptations are necessary. Any changes in response to local conditions 
may incur overall alternations in the whole system, and therefore demand meticulous 
calculations, argumentations, and even experiments. For instance, modifications had to be made 
in the AP1000 reactor that was originally designed for soft ground to fit the rock mass ground in 
Sanmen and Haiyang (Chen and Li 2014: 51). Any other geological hazards such as earthquake 
and flood as occurred in the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 in Japan also need to be taken 
into consideration. The recipient needs the vendor’s help to make variations due to different 
legal requirements in their countries. In addition to the “grafting” of NPPs onto a local site, the 
two sides need to decide together which equipment should be sourced locally and which from 
overseas, and which suppliers should be chosen. In the process, there are always a wide range of 
issues involved, including those relating to price, lead time, reliability, and most remarkably a 
conflict between the sellers’ aspiration of selling more and the buyers’ need to use locally 
manufactured components.  
Aside from the prolonged process of transplanting existing models into local ones, the long 
product cycle of nuclear power projects makes cross-border cooperation long-lasting. Both 
CGNPC and CNNC have been bound with their nuclear contractors for maintenance as well as 
planned and proposed projects in years or decades to come. A glimpse at the Sino-French 
nuclear cooperation gives us some ideas. Since the negotiations on nuclear cooperation started 
in 1978, the two-way interactions have always been ongoing no matter what particular point of 
time we are looking at. Both sides worked together until the Daya Bay deal was inked in 1985, 
which was connected to the grid in 1994 and followed by a new project at Ling Ao. Before the 
first phase of Ling Ao entered into commercial operation in 2003, the second phase was 
launched to localize the French M310 into CPR-1000. Now they are all in service and more 
units have followed. The loops are protracted as well as continuous. When the nuclear trumpet 
called for advancing from the second to the third generation reactors in the new century, the 
Sino-French league quickly made steps to the new front by introducing EPR into China.  
One particular aspect of the transnational alliances is localization, through which nuclear 
vendors and local recipients consolidate their positions in the market. This is because the 
process is as complex as effortful, and once the efforts are made both sides tend to stay together 
for long. When considering local substitutions, the units of measurements for equipment and 
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components need to be converted to the metric system. In many cases due to the requirement of 
accuracy it is hard to source components and parts approximate to the design. When the 
transnational partners finally manage to do so, things become easier for their future cooperation 
and their relationships tend to be reinforced in the course of time. Again because this involves 
elaborate details, the duration of localization may be further elongated by any improvements or 
upgrades made in the designs, which need to be synchronized in construction. And due to ever-
growing needs for upgrading, such as greater capacity and better safety control, re-innovation 
and redesign involve a higher level of cooperation between the vendors and recipients. In this 
way CGNPC and Areva’s Framatome gradually improved the imported M310 into the local 
CPR-1000. When they moved from the initial collaboration at Daya Bay to Ling Ao, the 
localization rate increased to 30 percent in the first phase and to 50 and 70 percent in the second 
phase. The rate was further raised from 80 percent at Hongyanhe to 85 percent at Ningde, and 
finally to 90 percent at Yangjiang.
3
 It takes around three decades for the progressive localization 
to unfold, and the goal was to forge CPR-1000 into a flagship reactor for China’s NPP array. 
Before its recent merge with CNNC’s CNP-1000, CPR-1000 had been widely deployed for 
domestic use. As of September 2014 six units of CPR-1000 were operating, with 16 units under 
construction (Table 4-1 and Table 4-2). 
Owing to the heterogeneous technologies involved in NPPs and the barriers in technology 
transfer, nuclear recipients tend to rely on international vendors over an extensive period. The 
nature of nuclear technologies determines that reverse engineering is less likely than it is in 
mass-production industries. For complete equipment such as nuclear islands, it is impossible for 
recipients to disassemble them and track down the technical details before they are installed. 
Within the nuclear industry chain, Chinese nuclear companies rely on international Nuclear 
Steam Supply System (NSSS) companies at the midstream, and at the upstream depend on 
equipment suppliers for core technologies that cannot be sourced locally. They all have their 
own research capabilities but for a very long time were not independent designers, and largely 
remained owners and operators at the downstream.
4
 For example, notwithstanding the 
localization progress made in CPR-1000, CGNPC still relies on Areva for intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) and has been restrained from overseas sales, which can only be done with Areva’s 
agreement on a case-by-case basis. Even though both CNNC and CGNPC recently came out 
with their own Gen-III designs, so far their research institutes have yet become recognized 
technology suppliers in the global arena. 
                                                     
3 Localization does not equal indigenization, and localization rate does not necessarily mean the level of indigenous 
capability. Sometimes the parts and components are sourced from local suppliers but the value-added of the projects, 
for instance design and system integration, are still held by others. 
4 Both have their own research capabilities in such research institutes as the Nuclear Power Institute of China (NPIC) 
and the China Nuclear Power Technology Research Institute (CNPRI). 
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Table 4-1 Operating nuclear power plants in China 
Units Type Design 
Net 
capacity 
(MWe) 
Designer 
(Country) 
Operator 
Commercial 
operation 
Daya Bay 1&2 PWR  
French 
M310 
2x944 
Framatome 
(France) 
CGN 1994 
Qinshan Phase I PWR  CNP-300 298 SNERDI (China) CNNC April 1994 
Qinshan Phase II, 1&2 PWR  CNP-600 2x610 NPIC (China) CNNC 2002, 2004 
Qinshan Phase II, 3&4 PWR  CNP-600 2x620 NPIC (China) CNNC 2010, 2012 
Qinshan Phase III, 1&2 PHWR  Candu 6 2x678 AECL (Canada) CNNC 2002, 2003 
Ling Ao Phase I, 1&2 PWR  
French 
M310 
2x938 
Framatome 
(France) 
CGN 2002, 2003 
Ling Ao Phase II, 1&2 PWR  
CPR-1000 
(M310) 
2x1026 
Framatome 
(France) 
CGN 2010, 2011 
Tianwan 1&2 PWR  VVER-1000 2x990 ASE (Russia) CNNC 2007, 2007 
Ningde 1&2 PWR  CPR-1000 2x1020 Areva (France) 
CGN & 
Datang 
2013, 2014 
Ningde 3 PWR CPR-1000 1020 Areva (France) 
CGN & 
Datang 
2015 
Hongyanhe 1&2 PWR  CPR-1000 2x1024 Areva (France) 
CGN & 
CPIC 
2013, 2014 
Hongyanhe 3 PWR CPR-1000 1020 Areva (France) 
CGN & 
CPIC 
2015 
Yangjiang 1&2 PWR  CPR-1000 2x1021 Areva (France) CGN 2014, 2015 
Fangjiashan 1&2 PWR 
CPR-1000 
(M310+) 
2x1020 Areva (France) CNNC 2014, 2015 
Fuqing 1&2 PWR 
CPR-1000 
(M310+) 
2x1020 Areva (France) 
CNNC & 
Huadian 
2014, 2015 
Total: 27 
  
24,196 
MWe    
Source: World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in China (Updated August 2015)”, available at 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China--Nuclear-Power/, accessed on 10 Sep 2015.  
Table 4-2 Nuclear power plants under construction in China 
Plant 
Gross 
Capacity 
(MWe) 
Reactor 
model 
Project control 
Construction 
start 
Operation 
Hongyanhe 4 1119 CPR-1000 CGN & CPIC 8/09 late 2015 
Ningde 4 1089 CPR-1000 CGN & Datang 9/10 early 2016 
Yangjiang 3&4 2x1089 CPR-1000+ CGN 11/10, 11/12 2015, 2017 
Sanmen 1&2 2x1250 AP1000 CNNC 3/09, 12/09 2017, 2017 
Haiyang 1&2 2x1250 AP1000 CPIC 9/09, 6/10 12/2015, 3/2016 
Taishan 1&2 2x1750 EPR CGN 10/09, 4/10 late 2016, 2017 
Shandong Shidaowan 210 HTR-PM Huaneng 12/12 2017 
Fangchenggang 1&2 2x1080 CPR-1000 CGN 7/10, 2011 2015, 2016 
Changjiang 1&2 2x650 CNP-600 CNNC & Huaneng 4/10, 11/10 2015, 12/2015 
Fuqing 3&4 2x1080 
CPR-1000 
(M310+) 
CNNC & Huadian 12/10, 11/12 late 2015, 2017 
Tianwan 3&4 2x1060 
VVER-
1000 
CNNC 12/12, 9/13 2/2016, 3/2017 
Yangjiang 5&6 2x1080 ACPR1000 CGN 9/13, 12/13 2018, 2019 
Hongyanhe 5&6 2x1080 ACPR1000 CGN & CPIC 3/15, 7/15 11/2019, 8/2020 
Shidaowan 1&2 2x1400 CAP1400 SNPTC & Huaneng 5/15, 8/15 12/2019, 2020 
Fuqing 5&6 2x1150 Hualong-1 CNNC & Huadian 5/15, 2015 2019, 2020 
Source: World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in China (Updated August 2015)”, available at 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China--Nuclear-Power/, accessed on 10 Sep 2015.  
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On the other side of the same coin, nuclear vendors also rely on the local partners for 
continuous market access. They are essentially in the same boat with technology recipients, and 
mutual interests propel the business alliances further. When in the early 2000s Chinese firms 
were only confident about making Gen-II+ reactors, nuclear vendors started to promote their 
Gen-III designs. And the procurement of Gen-III technologies set their cooperation into 
reiterative loops that are described before. In the turf war of third generation reactors, the 
competitive bidders were “talking about more than a half-century commitment in a project like 
this—25 years of prior reactor design and engineering expertise, five years of development for 
the new PWRs, and then 40 years of operation by China” (Hibbs, Maclachlan and Dolley 2005). 
Now that China has its own Gen-III designs based on Gen-II plus technologies, a new round of 
enduring cooperation with nuclear vendors started and will not in any sense fade in short-term. 
CNNC now has more units with ASE, CGNPC introduced EPR from Areva’s Framatome, and 
the new entrant SNPTC was created as a technology company to introduce AP1000 from 
Westinghouse. As for Areva, CGNPC was no doubt the ideal partner in forging the way for 
EPR to get into China, which in turn brought greater opportunities for Areva.  
Though to a lesser degree, a similar pattern of mutual benefit is found in the team of CNNC 
and its Russian partner, ASE. The two have maintained an interdependent relationship since 
they started working on the first project at Tianwan in the 1990s. Now they have two units of 
VVER-1000/V-428 reactors in operation, two modified units (specifically for China) under 
construction (Phase II), and four units of VVER-1200/V-491 in plan (Phase III & IV). Through 
experiences of the first phase of Tianwan, CNNC is now able to contribute more to the second 
phase in terms of construction, auxiliary projects and equipment procurement. An OECD report 
shows that CNNC is responsible for about 70% of the project, increasing from 50% in the first 
two units (Sozoniuk 2014).
5
 However, CNNC relies on its Russian partner for the design of 
nuclear islands and supply of the reactors and some related equipment. As the general contractor 
and equipment provider for Tianwan, ASE gained more experience through cooperation with 
China. With regard to V-428, the Chinese version of VVER-1000, ASE took specific Chinese 
requirements into consideration, such as the need for seismic resistance, and made adjustments 
according to local conditions. On top of that, the design ASE created for CNNC also 
incorporated suggestions from IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) expert reviews 
between 1995 and 2005. Compared to the standard V-320, V-428 features the addition of such 
safety measures as double containment, a core catcher, and passive hydrogen recombiners 
                                                     
5 CNNC’s subsidiary Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation (JNPC) is mainly in charge of Tianwan at the Chinese side. 
It was established in 1997 and is mainly responsible for the construction and operation of Tianwan NPP. JNPC 
consists of three shareholders: CNNC (50%), China Power Investment Corporation (30%) and Jiangsu Guoxin Group 
(20%). 
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(Rosatom 2015). Moving toward V-491, the advanced third generation (Gen-III+) reactor, ASE 
expects to develop greater competence through collaboration with Chinese. 
Based on the same logic, SNPTC and Westinghouse entered into an alliance in 2007 for 
their long-term common interests. While the domestic user needed advanced designs and local 
adaptations, the nuclear vendor expected to develop global competitiveness through new plant 
builds in overseas markets. The two are a perfect match in the sense that SNPTC was naturally 
attracted to Gen-III technology and Westinghouse was eager to promote its “most advanced, yet 
proven” AP1000. To challenge the Gen-II reactors, SNPTC is dedicated to indigenizing and 
standardizing AP1000, which allegedly has a higher safety level, longer life cycle and improved 
operation attributes than Gen-II reactors. Despite the agreement on overall technology transfer, 
SNPTC needs to cooperate with Westinghouse in the indigenization of AP1000. And as 
discussed earlier, the process is by no means a clear-cut one that can be easily achieved in a 
short period of time. Furthermore, SNPTC also needs technical consulting services from 
Westinghouse in the development of CAP1400, a larger reactor with its own know-how. As for 
Westinghouse, winning an international deal is essential since its home country is no longer 
engaged in infrastructure expansion, and “developing a presence in China” that is integrated into 
global operations helps enhance its capabilities (Metzler and Steinfeld 2013). Amid a declining 
performance over the years, Westinghouse was afraid of not being able to find a buyer for its 
new model. Given that China was willing to be the first one to try the new model, Westinghouse 
would be happy to see AP1000 installed without operation track record anywhere else. The key 
consideration was that it found a home as big as China for AP1000 to flourish.  
The joint force of SNPTC and Westinghouse became a challenge to the CGNPC-Areva and 
CNNC-ASE alliances in the industry. They worked together trying to make AP1000 the basis 
for China’s move to Gen-III technology, aiming to elbow out the prevailing Gen-II reactors and 
unify China’s nuclear industry. By October 2014, there were four units under construction at 
Sanmen and Haiyang, eight more planned but delayed post-Fukushima, and a lot more proposed 
to follow (WNA 2015a). Through Sanmen and Haiyang, SNPTC and Westinghouse focus on 
the joint development of CAP-1400, a local standardization of AP1000, with two demonstration 
units planned at Shidaowan. This is a larger model for which SNPTC will own the intellectual 
property rights and that will be used for large-scale deployment. Apart from being committed to 
domestic markets, they also went into agreement to expand their partnership in third-country 
overseas projects, which was meant to “establish a mutually beneficial and complementary 
partnership” (WNA 2015a).  
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3.2 Political economic power of the transnational teams 
Aside from strategic interdependence, another attribute the cross-border coalitions share in 
common is the political clout derived from the positions in their own countries. Growing out of 
government initiatives, Chinese nuclear giants are all now centrally administered enterprise 
groups with a bureaucratic background. CNNC came from a military industry family called the 
Second Ministry of Machine Building (Second MMB, “er ji bu”), which oversaw the nuclear 
industry and has a glorious history of making “Two Bombs and One Satellite”.6 With 45% 
owned by the Guangdong province when created, CGNPC largely represented the interests of 
the powerful provincial government before it was put under the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council in 2003. As for SNPTC, it has 
its origin in the macroeconomic management agency, namely the State Planning Commission 
(SPC, “ji wei”), and was set up by the State Council. Despite being a technology company, 
SNPTC extended its business downward through merger with China Power Investment 
Corporation (CPIC), one of the five largest electricity producers. In terms of featured reactors, 
the three state conglomerates divide up the Chinese nuclear market, all with their own political 
resources drawn from the center.
7
 
The three Chinese nuclear groups’ foreign suppliers are all global leaders in the design of 
nuclear reactors or the engineering of NPPs. And they all enjoy political clout thanks to the 
significant roles they play in their local economies. Russia’s nuclear power export is 
monopolized by ASE, which is a part of Rosatom, the state corporation overseeing the country’s 
nuclear industry and the only vendor in the world able to offer the industry’s entire range of 
products and services (Ernst & Young 2012).
8
 China’s old friend Areva, the world’s largest 
nuclear energy group, is a French government-owned nuclear behemoth with over 45,000 
employees (Areva 2014). Apart from government ownership, it derives political power from its 
predominant role in France’s number one position in nuclear equipment export, with almost six 
billion Euros in exports each year (Thomas 2014). In addition, Areva designed all French 
reactors in the industry, which provide about 75 percent of electricity for France and made the 
country the world’s largest net exporter of electricity (WNA 2015b). With regard to 
                                                     
6 These refer to the successful independent development of atomic and hydrogen bombs, which were regarded as the 
spiritual monument of self-sufficiency, national cohesion and patriotism. Under the conditions of serious external 
threats, weak industrial base and backward economy back in the 1960s, China was forced to develop atomic and 
hydrogen bombs on its own. The Sino-Soviet split and the termination of technological assistance in the critical 
moment taught the Chinese not to rely on others. So “Two Bombs and One Satellite” represented a great achievement 
for the whole nation and have been cited by the following generations of nationalists.  
7 One notable thing is that SNPTC is a technological company that normally does not take part in the ownership and 
operation of NPPs. In terms of ownership and operation, CNNC and CGNPC share the market with other five big 
power generation companies corporatized from the Ministry of Electric Power (later State Power Corporation of 
China). 
8 Atomstroyexport (ASE) belongs to Atomenergoprom, a subsidiary of Rosatom. Another subsidiary of Rosatom, 
Gidropress mainly focuses on reactor plant designs. 
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Westinghouse, an American-based, Japanese-owned (acquired by Toshiba in 2007 from British 
Nuclear Fuels, which had acquired the nuclear assets of the US Westinghouse Electric Company 
in 1999) nuclear power company, it is a world-leading supplier of NPP products and 
technologies. It led a nuclear consortium to supply the world’s first PWR in 1957 and its 
technology is the basis for approximately one-half of the world's operating nuclear plants, 
including those developed by Areva (PR Newswire 2007). 
Granted the remarkable positions of nuclear power players, cross-national new power 
partnerships normally have political implications for diplomatic relations. The cooperation of 
CNNC and ASE is a case in point. Only taking a minor share of the Chinese market, VVER 
reactors actually speak for the strategic energy relationship between China and Russia. With the 
state-level cooperation as their backbones, CNNC and ASE managed to secure a small share of 
the cake when transnational coalitions were competing for the crown of the base model for 
China’s national nuclear power program. It is hard to say that VVER won the battle, but at least 
it received more orders and injected new blood to the energy relationship between the two 
countries. Similarly, out of the consideration of balancing diplomatic relations with nuclear 
energy powers Areva’s EPR was entitled entry into China in cooperation with CGNPC. With 
regard to the selection of Westinghouse’s AP1000, political interests were also in work on top 
of other considerations such as technology, security, and industrial interests.  
4. Coalitional lobbying in the first two decades 
Chinese nuclear giants pair up with their foreign partners to facilitate their business expansion in 
the Chinese market. Since the green light for a nuclear power project means straightforward 
access to the market, the central decision on project approvals is directly linked to business 
interests. Over the past three decades, the selection of reactor models in China has often been 
accompanied by struggles between competing transnational coalitions. The wrestles culminated 
when the central government decided to embark on a nationwide nuclear power expansion 
entering the new Millennium. Similar to technology standards in other industries, the central 
decision on technology unification to a particular reactor design means officially setting up a 
business kingdom for the transnational coalition promoting the design. This triggered greater 
political activism of transnational coalitions in national nuclear policymaking, which was 
repeatedly hijacked for business purposes.  
Drawing their strength from internal and external sources, Sino-foreign coalitions have been 
engaged in having their reactors, either imported or localized, to be deployed in China. The 
battlefront was once largely between the CGNPC and the CNNC consortiums respectively with 
their foreign nuclear vendors. Derived from the Guangdong provincial government, CGNPC 
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benefits from a relatively high degree of autonomy that Guangdong enjoys from the center to 
pursue a market-oriented approach to reform. And with the help of government agencies in 
charge of power supply and civilian machineries, the Guangdong government managed to push 
through the cooperation with French company Framatome, which later evolved into the 
CGNPC-Areva coalition that persists and thrives to the present. Another lineage traces back to 
the ministry responsible for defense industries and later the Ministry of Nuclear Industry (MNI), 
which was later corporatized into the CNNC. Despite its military origin and hence a determined 
nationalist, the CNNC had to learn from foreign nuclear reactors to develop its own designs and 
established business partnership with Russian and Canadian nuclear vendors. 
4.1 Sino-French nuclear energy cooperation 
Coalitional lobbying of the rival camps has permeated each one of the three rounds of 
technology selection in Chinese nuclear energy development. The first round of import is 
characterized by the Daya Bay project, a direct outcome of the Sino-French joint efforts in 
nuclear power generation. When China’s interests in nuclear energy became known to the world, 
the French approached China for the sale of a complete NPP project with two units of M310. In 
January 1978, French Premier Raymond Barre visited China, and the chairmen of two large 
French companies providing NPP solutions, Alsthom (now Alstom) and Creusot-Loire 
(Framatome’s parent company) were also in the team (Fountain 1979: 38). This trip ignited the 
enthusiasm for French reactors in the opening-up China, particularly in Guangdong. Blessed 
with a gift of “maverick” ideas and the propensity to take bold actions, Guangdong provincial 
government responded immediately to seek support from reformists at the center and promote 
the turnkey project in its territory (Zheng 2007: 237-8). In addition to the aspiration of leading 
China’s great transformation toward the use of foreign capital and technologies, Guangdong 
was also motivated by such goals as to ease power shortages and to inject new blood into the 
local economy. In the late 1970s, government officials from Guangdong made frequent trips to 
Beijing to lobby for greater local autonomy in decision-making and at the same time also 
fervently for the NPP project at Daya Bay (Xu 2010).  
Guangdong’s passion met with the activism of ministerial agencies favoring the import of 
nuclear reactors, mainly those in charge of power supply and civilian machineries. At that time, 
nuclear energy was under the authority of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power 
(MWREP), which vigorously proposed to replace the self-reliant project at Qinshan with a 
turnkey project using French reactors. The prevailing concern was that Qinshan was not 
economically viable compared to hydro and thermal power plants, and some expressed the view 
that they “were impatient with the domestically developed technology to meet the rising 
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demand” (Xu 2010: 27). Similarly, the First Ministry of Machine Industry (First MMI) argued 
that it was meaningless to continue working on Qinshan when advanced reactors with greater 
capacity were readily available through import. In the same year that an agreement between 
Guangdong and Hong Kong was inked to finance the whole plant import project at Daya Bay,
9
 
the MWREP immediately sent a working team to Guangdong to discuss the specifics of 
carrying out the plan. 
Externally, nuclear vendors and governments from Europe, especially France and Britain, 
stepped up the effort in making the NPP deal happen. After China experienced a cooling-off 
period due to finance and especially safety concerns after the Three Mile nuclear accident, 
French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing made a trip to Beijing in October 1980 and pressed 
hard for the sale of two nuclear islands by Framatome and engineering support by Électricité de 
France (EDF), a French electric utility company largely owned by the French government. From 
then on, Daya Bay became the focus of Sino-French negotiations. At the same time, a British 
company, General Electric Company (GEC), was also involved in the negotiations for the 
supply of two conventional islands. As Guangdong had been in discussion with a utility 
company in Hong Kong (then under the British colony control) for funding solutions, the British 
government also tried every effort to get GEC into the deal out of such considerations as 
economic benefits as well as control over Hong Kong. Finally in 1983, France and Britain 
respectively secured contracts from China regarding the supply of reactors and turbine 
generators for Daya Bay (Xu 2010: 43-44). 
4.2 The proliferation of Sino-foreign coalitions 
China’s second round of nuclear reactor import started in the early 1990s, which was featured 
by a greater degree of foreign participation. There was a few years’ suspension for new projects 
due to the west’s diplomatic and economic sanctions in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen 
incident. When the ongoing NPP builds were about to finish and the external environment 
gradually brightened up, China’s nuclear energy industry witnessed a boom of NPP project 
approvals. During this period, the Sino-French cooperation at Daya Bay further developed into 
the CGNPC-Framatome alliance (now CGNPC-Areva) to consolidate its position in the market 
through localization. Another highlight of the period is the official authorization of two more 
whole plant imports respectively from Russia and Canada. With executive functions and 
strategic considerations on its shoulders, CNNC continued the negotiations with Russians and 
Canadians that the MNI started in the early 1980s. Even though CNNC’s collaboration with 
                                                     
9 In 1979, the Guangdong Electric Power Company started negotiations with the China Light Power Co., Ltd in Hong 
Kong on forming a joint venture and they quickly came to an agreement. The idea was to build a NPP in Guangdong 
using foreign capital and repay the debt with the earnings of selling electricity to Hong Kong, which suffered from 
severe energy scarcity and was constrained by its small size to develop power generation projects (Wang 2011a). 
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foreign vendors was not so much related to business interests as to ministerial responsibilities, it 
later developed into a type of business partnership similar to the CGNPC-Framatome coalition.  
The Sino-French nuclear energy cooperation went further in the time of crises, which as a 
result strengthened bilateral economic relations. One significant case was Ling Ao, through 
which the two worked together to tide over one of the most difficult times. When China was in 
near diplomatic isolation, France still saw “China as a long-term partner” and would “reassure 
China that it will continue to have access” to nuclear equipment for a second nuclear plant 
(Hibbs 1991). The promise materialized into Ling Ao in January 1995. As a duplicate of Daya 
Bay, it became the second turnkey project in cooperation with the French company Framatome 
and the British GEC. This time CGNPC was created in 1994 for the commercial operation of 
Daya Bay when it was put into service, and also for the construction of follow-up projects 
including Ling Ao. The deal was signed at a time when Framatome almost ran out of business 
due to the global drought in nuclear contracts (Xu 2010: 59). As the Framatome chief put it, 
thanks to the deal the French nuclear industry found “a new reason to live” (MacLachlan 1995a). 
The French industry minister also acknowledged that the contract not only recognized “the 
French nuclear industry’s success” but also marked “a renewal and reinforcement of economic 
cooperation between China and France” (MacLachlan 1995b). 
When the Sino-French affinity was growing in the industry, a separate initiative between 
CNNC and the Russian firm Atomstroyexport (ASE) came onto the stage. Starved of orders 
since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, ASE was eager to sell nuclear reactors to China.  Among the 
earliest to approach China in the 1980s, it could not go further until the Sino-Russian tension 
eased in the early 1990s. Seeing the opportunity, ASE managed to integrate the proposed deal 
into a broader cooperative framework and a warming relationship between China and Russia. 
The deal was packaged into a bond between the two countries, which provided the ailing 
Russian industries a way to survive amid the economic meltdown, and brought China an ally 
when China was in desperate need of one facing the hostile external environment. While China 
found that establishing “a strong partnership with the Soviet Union was politically and 
diplomatically important” (Xu 2010: 56), the Russian Federation regarded the deal as a lucrative 
incentive to rebuild the relationship. On his first official visit to China in 1992, President Boris 
Yeltsin signed a joint statement and memoranda of understanding on techno-economic 
cooperation across a wide range of areas, including selling two VVER-1000 PWRs to China 
(Hibbs 1992). This NPP deal located in Tianwan was the largest project in the comprehensive 
agreement, which actually lifted the curtain on Sino-Russian energy cooperation in recent two 
decades. 
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The Sino-Russian agreement also indicated the formation of a new business partnership 
between CNNC and ASE. When ASE resumed the negotiations with China in the 1990s, CNNC 
as the successor of MNI naturally took up the responsibility of working together with it to 
implement the Tianwan project. On the one hand, CNNC inherited bureaucratic functions from 
MNI, the former body in charge of nuclear industry, and continued to act as the official contact 
for foreign nuclear suppliers, including ASE. On the other hand, it had business interests and the 
need to make a living through the operation of NPPs. With only one small NPP trial-running in 
Qinshan since 1991, it needed revenues from large commercial projects to cover its loss. Since 
no additional small trial project was allowed and the second Phase of Qinshan was stalled due to 
the sudden withdrawal of German participation, opening arms to Russians would be a 
reasonable choice. The Janus-faced nature of CNNC decided that its partnership with ASE was 
as politically right as economically beneficial. In addition, CNNC at that time also suffered a 
setback in its negotiations with Kraftwerk Union (KWU) on Qinshan Phase II due to worsening 
diplomatic relations with Germany. 
Bearing diplomatic meanings, the CNNC-ASE cooperation nevertheless saw a business 
rationale behind Tianwan. When Tianwan went into commercial operation in 2007, the Chinese 
side claimed that “we have fulfilled a political and diplomatic mission”, whereas the Russian 
CEO commented that “Tianwan nuclear power station is fully justified as the crystallization of 
friendship and cooperation” (Shmatko 2007; Zhang 2007). At the national level, it became an 
integral part of the Sino-Russian relationship based on energy resources in consideration of their 
mutual geopolitical and strategic interests, particularly the supply of uranium, oil and natural 
gas. However at the industry level, the transnational partnership turned into a powerful interest 
group in China’s nuclear energy policymaking, which in the next stage centered on the selection 
of third generation reactors. 
Similar to the cooperation with ASE, CNNC started its relationship with the Atomic Energy 
of Canada Limited (AECL) when the international environment became less hostile against 
China. Following in the footsteps of French and Russian vendors, AECL resumed serious talks 
with CNNC in 1992 on the sale of two Candu reactors regardless of the opposition by the 
United States amid the embargo. The third phase of Qinshan came into being as a result of the 
rekindled NPP cooperation between China and Canada. Within Canada, AECL countered 
questioning about the government subsidies it received by citing the pending sale as a two 
billion dollar deal and “the equivalent of 12,500 jobs over six years”; and it managed to ramp up 
support of the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, from whom the deal received “intense 
promotion” (McCarthy 1994). As for CNNC, there was no reason to reject the deal in view of 
the financial arrangements that the Canadian side promised to make (Hibbs 1996). Moreover, 
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the project was also one that China needed. Aside from the need for more friends in the 
international community and a reboot of the national economy, the country was also hastening 
installed capacity to address the critical electricity shortage that seriously threatened its 
economic growth. Therefore, unlike the first two phases using domestic reactors, Qinshan phase 
III became a third whole plant import project. 
5. The intensification of coalitional lobbying since 2003 
The Sino-American coalition went onto the stage at a time when Beijing felt the need to actively 
promote a nuclear power expansion nationwide but was troubled by the disputes over 
technology selection. It stemmed from a consensus in the nuclear community especially at the 
end of the 1990s that a standardized nuclear reactor based on a particular platform should be 
developed for future deployment. According to a report conducted by the Development 
Research Center (DRC) of the State Council, a unified technology route is necessary for the 
sake of cost and safety management.
10
 While this is a rational choice for the central government, 
it is hard to carry out because neither the CNNC nor the CGNPC would take that step back and 
give way to the other. When CNNC made every effort to promote its CNP-1000, which it had 
worked on since the early 1990s, CGNPC insisted that its CPR-1000, an upgraded version of the 
French M310, should be chosen. In the beginning, Beijing intended to support the indigenous 
CNP-1000 but this was not what CGNPC wanted. For Beijing, both policy coalitions were 
established and hard to be reconciled. However, the clock was ticking and the decision had to be 
made due to a severe shortage of power supply and long-term planning for sustainable 
development. 
Against this background, the advocates of Gen-III reactors quickly took the high ground 
amid CNNC and CGNPC’s fight over the future base model. There was a group of nuclear 
scientists and engineers that had long been interested in American nuclear energy technologies 
but did not have the chance due to a variety of reasons. They started their contact with 
Westinghouse for technology cooperation in the early 1980s and had since long been the major 
force of convincing the government to buy from it. At the same time, Westinghouse had never 
ceased the effort to sell its reactors to China but the deal had been put on hold for almost 13 
years because of the US government’s concerns over nuclear proliferation. It was reported that 
China approached the United States and negotiated with every administration since the Reagan 
presidency but the deal had not passed the congressional review (Xu 2010: 144-5). Both sides 
had lobbied vigorously to implement the deal through the years especially after the ban was 
                                                     
10 A meeting was convened with the presence of CNNC, CGNPC, BINE, Ministry of Machinery and SPCC to discuss 
the issue on a standardized commercial power reactor. The meeting was meant to pool the resources to work toward 
the goal. 
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finally lifted by the Clinton government in 1998. Since the external block was already cleared 
and Beijing had a headache with the inability to resolve the internal disputes, the stake of 
turning to Westinghouse’s reactors increased.  
The two-decade long futile efforts between Chinese nuclear experts and Westinghouse saw 
the prospect of a solution after the inception of the Hu-Wen government in 2003. The new 
administration was earnest to fulfil the ambition of becoming a future nuclear energy 
powerhouse by adopting “the most advanced technology in the world” and “achieve technology 
standardization”. One important instruction was that this should be done regardless of the 
connections to Beijing, indicating the central determination to bypass the powerful domestic-
foreign coalitions led respectively by CNNC and CGNPC. Later in the same year, six nuclear 
energy experts from the import camp signed a petition to the State Council in support of foreign 
advanced third generation technologies.
11
 There were two of them with a background in the SPC 
system, mainly the Ministry of Machinery Industry, and two of them working in the National 
Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA). Later the six experts, known as “the six gentlemen of 
import” or “the third generation club”, became preparatory group members of the SNPTC, 
which oversaw the assessment and selection of third-generation reactors.  
5.1 Lobbying by the import camp and Sino-American collaboration 
Nuclear energy experts represented by the “six gentlemen” brought forward nuclear energy 
safety to justify the need to import third generation technologies. Many of them believed that 
the second generation reactors operating in China did not rival the most advanced reactors in the 
world, and that China failed to compete with other countries in nuclear energy technologies and 
lagged behind not only the industry leaders, but also late-comers such as South Korea. 
According to Yu Zusheng, a nuclear expert in SNPTC and NNSA as well as one of the “six 
gentlemen”, the gap between China and those established nuclear powers is like the difference 
“between primary school students and PhD candidates” (Ma et al. 2011). The indigenously 
developed second generation reactor was regarded as “not coming up with the international 
nuclear safety standards” (Wang and Li 2005). This is also why CNNC’s CNP-1000, a second 
generation plus reactor upgraded from CNP-600, did not pass the safety review by the NNSA. 
Another SNPTC expert that used to work in the First MMI, SPC and later NDRC believed that 
CNP-600, the domestic reactor modelled after Areva’s M310, was not qualified as a “base 
model” due to the risks in incident prevention and fireproof design (Tang 2003).  
                                                     
11 The six gentlemen are Tang Zide (used to work for the first MMI and SPC), Xu Lianyi (used to work for the first 
MMI), Lin Chengge (used to work in China Institute of Atomic Energy, NNSA, and International Atomic Energy 
Agency), Yu Zusheng (NNSA), Jin Jusun, and Xia Guojun. 
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The technology rationality of nuclear experts was complicated by departmental interests, in 
which the SPC system favored imports. On the surface was the disapproval of home-grown 
reactors, but behind the scene was a grudge that the electric power family (dian li kou) held 
against the military industry family (neng yuan kou) in the controlling rights of the sector. This 
is well known as a “cognitive difference” between the two systems.12 Looking back, the sector 
used to be under the authority of agencies in charge of energy, electric power, and civilian 
machineries (MWREP and the First MMI in the SPC system) but fell in the hands of military 
production (MNI) from 1986-1988.
13
 Since then the electric power system had largely been 
excluded from participation in the industry, and power generation companies were not allowed 
to enter the NPP market until 2007. Therefore, technology standardization became a long-
awaited opportunity for the electric power family to stand up and win the decades-long political 
struggles within the sector.  
The SPC’s criticism of second generation reactors mainly pointed to CNNC’s failure in the 
formation of indigenous technology capability. It was believed that China’s backwardness in 
nuclear energy technology was attributed to CNNC and its predecessor MNI. According to the 
“six gentlemen”, it was the “detour” into the military industry system that led nuclear power 
away from growing into a strong national industry. According to a book written by Tang Zide, 
the “mistaken step” when the sector was stripped from the MWREP to MNI in 1986 triggered a 
self-reinforcing vicious cycle in which the sector was delinked from the electric power market 
(Tang 2007). The argument was that under the jurisdiction of defense production, the sector 
“wrongly” embarked on an independent path—symbolized by CNP-300 at Qinshan—when 
MNI was not in a position to do so. According to Yu Zusheng, at that time trying to develop 
nuclear reactors mainly relying on domestic resources equaled to expecting “the Monkey King 
jumping out of stone”, meaning that miracles would not happen out of nothing (Ma et al. 2011). 
And that was why the sector kept missing the opportunity of “standing on the shoulder of 
nuclear power giants” (Ma et al. 2011). As one of the fiercest critics among the “six gentlemen”, 
Tang Zide argued that the localization of imported reactors CNNC boasted about was not the 
development of indigenous technology capability in the real sense, and its CNP-600 was simply 
an awkward imitation of the French M310. In their words, the CNP series were actually reactors 
relying on “foreign crutches” (Ma et al. 2011).  
                                                     
12 Interview no. BJ171013, a former employee of CNNC, Beijing, 17 Oct 2013. 
13 There was a failed attempt to accommodate the opposition with the creation of the Ministry of Energy (MOE), 
which was dissolved in 1993 due to the bickering group interests. With a transitory return to the SPC in 1996, nuclear 
power was reassigned to the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) 
during a massive reorganization of the Chinese defense industry in 1998. Later there were efforts to recentralize 
energy policymaking. In the new century, the efforts include the National Energy Leading Group in 2005, the 
establishment of the National Energy Administration (NEA), a vice-ministerial body of the NDRC in 2008, and the 
National Energy Commission (NEC) directly led by the State Council in 2010. 
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Given the perceived incapability of CNNC, the import camp argued that the best alternative 
was to introduce foreign advanced technologies. For them, the fundamental problem in the 
sector was the military legacy that CNNC carried along from its predecessors, the Second MMB 
and the MNI. According to Tang Zide, overlooking the “energy nature” of nuclear power and 
the difference between civilian and military applications of nuclear technology was the reason 
why the sector went astray and kept falling behind. Unlike strategic defense industries that were 
expected to be developed at all costs, the commercial nature of the sector determined that it 
should be developed profitably. When domestic technologies failed to meet the rising demand in 
electric power, reactors should be developed through cooperation with international vendors. In 
their view, imports would save the sector from the inefficiency and incompetence of the defense 
production system represented by CNNC. The integrationists lobbied the central government to 
set up a new SOE to undertake the task and lead China’s nuclear energy expansion.  
The proposition played right into Beijing’s hand because of the need to fulfil the ambitious 
goal of nuclear energy development. For Beijing, it was a stone killing two birds: the use of 
Westinghouse’s technologies made the prospects of the sector brighter than the original plan for 
second generation reactors, and the “six gentlemen’s” suggestion of establishing a new 
company was expected to resolve the conflicts between CNNC and CGNPC. As an NNSA high 
official said to describe the rationale behind the decision, “since both of the two sons are not 
submissive and fighting for their own interests, it is necessary to have another one” (Ma et al. 
2011). It seemed that an integrationist approach through high-level intervention would provide a 
solution to the quarrels over reactor models, which were actually the fight over the leading 
position of the sector. In September 2004, the new NDRC restructured out of the State 
Development Planning Commission (SDPC, previously SPC) put two NPP projects originally 
planned to use the second generation reactors into international bidding for reactors pioneering 
third-generation PWR technologies. The decision was apparently one in favor of foreign 
reactors because at that time the best China could do was CNP-1000, which Beijing was not 
confident about. Canadian Candu was ruled out because it is not PWR. At the end, lobbying by 
the import camp crystalized into a new transnational coalition between SNPTC and 
Westinghouse through the introduction of AP1000. 
5.2 A three-way contest among transnational coalitions 
At the international level, the activism of the Americans met competition from the French and 
Russians for China’s mammoth nuclear power contract. Within China, the technology 
rationality of nuclear experts coupling the integrationist value of the electricity family caught 
CNNC and CGNPC on the defensive. After Beijing announced the plan of building a national 
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NPP fleet based on Gen-III reactors, Chinese buyers and international vendors quickly 
assembled to maintain their footholds in China. While CNNC and CGNPC turned their 
internecine conflict into an alliance against SNPTC, Westinghouse (AP1000) entered a fierce 
battle with Areva (EPR) and ASE (VVER-1000). As for the vendors, all had received support 
from their governments and a procession of political leaders from their home countries had 
pressed China before the decision was made in December 2006. International political factors 
further complicated the issue, in particular Toshiba’s purchase of Westinghouse and its impact 
on the decision considering a strained Sino-Japan relationship. Internally, the import camp that 
had been interested in American nuclear technologies became the preparatory body of SNPTC. 
With the preparatory body appointed as the bid selection committee, Westinghouse’s AP1000 
finally won out, but soon after that CGNPC and CNNC’s longstanding partners Areva and ASE 
also received orders from China. 
Within China, SNPTC pioneers’ attempt to determine China’s future nuclear technology 
posed a threat to CNNC’s inherited authority over the industry and its market position. First of 
all, the bid evaluation group that later became SNPTC was expected to be a central initiative 
prevailing over CNNC and CGNPC, even though all are centrally owned by SASAC. A second 
aspect is that the proposal to import whole plant from a different foreign vendor to form China’s 
nuclear technology basis would elbow CNNC’s CNP-1000 and CGNPC’s CPR-1000 out of the 
market. As a result, the power struggle for turf originally between CNNC and CGNPC turned 
into the two’s united crusade against the import proposal. They were unanimous in their concern 
that China would become a “proving ground” of Gen-III reactors since there was still not even 
one of such nuclear plants operating in the world.
14
 In particular, CNNC challenged SNPTC’s 
autonomy in guiding central decision-making and vied for control over the projects under 
bidding, originally at Sanmen and Yangjiang. It proposed to Chinese leaders that Chinese 
design institutes, all under CNNC at that time, should take a dominant role in the work of the 
two plants, and foreign vendors only supply partial systems or specific components (Hibbs, 
Weil and MacLachlan 2006). This is definitely not what SNPTC wanted, to start a whole new 
platform through the procurement of complete nuclear islands.  
The rivalry was no less fierce in the global arena. Three vendors were shortlisted: 
Westinghouse, Areva and ASE.
15
 Among the three finalists, ASE appeared to be at a 
disadvantage but derived its confidence mainly from the strategic energy relationship between 
Russia and China.
16
 It had been sanguine in seeking to build more units at Tianwan. Areva as 
                                                     
14 Interview no. BJ310812, a Caixin reporter, Beijing, 31 Aug 2012. 
15  CNNC’s Canadian partner AECL was not in the run because its Candu is pressurized heavy water reactors 
(PHWR) but China opted for PWR as the cornerstone of its nuclear energy expansion plan. 
16 Interview no. BJ090812, researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing, 09 Aug 2012. 
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China’s major nuclear technology provider became Westinghouse’s archrival in the contest for 
the multi-billion dollar contract. Both Westinghouse and Areva promised that if they won the 
bid, they would allow Chinese engineers to be involved in largely every step of the projects and 
help local companies to manufacture many of the parts in the future (Ortolani 2005). While 
Areva, the then Framatome cited “a long history of cooperation” with Chinese design institutes 
and manufacturers, Westinghouse tried to demonstrate that it would become “a dependable 
partner” in China (Nucleonics Week 2005). Hyping up its track record of technology transfer, 
Westinghouse wanted to convince the Chinese of its sincerity in helping build a nuclear-reactor 
program in China as it did in France and South Korea. To send out a clearer message to China, 
it agreed to share detailed engineering details with Chinese design institutes.  
Along with the tournament among reactor vendors, a very heavy-handed engagement by 
supporting governments characterizes the competition. When Westinghouse, Areva and ASE 
filed bids on 28 February 2005, leaders from the three countries started lobbying China on 
behalf of their nuclear companies. It was reported that there was “a yo-yo movement since the 
bids were submitted, often in parallel with official visits by Chinese leaders to the US or France, 
or by Western leaders to China” (MacLachlan and Hibbs 2006). The White House was solidly 
behind Westinghouse. After Beijing announced the decision to call for international bidding, US 
Vice President Cheney and Energy Secretary reached Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong 
for formal talks addressing energy issues, including clean energy technologies. Later the Bush 
administration promoted the potential deal by linking it to the trade discussions with China. At 
that time, US pressed China hard to correct the trade imbalance between the two countries, and 
saw the AP1000 deal a golden opportunity to achieve the goal. The Westinghouse CEO Stephen 
Tritch had been a member of the trade delegation to China led by the US Secretary of 
Commerce Carlos Gutierrez. French President Jacques Chirac also lobbied for Areva during a 
visit to Beijing, warning that it would be risky for China to award the projects to Westinghouse 
because it had not built any nuclear plants for many years and its AP1000 existed “only on 
paper” (Sergeyev 2006).  
A confluence of interest across the border gradually took shape as a result of internal 
struggles and external contest.  On the one hand, the import faction led by NDRC and the 
evaluation group needed to maintain its control over the decisions, which was under threat 
because of CNNC’s request for limiting foreign participation. On the other hand, in order to 
make its way into China Westinghouse entered into negotiations with Chinese planners and the 
preparatory office of SNPTC, the organization reviewing and assessing the bid applications. For 
the selection committee and Westinghouse, CNNC became a common roadblock to achieve 
their goals. There are two reasons that they had to deal with CNNC: one is that it would take up 
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roughly half of the planned NPPs once the base reactor was confirmed.
17
 The other is that 
almost all nuclear research institutes in China were under CNNC and foreign bidders had to 
cooperate with one of them to win the deal. However, the Nuclear Power Institute of China 
(NPIC), CNNC’s design arm for CNP-600 and CNP-1000, had not been optimistic about whole 
plant import. According to a director of NPIC, history tells that core technologies could not be 
acquired through turnkey projects, and the design packages from foreign vendors are normally 
“black boxes” with essential features concealed (Wang 2006a: 29).  
Facing common obstructions within China, Westinghouse and the Chinese nuclear experts 
supporting import stood together to push the course through. The evaluation group made of the 
“six gentlemen” and some other scientists and engineers from CNNC, CGNPC and academia 
only had eyes for AP1000 and repeatedly praised the passive safety systems and other features 
of the design. However, at that time Westinghouse was at a disadvantage when its controlling 
shareholder, British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) announced that it was going to sell 
Westinghouse. To make it more appealing to the Chinese, Westinghouse sent the “Father of 
AP1000” Howard Bruschi to China for “a strategic partnership” (Li and Zhu 2011). He stressed 
“complementarities” between the two sides, that China’s strength in skilled personnel, 
manufacturing and construction was a perfect complement to the American design. The 
statement indicates that the deal was a win-win cooperation in which China would benefit from 
technological upgrading in many sectors. In a report to Beijing, Chen Zhaobo, head of the 
evaluation group, advised that China had greater leverage in negotiations because Westinghouse 
given its financial difficulties was more likely to agree with technology transfer, compared to 
Areva in view of its extant market position in China (Li and Zhu 2011).  
At the same time, the Sino-American coalition also needed to deal with the divided 
preferences in CNNC’s design institutes. CNNC once had three design institutes, respectively 
NPIC, China Nuclear Power Engineering Co., Ltd (CNPE) and the Shanghai Nuclear 
Engineering Research and Design Institute (SNERDI). The first two were extensively involved 
in the indigenization of French M310 (CNP-600 and 1000), whereas SNERDI designed CNP-
300, the first home-grown NPP and the first export project to Pakistan. In general, some experts 
particularly from NPIC and CNPE preferred French EPR whereas others mainly from SNERDI 
were in favor of AP1000.
18
 The decision was delayed because of prolonged negotiations with 
local research institutes regarding converting the reactor design from conceptual to workable 
packages. Westinghouse attempted to reach an agreement with NPIC but failed. At that time, 
CNNC’s design institutes including NPIC were promoting the independently developed CNP-
1000 and expecting its approval. Aside from technology transfer as a condition, CNNC 
                                                     
17 Interview no. BJ171013, a former employee of CNNC, Beijing, 17 Oct 2013. 
18 Ibid. 
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requested a domestic content as high as 75% for the projects, which received objections from 
bidders that the local content scope was “too high” and “too risky” for the new advanced models 
(Hibbs and MacLachlan 2005). As a means of appeasing CNNC and the nationalists, 
Westinghouse and senior US officials expressed repeated pledges to transfer nuclear reactor 
technologies to China.  
Aside from technological negotiations, Westinghouse and other nuclear firms also addressed 
diplomatic relations between the two countries. The US nuclear lobbying group led by 
Westinghouse mobilized the US governments for support. In response to the Chinese decision-
makers’ worry over the bilateral relationship in view of the specificity of NPPs, commitments 
were made alongside the Sino-American talks on nuclear energy cooperation, which involved 
the highest reaches of government in both countries. In the end of 2005, US Secretary of State 
Rice coordinated the Department of State, security, defense, commerce, energy, and Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). to sign a joint guarantee that Westinghouse would comply with 
the technology transfer agreement, and the US ensured the continuity of the agreement (Li and 
Zhu 2011).  
When the path was almost cleared within China, the import faction had to overcome a 
further hurdle. As it had support from most nuclear experts within the evaluation group and the 
political concerns were removed, it prepared for further negotiations with the US. In fact early 
in January 2006, almost eleven months before the final decision was made, the group had 
submitted a proposal based on Westinghouse’s bid to the Chinese government.19 However, a 
sudden announcement of the acquisition of Westinghouse by Toshiba in February stranded the 
decision. Because of this Westinghouse took on a Japanese identity. To some nationalists, the 
potential involvement of a Japanese company might bring uncertainties in China’s nuclear 
security. According to an insider, there were concerns that due to the long life cycle of NPPs, 
these projects might be negatively influenced in case the Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated, 
and “it was hard to say that the two countries could maintain a stable and peaceful relationship 
in the long run”.20 The same interviewee also pointed out that because of the complex nature of 
NPPs, it was impossible for Chinese recipients to have an overall technology transfer in a real 
sense, and “the plants in China would become a latent source of nuclear radiance, if not a time 
bomb”. Within CNNC some also warned that the use of AP1000 would strengthen a US-Japan 
alliance that might exercise strategic containment over China’s nuclear energy development.21 
                                                     
19 Interview no. BJ170812, a former researcher at the School of Public Policy & Management, Tsinghua University, 
Beijing, 17 Aug 2012. 
20 Interview  no. BJ160812, researchers at the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), Beijing, 16 
Aug 2012. 
21 Ibid; the concern was mainly based on the ambition of Japanese nuclear firms, which actively unveiled nuclear 
energy business cooperation around the globe. Another most significant move was Hitachi’s announcement of 
cooperation with the American conglomerate General Electric in November 2006. Only a few weeks before that 
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There were reports revealing that the selection committee, referring to the preparatory office of 
SNPTC, was mainly made up of nuclear power technicians and thus did not have a fine sense of 
risk assessment in foreign relations (Suo 2006).  
Westinghouse, its Japanese shareholder, and the US government reacted immediately to 
push the deal through. Westinghouse sent in an urgent letter to SNPTC promising that it would 
continue to follow all commitments it had made for the deal, including full technology transfer. 
Its CEO also claimed that Westinghouse would continue to be a US-operated company and the 
technology would remain in the control of the US government (Wan 2006). The CEO of 
Toshiba wrote in person to Chen Zhaobo that the management of Westinghouse remained 
unchanged and there would be only a vice president from Toshiba residing in the US. And upon 
China’s request the US government issued another affidavit that after the Japanese purchase of 
Westinghouse, its export to China is still under the jurisdiction of the US government (Li and 
Zhu 2011). It is only after that the political concerns in China were largely erased.  
At a time that the Sino-American coalition was going to win, CNNC and CGNPC joined 
hands to market Areva’s EPR. In addition to a traditional affinity between CGNPC and Areva, 
CNNC also has a link with the French company. Like CGNPC’s CPR-1000, its CNP-1000 was 
based on Framatome’s M310. And before CGNPC had its own research institutes, it relied on 
CNNC in its local integration of Areva’s conceptual design, which therefore had a fairly good 
understanding of French technologies. Even though initially the Russian model by ASE was 
preferred because of its competitive price, it was hard for CNNC to push it onto the stage 
because of the failure it showed up. So if CNNC had to make a choice among the three bids, 
EPR would be a better option because it had the same root with CNP-1000 and CPR-1000. 
Within CNNC, in particular NPIC, there was a group of nuclear scientists and engineers in favor 
of French Areva. A CNNC engineer said that if AP1000 was selected, China’s nuclear 
technology accumulated based on M310 would be wiped out because AP1000 was a completely 
different design (Wang 2006b). Areva’s CEO of the China region also cited this as the unique 
advantage if China opted for EPR, which had an “inherited coherence” with China’s own Gen-
III reactor in future. Moreover, he stressed that Areva had already gone through the details of 
indigenizing EPR with Chinese nuclear equipment manufacturers and design institutes.  
The contention between the Sino-French and the Sino-American coalitions became white 
hot in 2006 and espionage was reportedly present in the competition. Revolving around the 
Gen-III bid selection at least three high-level officials from CNNC, CGNPC and another SOE 
fell from power and was put into prison due to disclosure of state secretes to foreign bidders. It 
was reported that they received bribes from a consultant firm, which in return had payment from 
                                                                                                                                                           
Japanese MHI signed MOU with French Areva for partnership in certain areas. It was suspected that the Japanese 
government was behind the ardent global reaches of the industry.  
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some “western and Japanese companies within their scopes of business activities” (Niu 2011). A 
nuclear expert taking part in the selection suspected that the purchase of Westinghouse by 
Toshiba was the direct result of an information leakage about nuclear technology introduction. 
In his opinion, Toshiba decided to buy Westinghouse at a price much higher than other bidders 
is because “someone let out the information that China decided to buy AP1000”, which caused 
the subsequent turmoil surrounding the Japanese nature of Westinghouse (Lin 2014b).
22
 This 
referred to Kang Rixin, the former general manager of CNNC. It seems that when they took part 
in the tender negotiations, the three secret agents worked for the benefits of Areva. Then the 
CEO of China National Technical Imp & Exp Corp. (CNTIC) disclosed the base price in the 
negotiation with Areva. Similarly, Areva’s chief representative in China had been in close 
contacts with Shen Rugang, the deputy general manager of CGNPC that was a member of the 
Chinese delegate to negotiate with Areva and EDF before 2004 (Niu 2011). A report by Agence 
France-Presse (AFP) revealed that the Areva representative was involved in a consultant firm 
suspected of bribing some executives of CGNPC. 
As an outcome of the activism, CNNC and CGNPC were largely excluded from the 
decision-making process at the late stage. This is because at that time joint efforts of the two 
incumbents impeded a final decision at the center. Worn out from the coalitional competition, 
Beijing granted nuclear technicians and technocrats greater power and as a result the evaluation 
group dominated the process. According to the first general manager of the Sanmen project, in 
the beginning nuclear operators had a role in the evaluation and negotiations but gradually were 
removed from the process (Zheng and Zhang 2014). Therefore, the final decision was left in the 
hands of NDRC and the nuclear scientists and engineers from design institutes and universities. 
In October 2006, Zhang Guobao, the deputy director of NDRC, convened a meeting with the 
nuclear energy community and the voting result was AP1000, which was approved by State 
Council in November (Wang 2006b). With the bid evaluation group including the “six 
gentlemen” as its major component, SNPTC was officially established to indigenize AP1000 to 
a standardized Chinese model. The meeting also decided to reassign SNERDI originally under 
CNNC to the newly created SNPTC to augment its research capability.  
Regardless of the defeat their local allies suffered, Areva and ASE did not give up the 
strivings. The most eye-popping thing is that only a few months after AP1000 became the jewel 
of the crown Areva obtained an order from China for two units of EPR to be built at Taishan, 
without bidding and technology transfer. When Areva still held on fast to its principle of 
refusing to sell technology without building a plant, French President Jacques Chirac stated that 
they were “still in the race” to sell Gen-III reactor units to China. On the one hand, Areva’s 
                                                     
22 Aside from Toshiba, the bidders to buy Westinghouse are the leading nuclear firms in the world, including General 
Electronics (GE), Areva, MHI and Hitachi.  
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nuclear-reactor arm did not want to take the risk of creating its own competitor because 
Framatome itself grew out of a Franco-US joint venture with Westinghouse license and later 
became a major challenger to Westinghouse (Gauthier-Villars 2006). As a French executive 
said, “When it comes to technology transfer, there are limits we won't go beyond” (Pogam 2006: 
22). Then after a while it was believed that the above-mentioned cross-border collusion opened 
doors for the French. On the other hand, the French government helped with the deal. Zhang 
Guobao explained that China bought EPR because of “the perseverance of the French and a 
need of balance in diplomatic relations” with US and France; and France helped China a lot in 
the past so China should care for France in this case (Ma 2011). As for the Russian side, ASE 
also managed to expand its business with China and was awarded an order of more units of 
VVER to be installed at Tianwan. It was widely accepted that China’s procurement of Russian 
technology and equipment was mainly out of the consideration of “resource exchange”. It 
followed the rationale of the previous projects at Tianwan, which were embedded in the 
strategic energy cooperation between the two countries. And of course, CNNC is in charge of 
the cooperation with ASE. 
6. Negative business responses to Beijing  
From the three decades of China’s nuclear technology selection it is not hard to see that the 
central government’s efforts of building up a strong indigenous nuclear power industry were 
greatly undermined by transnational interest groups. For each of the three turning points 
centering on technology routes, a confluence of internal and external forces dictated the 
decisions regardless of a nationalist orientation at the center. In the first round, the 
materialization of Daya Bay not only kicked off the decades-long cooperation between CGNPC 
and Framatome, but also created a historical precedent for foreign participation in the industry. 
During the economic renaissance after Tiananmen, technology selection in the nuclear industry 
revolved around the reconstruction of diplomatic relations in an ominous external environment. 
And on the eve of a great nuclear expansion within the country, the selection of Gen-III reactors 
staged a climax of the “grand finale” among the cross-border coalitions. However, the finale did 
not wind up the coalitional competition but rather unveiled a much more persistent and intense 
one with the addition of a new powerful team. Particularly in this most recent contest, no one 
group suffered a defeat but instead each gained a better position than before in the market. 
SNPTC and Westinghouse won a Gold medal in the paired games, CGNPC and Areva earned a 
Silver, and CNNC and ASE got a Bronze. However, when the multinational team players held 
their trophies smiling on the stage, the race organizers in Beijing became fluttered in their heart, 
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contemplating how to accommodate the three teams in one playing field (a standardized nuclear 
power system) in future.  
6.1 Government-business compromises in technology selection 
The constraints of transnational business interests on central decisions are far more extensive 
than traditionally examined within the national border.   Not only did Beijing need to cope with 
the group interests from within, it also had to handle international relations outside, which made 
decision-making even more complicated. Macroeconomic and strategic considerations with 
other countries were intricately involved when foreign firms drummed up support from their 
home governments, which was always the case. And this is particularly true when there were 
more than one foreign teams canvassing at the same time. Due to the stickiness of nuclear 
technology cooperation, oligarchic competitions within the country gradually translated into 
coalitional struggles across borders. As a result, Beijing’s attempt to create “national champions” 
turned into the nurturance of “multinational teams” and “global partners”. After the 2007 
grappling, China’s nuclear industry became a battlefield of the three cross-border alliances. It 
was believed that the polarization of the “three kingdoms” would be a serious impediment to 
gather China’s nuclear R&D strength in building a national industry steered by national firms 
with independent technology capabilities.
23
  
From the previous experience of Beijing, it had a hard time to break the curse of domestic-
foreign leagues, which tied up its hands in technology unification. It met resistance because no 
one wanted to give up their own models that they had developed or collaboratively worked on 
with their foreign partners over the years. Due to their bureaucratic background and 
oligopolistic power, the central SOEs have strong political and economic clout to intervene in 
the agenda and drive the trajectory further from a unified and indigenous one. Being in the line 
of military descent CNNC can be seen as a commercial incarnation of the self-reliance spirit, 
but even the determined nationalist used Russian and Canadian reactors, and learned from the 
French in reactor design. CGNPC, mainly an offspring of the Guangdong provincial 
government, inherits an “open mind” from its local authority: it has forged a close tie with its 
French partner Framatome, now under Areva, and actively promoted the models designed by 
Areva since 1980s. Areva to CGNPC is what water is to fish, and CGNPC’s challenge of 
CNNC in the standardized reactor design put Beijing in a dilemma.  
Since both were unyielding to one another, Beijing had to form a new united front out of the 
scope of the two incumbents. This is where a bid evaluation committee was brought in to select 
a different international nuclear vendor. Beijing meant to rein in the internal defiance by 
                                                     
23 Interview no. BJ070912, researchers at the Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology, Tsinghua University, 
Beijing, 07 Sep 2012. 
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borrowing more external forces. When Westinghouse was confirmed in 2006 as the technology 
roadmap and SNPTC was delegated to the indigenization of AP1000, the two forged a new 
alliance that became a powerful challenge to the two existing ones. Even though SNPTC was 
created into a position of commanding future technology, it has been actively seeking to 
penetrate downstream to compete with CNNC and CGNPC. In July 2014, it submitted a 
restructuring plan to the SASAC requesting to bring China Power Investment Corporation 
(CPIC) into the SNPTC-Westinghouse alliance (Lin 2014a). This is a logical choice because 
SNPTC could only step into the realm of NPP ownership and operation through a power 
generation company, not to mention that CPIC as one of the five big electricity companies 
shares deep ties with SNPTC.
24
  
Ironically, the creation of a new central SOE to unify the Chinese market brought Beijing 
further away from its goal of standardization; and having one more team into the game did not 
weaken the existing interest groups but provoked them instead. None of them wanted to be at a 
disadvantage in the distribution of business interests. The fact that both Areva and ASE 
obtained orders from China after Westinghouse’s triumph illustrates the point. In view of the 
long relationship between CGNPC and Areva, it is hard to pacify the duo without buying EPR. 
At the end, French reactors came to China without whole technology transfer. The reason that 
Areva could maintain technology control is mainly attributed to its long-standing position in the 
market through CGNPC and the first mover advantage compared to other international vendors. 
Till now, CPR-1000 is still prohibited for export because Areva holds its IPR. Most importantly, 
the Taishan project with a new design is contrary to Beijing’s initial goal of building a uniform 
array of plants. As for ASE, even though it was out from the very beginning, it also secured an 
order for the sake of bilateral nuclear energy collaboration and strategic relationship since the 
early 1990s. As a result, the sector witnessed a proliferation of players and greater diversity in 
reactor models.  
Beijing was resolute to restrain the coalitional disturbances, but in fact involuntarily or 
intentionally stood up for a stronger transnational team. Taking a closer look at the decision on 
AP1000, “technology rationality” became the supreme measurement for bid evaluations because 
there were also divergences within the top leadership.
25
 When Beijing left CNNC and CGNPC 
as nuclear operators out in the cold, it temporarily dissolved the existing alliances that derived 
                                                     
24 CPIC came from the agency in charge of electric power generation and SNPTC has its origin from the SPC system. 
In history, they all were in favor of technology import, known as the “electricity family”. In addition, SNPTC’s 
chairman of the board, Wang Binghua, was the first general manager of CPIC. Limited by a lack of nuclear 
technology, CPIC could not take participate in NPP projects on its own. For CPIC, joining the alliance of SNPTC and 
Westinghouse would unleash its great potential. Moreover, with the help of SNPTC, CPIC now has two units of 
AP1000 under construction at Haiyang. Therefore, a merger between CPIC and SNPTC would be an optimal choice 
for both.  
25 Interview no. BJ121012, a government official at the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
Beijing, 12 Oct 2012. 
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their power from the center. But at the same time, an assembly of nuclear experts, technocrats 
and state leaders eventually emerged as a state enterprise that is even higher than central SOEs. 
Unlike CNNC and CGNPC that both start with C (zhong zi tou), meaning “China”, SNPTC has 
“an initial of S (guo zi tou)”, standing for “State”. The combination of a state company and the 
“most advanced technology” in the world served as an expedient policy under the circumstance. 
Technology, finance, and trust were three keystones to the selection, which were complemented 
by “political intangibles” between the countries (Hibbs, Maclachlan and Dolley 2005). It was 
said that foreign affairs officials also played a significant role in lobbying Beijing for the 
countries to which they were appointed.
26
 So as for the decisions on EPR and VVER, if they 
were voted out in terms of technology, we can still safely say they won in the other dimensions.  
But it is hard to say whether the new transnational team would rein in the coalitional conflict 
when the Sino-American coalition in China becomes increasingly powerful overtime. Now with 
the addition of CPIC into the SNPTC-Westinghouse union, the alliance may potentially portend 
the rise of a big “electricity family” that would bring it greater leverage than others. Together 
with other power generation companies CPIC was structured out of the State Power Corporation 
of China (SPCC), previously the Ministry of Electric Power, which traced further back to 
MWREP. It had tried hard to set its feet in the nuclear industry before it was finally approved in 
2007 as a third NPP owner and operator in addition to CNNC and CGNPC. With CPIC limited 
by technology and SNPTC constrained by its business scope, a merger would mean potentials 
unleashed and a great strengthening of the SNPTC-Westinghouse partnership. However, it 
remains to be seen whether the combination would help build up a national industry. If yes, 
Beijing would be free of worries. But if not, the colossal kingdom would add to the turmoil seen 
over the decades, and the central government would be further weakened in its authority of 
making policies. Again due to the special nature of nuclear technology cooperation, once a 
transnational alliance secures footholds it tends to become self-perpetuating.  
6.2 Firms’ negligence in R&D 
The hustle and bustle of coalitional rivalry distracted Beijing from a nationalist course, and also 
diverted the attention of Chinese nuclear companies from the formation of indigenous IPR. As 
in the first three decades China’s indigenous efforts were done by CNNC’s research institutes, 
CNNC is the observation port. As a partial result of the coalitional competitions, CNNC only 
intermittently came out with a few home-grown models. Due to its hostility against the 
CGNPC-Areva group, CNNC has reportedly contained NPIC because of its technology ties with 
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CGNPC and Framatome originated from CNP-600.
27
 The containment includes forcing the 
transfer of NPIC’s CNP-1000 to SNPTC, hindering NPIC’s cooperation with CGNPC, 
depleting its core technology capability (civilian nuclear engineering), and abruptly terminating 
a proposed joint venture project between NPIC and Areva in the concern of “possible 
interference into the Gen-III selection” (Nanba Huofu 2009). All these moves were meant to 
avoid an amalgamation with the French followers in China’s nuclear industry through the 
suppression of NPIC within CNNC. This is so because NPIC was known as having an ambition 
to become a NSSS company like Areva and Westinghouse, and finally build a national platform 
for nuclear power research that surmounts business interests. Deeply entangled in the competing 
interests, CNNC had its research strengths scattered, with some flowing into CGNPC. As a 
result, before 2007 China was left with only three indigenous models, two (CNP-300 by SNPTC 
and CNP-600 by NPIC) installed and one (CNP-1000) disapproved.
28
  
Despite the improvements in independent R&D, Chinese nuclear firms stood in the way of 
building a national nuclear energy technology platform. One positive change after the nuclear 
“three kingdoms” came into being was that competition stimulated the Chinese nuclear firms to 
engage in developing their own models of indigenous IPR. This is mainly because CNNC now 
had competition from both SNPTC and CGNPC. A few years after the upheaval, CNNC 
updated CNP-1000 into ACP1000 and CGNPC developed its CPR-1000 into ACPR1000+. 
However, both became obstructions to the national goal of merging the two models into one 
indigenous Gen-III reactor, namely Hualong-One (China Dragon-Number One). As the cores of 
the two models were very different and both received approvals from IAEA, neither CNNC nor 
CGNPC wanted to abandon their own designs. While CNNC derived its nuclear reactor 
technologies mainly from Canada and Russia, CGNPC had French blood in its core 
technologies. Since the central order of rationalizing the two models in 2013, there had been 
several rounds of negotiations between the two nuclear giants. Both challenged the unification 
to a single model but had to start cooperation with each other because Beijing set the merging as 
a precondition for any new project approvals (Zhang 2014). As a result, they became partners 
only on the surface. Even though Hualong-One finally came into being, the merging remained 
only in name, not in technology, and the two firms had different target markets in terms of 
                                                     
27 A second independent project in China was CNP-600 by NPIC for Qinshan II, which was originally put on agenda 
as a cooperation project with Siemens AG subsidiary Kraftwerk Union (KWU) but was forced onto an independent 
path due to the withdrawal of German participation after 1989. Through CNP-600, NPIC developed a technology 
cooperation relationship with Framatome. 
28 According to an interviewee (no. BJ171013, with a former employee of CNNC, Beijing, 17 Oct 2013), the failure 
of CNP-1000 was attributed to the interruptions in R&D as a result of the restructuring CNP-1000 out of NPIC. 
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export (Zhang 2015).
29
 This remains an obstacle to Beijing’s effort of building up a “national 
team” to expand business overseas.  
Alongside the infighting among nuclear SOEs, the competition among transnational 
coalitions became even fiercer. CGNPC created its own research institute in 2005 and had a 
deeper relationship with Areva through EPR. And because of Areva’s negative experiences in 
the cooperation with CNNC, it found CGNPC to be the most trustful. In addition, the strategic 
partnership between their turbine and generator providers, namely Dongfang Electric (DEC) and 
Alstom, also strengthened the CGNPC-Areva alliance. At the same time, SNPTC and 
Westinghouse have been committed to the construction of AP1000 reactors and the 
development of CAP1400 (the localized version of AP1000, with C standing for Chinese), 
which is expected to unify the Chinese market through a “standardized blueprint” (Suo 2012). 
Especially after the Fukushima Crisis in Japan, the passive safety system of SNPTC-
Westinghouse becomes more popular than others due to its simple design with less equipment. 
As for CNNC, it is no longer the “big boss” despite its identity as the “first son” in the nuclear 
family.
30
 It felt particularly challenged by the expansion of SNPTC-Westinghouse alliance with 
the addition of CPIC, and CGNPC’s purchase from France of recycled nuclear fuel, which has 
been monopolized by CNNC within China. Now since “going-out” has become China’s national 
strategy for nuclear power development, the three nuclear giants are still engaged in “vicious 
competition” and “serious internal frictions” (Lin 2014c). In fact, it is not only when Chinese 
enterprises go out that the internecine becomes a problem: it has always been so since 
international vendors came to China and forged alliances with them.   
7. Conclusion 
The chapter has argued that due to nuclear energy’s distinct attributes compared to traditional 
mass-production industries, nuclear companies tend to develop long-standing strategic business 
relationships with international vendors; and a confluence of domestic and foreign business 
interests is likely to form policy coalitions across borders. In China’s case, all the nuclear giants 
came into such type of partnerships with their chosen nuclear lead firms in the world, which 
pooled their resources together to make their preferences heard in the central policy agenda. 
Chinese nuclear state companies derived their power from their bureaucratic background and 
economic significance, and international vendors sought support from their home governments. 
In over three decades, the powerful domestic-foreign symbiosis grew increasingly powerful and 
diversified, and became a major force propelling China’s nuclear energy industry onto an 
                                                     
29 CNNC is looking at Pakistan, Argentina, Egypt, and Algeria, whereas CGNPC targets UK, Romania, Ukraine, 
Hungary, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
30 Interview no. BJ280812, a researcher at the Energy Research Institute (ERI), National Development and Reform 
Committee (NDRC), Beijing, 28 Aug 2012. 
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integrationist path. Despite a nationalist orientation at the center, the divergence of cross-border 
group interests led Beijing away from its intended course, and turned Beijing’s efforts of 
fostering national champions into global partners over and over again. 
In China’s nuclear energy industry, the way that domestic business identified with 
international nuclear vendors and with the Chinese state remained largely consistent in over 
three decades’ of time. Chinese nuclear firms have shown a continuing preference for strategic 
collaborations with international vendors due to technology lock-in. This is particularly so when 
the protracted interactions with foreign partners were intertwined with introducing new 
generations of reactors that differ greatly from earlier designs, which made the cross-border 
business relationships even stronger. This explains the three rounds of nuclear reactor imports 
over the past three decades. Chinese nuclear firms led the import of the first and second 
generation nuclear reactors respectively in the 1980s and 1990s, and helped promote the third 
generation reactors made by their foreign partners to Beijing in the 2000s. The passion of 
Chinese nuclear firms in cooperating with international vendors and introducing new foreign 
nuclear reactors into China did not subside even when Beijing made technology autonomy the 
top priority in the country’s industrial development in the new century. When political winds 
blew in the direction of technology independence after 2003, the pro-foreign stance of Chinese 
nuclear firms and their preference for a more open policy environment did not change. 
Chinese nuclear firms have been bound together with international vendors over the years 
and their common interests of obtaining greater market share outweighed those at the center of 
achieving technology unification and indigenous R&D. Due to a high degree of user 
involvement and long product cycles of nuclear power projects, the transnational alliances are 
long and serious, and they tend to persist because of technology lock-in and the heterogeneity of 
capabilities involved in the projects. Unlike in commodity manufacturing, nuclear reactor 
technologies and skills cannot be easily acquired through transfer. In addition, the cross-border 
coalitions enjoy great political and economic power as a result of high entry barriers, and have a 
ready access to policy process. Because of these characters seen in the nuclear industry, internal 
conflict among Chinese buyers easily transforms into coalitional rivalry across borders. So 
when efforts are made to standardize the nuclear energy market with a unified reactor 
technology, it is natural to meet resistance from the transnational coalescences.  
There are three transnational coalitions now operating in China, chronologically CGNPC-
Areva, CNNC-ASE and SNPTC-Westinghouse. They played different roles at different stages 
but all managed to introduce international vendors and their nuclear reactors into China. 
Guangdong provincial government and its supporters in Beijing brought in Framatome, which 
exerts the greatest influence over China’s nuclear technology development. The Sino-French 
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cooperation later became the coalition between CGNPC and Areva. The case of CNNC is 
different: stemming from the nuclear energy authority, it was in charge of negotiations with 
Russian and Canadian nuclear vendors and imported reactors from both. At the same time, 
CNNC also cooperated with the French because all nuclear research institutes were in its control 
and had to help CGNPC in reactor design. The experience polarized CNNC in terms of 
technology preferences. When it came to the international bidding for the third generation 
nuclear reactors, Westinghouse’s pressurized water reactor was chosen because the coalition 
that later became SNPTC-Westinghouse had the most powerful lineup to support its bid. Within 
China it had support from nuclear experts, technocrats and some central leaders; and within its 
own country, it lobbied the United States government through the help of other nuclear 
companies in its consortium. The decision strongly touched the nerves of existing transnational 
alliances, and the repercussion is that they brought in more foreign reactors and further 
diversified the nuclear energy market.  
As a result of the shared cross-border business interests, Chinese nuclear firms were 
unresponsive to the nationalist initiatives in the interactions with the central government. While 
the aim of Beijing was to nurture indigenous technologies, indigenous Chinese firms acted as 
the loyal “global partners” of international vendors and were keen on promoting the nuclear 
reactors of their foreign partners. When Beijing called for the indigenization of foreign 
technologies, the firms worked toward stronger transnational teams even in the localized 
versions of foreign nuclear reactors. Because of this, research and development resources have 
been scattered, which distracted the industry from pursuing an independent path through 
technology unification. Being engrossed in coalitional contests, Chinese nuclear firms spared 
limited energy in independent design and had limited interests in domestic cooperation. In fact, 
early in 1999 the State Planning Commission had proposed that CNNC and CGNPC should 
jointly develop nuclear reactor technologies with Chinese intellectual property rights (Zhang 
2014). However, the proposal received lukewarm responses from the two firms, and this 
continues today in the rationalization of Hualong-One. Technology diversification may persist 
until someday all firms agree to bury the hatchet or sever the ties with their foreign partners. For 
the firms, growing completely independent from foreign partners may mean decades. For 
Beijing, turning China into a not only big but also strong country of nuclear power technology is 
by no means easier than that.  
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Chapter 5  
The making of “national champions” in the wind power industry 
 
“Foreign firms attempting to go it alone in China's wind power market without a 
local partner risk being frozen out when domestic turbine makers become strong 
enough to compete”. 
--- A senior executive at German REpower Systems AG, 2006 (Winning 2006) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In contrast to what was seen in the nuclear energy industry, most top Chinese wind firms 
responded actively to Beijing’s call of working toward a national industry driven by Chinese-
owned technologies. In spite of importation at the initial stage and later production relying on 
foreign licenses, the government-selected producers of wind turbine generators (WTG) 
coordinated with Beijing in marginalizing foreign products manufactured overseas and at home. 
From there being merely no local manufacturing to domestically made wind turbines taking a 
lion’s share of the Chinese market, took only five years. In response to the national support of 
wind power development, especially the requirement of locally manufactured wind power 
equipment in new wind farms, local turbine producers quickly flourished over the entire country. 
Generally Chinese firms have been engaged in independent production albeit making use of 
foreign technologies, mostly through technology licensing. Some of them followed Beijing’s 
will in shifting foreign technology acquisition to indigenous research and development (R&D). 
There were a large number of small firms that were only interested in cost competition but not 
in indigenous innovation, but they did not gain support from Beijing and found themselves 
ostracized. Those who were favored by Beijing and in return obeyed Beijing in turning policy 
support into advantages over foreign competitors became the so-called “national champions”. 
For the most part of their catching-up process, they generally focused on the formation of 
proprietary technologies and gaining competitiveness in not only the domestic but also the 
international market. 
Why was Beijing’s intention of building an indigenous industry with technology autonomy 
well received by firms in the wind power sector? By looking into government-business 
interactions in the sector, the chapter argues that due to the standardized nature of wind turbine 
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manufacturing, the idea of collaboration in production was neither necessary for Chinese late-
comers nor appealing to world-leading wind turbine makers, and the divergence of domestic-
foreign business interests made local firms committed followers to Beijing’s nationalist 
initiatives. First, the wind power sector resembles many other mass-manufacturing sectors in the 
sense that production is codified and competition is mainly based on economies of scale, so that 
technologies are easily transferable among industrial players and skills can be obtained through 
learning-by-doing in a short period of time. Second, because of the ease of technology 
acquisition, the domestic-foreign business relationship in the sector was one of mutual-exclusive 
market competition. Chinese wind firms did not need technologies from foreign established 
producers, which also avoided to be involved in the production of local firms for the fear of 
losing technological competitiveness. Third, in order to fend themselves off foreign competition, 
Chinese indigenous firms chose to cooperate with the central government in the effort of 
strengthening indigenous manufacturing and designing capabilities, and increasing competitive 
advantages over foreign competitors.  
Similar to the preceding chapter, this chapter analyzes the Chinese wind energy sector by 
testing the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 but illustrates a completely different story in 
comparison to the nuclear case study. The next section demonstrates that WTG is a typical 
mass-manufacturing sector characterized by relatively simple components interfaces, medium to 
low technology barriers, and relatively high possibility of technology transfer. Section three 
focuses on the competing interests between Chinese and foreign WTG producers, and stresses 
that there was a void of transnational coalitions in support of open policies in the sector. 
Sections four and five discuss the proactive responses of local wind firms to the central 
initiative of building up an indigenous industry, with section four focusing on those in the state-
led R&D and technology acquisition in the first two decades, and section five on those in the 
state-directed wind power expansion since 2003. Section six reviews the state-industry 
coordination in local manufacturing, technology indigenization, and foreign market entry. The 
last section sums up the chapter and shows that the findings are consistent with what are 
hypothesized in the theory chapter. 
2. Nature of the sector 
Unlike the “complex product systems” (CoPS) represented by nuclear power plants, the wind 
power industry is typical of automated and systematized manufacturing that benefits from 
economies of scale. In the category of mass-production, WTG production is represented by a 
relatively low unit cost, is made of standardized components, and produced in high volumes and 
large batches. With medium or low entry barriers in terms of technology and capital, 
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competition in the production of wind power equipment is based on cost minimization. Due to 
the short product life cycle and simple product systems compared to CoPS, technology transfer 
is relatively easier for wind power and catching-up is likely to happen in a shorter period of time. 
Most manufacturing industries, including WTGs, are in this category, even though they vary 
wildly in many dimensions. For example, solar photovoltaic (PV) is characterized by lower 
entry barriers, shorter product cycles and a more straightforward production process than the 
wind power industry. Other examples include auto assembly that is similar to wind turbine 
manufacturing, as well as electronics and semiconductors resembling solar PV.  
The nature of wind turbine manufacturing as an industry of mass-production determines that 
it displays certain patterns in technology acquisition, industrial relations, and connections to the 
government. First of all, it is possible for wind turbine manufacturers in emerging economies to 
challenge leading international firms through technology outsourcing. For mass-manufacturing 
industries such as WTG manufacturing, production processes are highly standardized and the 
chances for firms to grow through learning are high. As technology matures overtime, 
manufacturing starts moving to developing countries to take advantage of low costs. And this is 
when pioneering  manufacturers soon lose their competitiveness to those in the local market, 
which move rapidly to the acquisition (duplicative imitation) and assimilation (creative 
imitation) of foreign technologies, and improvements in productivity (process innovation) (Kim 
1997: 88). Using borrowed technologies, firms in late-industrializing countries are able to 
challenge long-established manufacturers thanks to “lower wages, higher subsidies, as well as 
intense efforts to raise productivity incrementally” (Amsden 1989: 5). This cost advantage also 
results from the fierce competitions between the large number of industry players that enters the 
industries with relatively low technology and capital barriers. 
The existence of a particular group of companies providing technology-based services 
makes catch-up possible for new entrants engaged in wind turbine manufacturing. Instead of in-
house development, WTG manufacturers could choose to collaborate with engineering design 
firms from industrialized countries, most of which are small producers, research institutes, 
laboratories, universities and consulting firms that are not capable of or not interested in large-
scale manufacturing. These firms normally focus on a specific spectrum of expertise and offer 
such R&D services as design, engineering, prototyping, testing, training, and technical 
consultancies to their clients, known as knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) (Miles et 
al. 1995). As “one of the most dynamic components of the service sector in Europe and in most 
highly industrialized countries”, KIBS also extend their reach to industrializing economies and 
sometimes collaborate with recipients in multiple countries (Rodríguez and Nieto 2012; 
Strambach 2001: 53). They are seen as complementary innovation assets to the technological 
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obstacles that late-comers face in production, and their interactions with users facilitates 
knowledge accumulation and innovation for both (Muller 2001). On the one hand, their clients 
are able to start manufacturing, gain experience and obtain technological capabilities through 
external acquisition of technologies; on the other hand, KIBS suppliers develop their own 
innovation capacities by integrating the production process and making continuous adaptations 
to the needs of their clients (Hertog 2000; Muller 2001).  
Because of the philosophy of focusing on core competencies, wind turbine manufacturers 
tend to develop a complementary relationship with design firms. Normally small in size, 
companies providing wind turbine designs do not set up their own manufacturing facilities and 
hence do not have concerns about losing market share to their local recipients. Compared to 
well-established firms having in-house R&D and being engaged in production themselves, these 
KIBS providers have less to lose and therefore are more willing to transfer their technologies. 
Royalty fees from the products manufactured by their local partners, integration into a thriving 
production environment and access to local innovation resources are what they are after. In 
exchange for technology know-how, producers in developing countries only need to pay fees 
without sharing the market with their technology suppliers. Despite limited capabilities in 
internal R&D, they are able to concentrate on reducing costs in manufacturing and on 
competing with others.  
These complementary relationships translate into business alliances to secure surviving 
spaces from the market dominated by manufacturers at the technology frontiers. Without 
technology cooperation, both developing-country firms and wind turbine designers are in an 
inferior position if they compete individually in the international market. Known as “laggards” 
in terms of developing new technologies and techniques, KIBS providers, in this case design 
firms, lag behind top industrial players due to the lack of manufacturing experience (Miles et al. 
1995). If not collaborating with startup manufacturers their professional knowledge cannot 
travel from lab to market and turn from design to products. As for manufacturers in late-
industrializing countries, lack of innovative capacity is the major blockage for them to enter the 
market and become active industrial players. The acquisition of wind technologies from KIBS 
providers gives them greater flexibility and cost efficiency than in-house R&D does. Through 
the production of acquired technologies, they could develop innovative capacities in the 
production process and collaborate with their KIBS providers for future designs. Moreover, they 
could also consider entering into long-term strategic collaborations with, or even acquiring, their 
design partners for greater competencies.  
Due to relatively simple product systems and standardized production, the KIBS supplier-
user combinations may be able to achieve economies of scale in a short period of time. 
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Compared to the CoPS industries, mass-manufacturing industries involve fewer subsystems and 
narrower knowledge, and the formation of competencies largely rests in production rather than 
system integration. Technology transfer is more straightforward in wind turbine manufacturing 
because product designs are simpler and codification of processes is easier than it is in nuclear 
power projects; and as less equipment and more standard components are involved in 
production, it is easier to develop local supply chains or sources from overseas technology 
suppliers. And instead of focusing on the integration of multi-disciplinary expertise and 
comprehensive subsystems, traditional manufacturers gain competitiveness through process 
innovation and cost minimization. As production-related activities are more relevant in WTG 
manufacturing, wind firms in industrializing economies are able to make use of transferred 
technologies and scale up production quickly. 
On top of rapid commercialization, the design-production alliances could engage in 
continuous interactions that help develop innovation and manufacture capacities. As is the same 
for traditional manufacturing industries, WTG is typical of a short product lifecycle and wind 
firms are under constant pressure to develop new models with larger capacity and make 
continual modifications to the acquired designs. While the upgrading of nuclear reactor 
technologies lasts decades, the cycle in WTG manufacturing lasts only a few years. Since the 
first civil nuclear power reactors started operation in the 1950s, the second generation reactors 
went into commercial use in the 1970s, and the third did not come to light until the 1990s. 
While the evolutionary third generation reactors are expected to dominate until the 2020s, the 
commercial construction of the revolutionary fourth generation designs may not be available 
until the 2030s (European Commission). In comparison, wind technology has seen an ever-
increasing growth in turbine capacity, and the prototyping of larger turbines with improved 
performance occurs every few years. Early commercial wind turbines in the 1980s only had an 
average per unit capacity of 50kW, but have reached 750kW in the 1990s, 2MW in the 2000s 
and 5MW in recent years. Future turbines are expected to be as large as 10MW or even 20MW 
(see Figure 5-1). Moreover, because of the relatively low entry barriers firms are challenged by 
new entrants that are engaged in price wars and compete on undifferentiated products, and 
hence are always driven to introduce diverse turbine models with better quality control in a 
timely manner. For that reason, adaptations and incremental improvements help reinforce the 
relationships between manufacturers and designers, and keep them up with frontier technologies.  
While developing-country firms in manufacturing industries could climb up technological 
ladders with the help of KIBS firms and compete with their larger international counterparts, it 
is impossible for those in the CoPS industries to form their own capabilities in conceptual 
design and system integration through the collaboration with one or more KIBS providers. They 
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need to rely on companies at the upper echelons of the industry through long-term strategic 
partnerships, from which they may develop their independent capabilities in a few decades’ time. 
In comparison to Framatome, which became one of the top industrial players in nuclear energy 
after about 50 years of cooperation with Westinghouse, it took only a few years for General 
Electric (GE) to become one of the world’s largest WTG producers after it tapped into wind 
turbine manufacturing through the acquisition of Enron Wind in 2002.
1
 If the American electric 
colossus’ story is not convincing, the experience of WTG firms from China, India, and South 
Korea tells the same story: mostly with an industrial base in other areas, firms from these 
countries realized a remarkable turnaround from no WTG manufacturing experience to compete 
in the global market within a limited amount of time. It took Suzlon only five years to get on the 
world top ten list of wind turbine manufacturers and has remained there since (Lewis 2013: 150). 
Chinese WTG firms as newcomers delineate a bolder version of the process: in the space of 
only a couple of years some of them became the top ten WTG manufacturers and together made 
China the largest wind power producer in the world. 
Figure 5-1 Growth in the size of wind turbines since 1980 and prospects 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), Wind Energy Technology Roadmap, 2013 edition, p.27 
Firms in emerging economies can choose from a wide range of solutions to technology 
acquisition through a panoply of partnerships with KIBS providers. Licensed production is the 
most popular approach among latecomers to establish WTG production operations. Despite 
certain constraints in the use of technologies, wind turbine designers are seldom involved in the 
                                                     
1 After the acquisition of Zond and Kenetech, Enron became the only remaining major American wind turbine 
manufacturer in the 1990s. GE made the purchase of Enron during its bankruptcy proceedings. For a detailed 
discussion of the evolution of wind turbine technologies in the United States, GE Wind and its business activities in 
China (Lewis 2013: 93-105).   
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business activities of licensees. While technology users are temporarily content with existing 
technologies, providers earn royalties from overseas manufacturing and reduce risks through 
multiple licensing agreements. In addition to the link between technology transfer and license 
fees, both parties benefit from the highly interactive processes in terms of innovativeness. As 
the relationship deepens, the mutually beneficial partnership sometimes moves on to joint 
development and becomes co-innovators of each other, with WTG manufacturers seeing a better 
prospect in forming their own IPRs in the process. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
the manufacturers become independent from KIBS providers in view of the rapid pace in 
technology upgrading. Therefore, some highly competent manufacturers go for the purchase of 
ownership rights in KIBS firms in order to gain greater technology independence. Wind turbine 
manufacturers in China and India made use of almost all of the solutions discussed above to 
achieve a legendary rapid rise. All these available solutions coupled with low factor costs, large 
market size and specialized manufacturing capabilities account for the phenomenal growth of 
wind industry in both countries. 
The interests of KIBS firms stands in sharp contrast to international frontier companies, for 
whom the most important thing in overseas business expansion is to avoid technology spill-over 
as much as possible. As they have achieved supply chain integration from R&D to production, 
marketing and management, technology transfer is in their least interests because this may mean 
creation of competitors that encroach on their market shares. The case of Denmark-based Vestas 
sounded an alarm bell for all wind firms: in ten years’ JV partnership it personally trained its 
own competitor Gamesa, which manufactured wind turbines with Vestas technology in the 
Spanish market and became a major challenger in the global arena, including in China.
2
 
Therefore, most lead firms prefer international trade or wholly owned FIEs, which give them 
greater control over intellectual property rights (IPRs) and overseas operations. In comparison, 
KIBS providers allow a much higher degree of local control over technologies and domestic 
participation in the innovation process. Therefore, the rivalry is between local subsidiaries of 
multinational wind corporations and developing-country firms that are in collaboration with 
KIBS providers.  
In many cases global lead firms are forced to enter into JV enterprises with local partners, 
either by the home government for market access or due to limited knowledge about local 
operations. They tend to be strange bedfellows because one side focuses on gaining 
technological autonomy while the other needs to protect their know-how. From the perspective 
                                                     
2  Lewis (2013: 84-86) had a detailed discussion of the process: following a separation deal between the two 
companies, the technology transfer agreement was phased out and Gamesa “acquired the right to sell anywhere in the 
world”. It then immediately expanded its presence globally, with manufacturing operations set up in many countries 
including China. 
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of international frontier firms, both risk-aversion and control over operations are essential when 
building up their business in overseas markets. However, the two goals are at odds with each 
other because the former brings about compromises but the latter creates conflict with local 
partners. Aside from technology acquisition, the high cost of imported components stimulates 
local partners to seek establishing alliances with component suppliers locally. However, foreign 
established wind firms favor the purchase of wind power generation units or components 
manufactured in their home countries, from which they can benefit from export sales. Some 
even see their local partners as sales offices in the local market. The divergence of interests 
always put JV cooperation to the test in daily business routines. For all JV partnership is about, 
domestic and foreign partners in WTG manufacturing are at best quarrelsome lovers that 
disagree on many situations.
3
 The situation is mitigated when it comes to the production of 
components and parts because less technology know-how is involved and local manufacturing 
means lower costs.  
Subject to market competition and protection of their proprietary technologies, international 
lead firms have a very thin chance of influencing local industrial policy. Local operations of 
large foreign firms, wholly owned or through a JV partnership, have their voices heard through 
the chambers of commerce representing businesses from their home countries. However, it 
remains uncertain that their voices will be channeled into the policy process because they either 
do not have a partner at all or even if they have one they harbor different thoughts about 
cooperation from their local partners. It is not in global top producers’ interest to transfer 
technologies especially when they are individually seeking to build up their own business 
kingdoms in the host country. In many cases foreign firms accept the terms for entering the 
target market, technology transfer for instance, even though they choose to transfer the older 
designs that would not become a direct challenge to their prevailing turbine models. Their home 
governments also have nothing to do until certain disputes falling into the purview of 
international regimes are involved. Foreign pressures can be strong under certain circumstances 
but remain limited if they are not in alliances with local industrial players.  
In contrast, native wind firms in catching-up economies have their preferences aligned with 
local industrial policy in the pursuit of expanding market share. This is because alliances with 
foreign KIBS providers and local suppliers are strong enough to confront international lead 
firms rather than relying on them as seen in CoPS industries. Local parts suppliers share a 
common interest with wind turbine manufacturers when it comes to participating in the bids for 
wind farm projects. With available technology know-how and cost advantages in production, 
local manufacturers cater for the demand of wind farm developers with better prices than their 
                                                     
3 The discussion on JV partnership is mainly on wind turbine manufacturing but not applied to JV plants producing 
components and parts, which are normally set up by FIEs. 
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foreign counterparts. With regard to wind engineering and design firms, complementary 
capabilities lead them to claim the benefit of supportive policies that their partners enjoy in the 
local market. Even some that become co-developers of their local partners are much less 
ambitious than larger manufacturers: through the development of a new model they are not 
going to set up their own local plants but rather seek a union with their local partners. Some of 
them are even allowed to license the jointly developed designs to manufacturers in a third 
country after being purchased by their local partners.  
Despite the use of developmental policy tools, wind turbine manufacturing is less politicized 
than it is in CoPS industries and largely follows market mechanisms in regular transactions. Due 
to the nature of mass-production, the industry is diffused among a large number of firms and 
characterized by frequent business transactions. With the exception of global conglomerates 
such as General Electric (GE), most companies specializing in WTG are not that large in terms 
of industrial output and the market is largely contested. Even though government support and 
industrial policies are widely used around the world when this industry is still in its infancy, 
most business activities and technology transfers take place through commercial channels rather 
than government initiatives. Changes can be seen with the growing salience of energy 
geopolitics, where countries have been engaged in the framework negotiations of clean energy 
and climate change cooperation incorporating related manufacturing industries. However, the 
politicization of WTG production is limited and the selection of business strategies remains in 
large part in the purview of corporate behavior.
4
 
3. Cross-border industrial relations 
As seen in traditional manufacturing industries, the logic of market competition in wind turbine 
production places new entrants under constant threat from well-established companies. To 
compete with international frontier companies, wind firms in latecomer economies borrow 
foreign advanced technologies from KIBS providers. Chinese wind firms started their 
businesses using licensed production and furthered their capabilities through joint development 
or even purchase of a design firm with its proprietary technology designs. In view of the 
standardized process in WTG production, technology transfer can be separated from the 
production process and foreign participation is not a necessity. The fact that wind firms in 
emerging economies are able to set up production operations and gain a high degree of 
autonomy results in a highly competitive relationship with leading international firms. In 
addition, the relatively low entry barriers and short product lifecycle make possible rapid 
industrial upgrading before the formation of independent technological capabilities. As cross-
                                                     
4 See Lewis (2013) for a discussion of the limited impact of bilateral climate and energy cooperation agreements on 
the market mechanisms in the wind energy industry.  
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border learning is readily achievable, most international lead firms are indisposed to share their 
knowledge with local firms even at the expense of market share in host countries.  
3.1 Technology acquisition from KIBS firms 
In China’s wind energy industry, a fundamental change in the business relationship between 
domestic and foreign firms was accompanied by a dramatic shift in the market structure. The 
Chinese wind market used to be dominated by the import of complete WTG units in the 1980s 
and JV partnerships in the 1990s. It became fraught with locally manufactured wind turbines 
since licensed production prevailed in the 2000s (Figure 5-2). Unlike the complete dependence 
on import or limited technology transfer through JV cooperation, Chinese wind turbine 
producers gained greater autonomy in daily operations by entering into licensing agreements. In 
doing so, indigenous Chinese firms achieved rapid scaling-up using foreign advanced designs 
with technology suppliers not interfering with their business activities. In this type of 
cooperation, Chinese firms overcame their weakness when making up for the weakness of small 
engineering design firms, which are strong in design but lack manufacturing capability. While 
the former are more interested in the downstream of the chain from lab to market and 
competitive in commercialization, the latter profit from overseas manufacturing and reduce risks 
through multiple licensing agreements in the local market. The direct link between them is 
found in technology transfer in exchange for license fees.  
The availability of alternatives to foreign partnership made possible technology acquisition 
by Chinese wind firms. Instead of waging a head-on fight with world wind leaders, Chinese 
firms sought alliances with small WTG manufacturers or engineering design firms from Europe. 
The major sources of licensing have been Anerodyn, Fuhrlander, and REpower from Germany, 
Windtec from Austria, and Norwin from Denmark. Some deepened the collaboration with 
Chinese firms to engage in “assisted reverse engineering”, which facilitated learning by Chinese 
in developing larger and more reliable wind turbines (Lewis 2013). There is little concern over 
market competition between foreign design firms and Chinese firms, with the former focusing 
on R&D and the latter on manufacturing. By licensing the right to manufacture its technology, 
these overseas partners maintain a low degree of involvement in local business and have 
minimum interest conflict with local firms. Some even share licenses or carry on joint 
development with multiple firms for profit maximization, which in fact provided high quality 
engineering services to more Chinese firms. One typical case is Aerodyn from Germany, an 
engineering design company that has signed technology transfer agreements with more than ten 
Chinese firms since it entered China in 2004, most of which became major players in the 
industry (Zhang and Su 2012: 83). 
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Figure 5-2 Market share of newly installed capacity, by ownership type, 2003-2010 
 
Source: For 2003, National Action Plan for China's Wind Power Industry Development, 2005, p8; For 2004-2006, 
China Wind Power Report 2007; For 2007-2008, Global and China Wind Power Industry Report 2008-2009; For 2009 and 2010, Li 
et al., 2011, China Wind Power Outlook 2010 (in Chinese), Hainan Press, Haikou. 
Because of the many choices they have, Chinese wind firms benefit from collaboration with 
European KIBS companies without too many constraints. The industry witnessed almost all 
types of technology solutions that local wind firms could choose to acquire designs from their 
foreign partners. While JV partnership turned out to be less effective in China’s WTG 
manufacturing, licensing and joint development became popular because Chinese wind firms 
could make full use of their manufacturing capabilities without too much interference from 
foreign partners. Almost all top Chinese wind firms started their businesses through licensing or 
joint development. To reduce restrictions on accessing foreign technology, some purchased 
ownership rights of a company with technology. China’s top wind turbine manufacturer, 
Goldwind, acquired a majority stake of Vensys in 2008 and gained greater control over the use 
of its turbine designs. This was seen as a reasonable move after REpower, another key 
technology provider for Goldwind, was purchased one year earlier by Suzlon, a leading global 
wind firm from India.
5
  
With various partnerships available and ready access to foreign advanced technologies, 
WTG producers in China developed competitiveness through economies of scale. On the one 
hand, due to the relative low entry barriers to WTG manufacturing, Chinese firms focused on a 
                                                     
5 Interview no. BJ251113, a manager of the China Wind Power Center, Beijing, 25 Nov 2013.  
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competition based on productivity and cost minimization. On the other hand, they engaged in 
“manufacturing-related innovation”, or “innovative manufacturing”, on top of the duplication of 
foreign models (Nahm 2014; Nahm and Steinfeld 2014). Like in many other industries such as 
solar PV, wind technologies “were easily accessible in global production networks” so that 
Chinese firms could grab market share through “the rapid and cost-effective translation of such 
technologies into mass-manufacturable products” (Nahm 2014: 18; 39). Despite limited 
capabilities in radical product innovation, creativity in the production processes has been the 
secret weapon that Chinese firms used to translate technologies into commercialization.
6
 Aside 
from cost advantages, a specialization in shop-floor innovation following technology acquisition 
also contributed to the rapid rise of Chinese WTG manufacturers.  
Thanks to the simple product systems, Chinese wind firms were able to benefit from local 
sourcing and closely follow the steps of frontier firms. As components and parts are 
standardized in WTG manufacturing, most Chinese firms established their supplier networks 
and achieved mass-production within a few years after their foundation. Some of them, namely 
Sinovel, Dongfang and United Power grew up to become one of the world top ten wind turbine 
producers within a couple of years (Table 5-1). The most outstanding of them is Sinovel, which 
started from seizing the commanding height of MW-scale turbine market by licensing the 
1.5MW turbine from Fuhrlander, and surpassed Goldwind to become the number one wind 
turbine manufacturer in China by 2008 and the third largest in the world by 2009. Within three 
years it had gained the titles of many “firsts” in China: the first to forge a near-complete 
domestic supply chain for MW-scale WTGs; the first to realize mass-production for MW-scale 
WTGs; and the first to develop a 3MW onshore and offshore turbine with proprietary 
intellectual property (Liaowang 2009). Notwithstanding its slowdown since 2010, the 
experience of Sinovel showcases a latecomer’s leapfrog over incumbents relying on licensed 
technologies.  
And because of the short product life cycle in WTG manufacturing, Chinese firms have 
never stopped the pursuit of technological upgrading. As “Run of the Red Queen” illustrates, 
generally China has been running a race “in perfect tandem with the technological frontier” 
“without actually advancing the frontier itself” (Breznitz and Murphree 2011: 3). This is also 
reflected in the wind industry, where Chinese firms remain sustainable and lucrative by keeping 
up with the state-of-the-art designs in the international market. They started to negotiate import 
or licensing of 1MW, 1.5MW or even larger designs when 750KW turbines dominated the 
market; and the collaboration on the development of multiple, or even double digit, -MW 
designs was already underway when MW-class turbines just prevailed. On top of the size, 
                                                     
6 Breznitz and Murphree (2011) had a discussion about China keeping up with the technology frontier without 
pushing the frontier forward in the IT industry. 
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modifications have to be made to adapt to local conditions, such as extreme weathers, high 
altitudes and grid connections. As wind farms moved to the sea, coastal conditions such as 
water depth, seabed conditions, currents, corrosion, migration, waves, high wind speed and 
typhoons need to be taken into consideration. Accordingly, offshore and intertidal turbines or 
universal designs adjustable to all conditions went onto the stage to meet the requirements. The 
follow-up of advanced designs keeps Chinese manufacturers lucrative without becoming 
novelty innovators themselves. 
Table 5-1 Top 10 Wind turbine manufacturers by global market share, 2008-2013 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 Vestas Vestas  Vestas  Vestas  GE Wind  Vestas 
2 GE Wind GE Wind  Sinovel  Goldwind  Vestas  Goldwind 
3 Gamesa Sinovel  GE Wind  GE Wind  Siemens Enercon 
4 Enercon Enercon  Goldwind  Gamesa  Enercon Siemens 
5 Siemens Goldwind  Enercon  Enercon  Suzlon GE Wind 
6 Suzlon Dongfang  Suzlon  Suzlon  Gamesa Gamesa 
7 Sinovel Gamesa  Dongfang  Sinovel  Goldwind Suzlon 
8 Goldwind Suzlon  Gamesa  United Power  United Power United Power 
9 Dongfang Siemens  Siemens  Siemens  Sinovel Mingyang 
10 Nordex REpower  United Power  Mingyang  Mingyang Nordex 
Source: Renewables Global Status Report, REN21 (Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century), 
consecutive years. The companies in bold are indigenous Chinese firms.  
In the process of upgrading to larger capacity and local adaptations, European design firms 
continue to play a significant role as indigenous research capability grows. While Chinese firms 
accumulated experiences through learning by doing, joint research and acquisition became 
increasingly popular (Table 5-2). With the help of design firms such as American 
Superconductor (AMSC/Windtec) and Aerodyn, some indigenous wind manufacturers, 
including Dongfang, Windey and Mingyang, improved their capabilities by making 
accumulative and radical changes to the existing models. Some of the cross-border collaboration 
also led to the formation of proprietary know-how: United Power did the major part of detailed 
R&D using the basic design and technical assistance of a UK firm, Garrard Hassan; Sinovel 
obtained IPR of the geared turbines as a result of cooperating with AMSC/Windtec;
7
 CSIC 
Haizhuang also managed to develop proprietary designs by collaborating with Aerodyn. Other 
than that, the acquisition of Vensys by Goldwind and of Darwind by XEMC pushed the Chinese 
wind industry further up technological ladders. Some leading firms, primarily Goldwind, 
Sinovel and United Power established large R&D centers that became national key laboratories 
of wind power generation systems. 
                                                     
7 Sinovel was in a lawsuit of alleged IP theft reported by AMSC/Windtech in 2011.  
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Table 5-2 Technology solutions of top 15 Chinese wind turbine manufacturers by 2013 
  Manufacturers Year Licensing Joint Development Acquisition 
1 Goldwind 1998* 
Repower/Jacobs 
(Germany) 
Vensys (Germany) 
Vensys 
(Germany) 
2 
United Power 
(Guodian) 
2007** Aerodyn (Germany) Garrad Hassan (UK)   
3 Mingyang 2006 Aerodyn (Germany) Aerodyn (Germany)   
4 Envision 2007   Danish research arm (EU)   
5 XEMC 2006* 
Zephyros/Lagerwey 
(Netherlands) 
  
Darwind 
(Netherlands) 
6 Sewind 2006*** 
DeWind/EU Energy 
(Germany/UK); 
Siemens (Germany) 
Aerodyn (Germany)   
7 Sinovel 2006*** 
Fuhrlander (Germany); 
AMSC/Windtec 
(US/Austria) 
AMSC/Windtec 
(US/Austria) 
  
8 CSIC Haizhuang 2004*** 
Frisia (Germany); 
Aerodyn (Germany) 
Aerodyn (Germany)   
9 
Dongfang Electric 
Corporation 
(DEC) 
2004*** REpower (Germany) 
Aerodyn (Germany); 
AMSC/Windtec 
(US/Austria) 
  
10 Windey 2001* REpower (Germany) 
Aerodyn (Germany); 
Zhejiang Institute of 
Mechanical and Electrical 
Engineering (China) 
  
11 
Huachuang 
(Datang) 
2006**   
Shenyang University of 
Technology (China) 
  
12 CSR Zhuzhou 2006*** 
AMSC/Windtec 
(US/Austria) 
    
13 
Hewind (Huayi 
Electric, or 
HEAG) 
2002   
Aerodyn (Germany); 
MECAL (Netherlands) 
  
14 
Taiyuan Heavy 
Industry 
2006*** Renk (Germany)     
15 
Beizhong (now 
Jingcheng New 
Energy) 
2005*** 
Fuhrlander (Germany); 
DeWind (Germany) 
    
Source: Author’s compilation, mainly from interviews, company websites, Lewis 2012, and other secondary 
documents. Notes: "Year" refers to the year that a company started wind turbine manufacturing; * indicates that the 
companies started wind energy research long before the year, mostly public research institutes in the 1980s or the 
1990s; ** refers to the companies established or owned by wind power generation companies; *** are the wind 
energy subsidiaries or divisions of large SOEs in the heavy industry; others are small SOEs or private firms. 
Despite the growths of independent technology capabilities, Chinese wind firms continue to 
rely on foreign consultancies in their designs and technology suppliers for certain parts. As a 
study of wind turbine development in China shows, wind firms accessed foreign technologies 
through the sourcing of key components abroad, licensed production, and purchase of small 
foreign design firms (Lewis 2007; Lewis 2013). This relationship with smaller foreign wind 
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firms is more strategic in offshore wind technology, which involves “significant scope for 
innovation” because of the stringent requirement for technical performance and challenges in 
increasing capacity and reliability (Wyatt et al. 2014: 39). For offshore turbines, the top Chinese 
wind producers continue to outsource a diverse range of components from foreign suppliers to 
“protect against problems in the production line” (Wyatt et al. 2014: 44). Similar is also true in 
the production of small standalone wind turbines for small amount or household-based 
electricity demand, which is still at its infancy stage. Other than that, a technology gap remains 
between indigenous and foreign technologies, and problems plagued the wind turbines made by 
indigenous firms. With the steady inflow of technology assistance from overseas, indigenous 
firms were able to keep up with the global race in WTG manufacturing. 
3.2 Competition with top global producers 
The ease of technology acquisition discussed above partly attributed to the fierce challenge that 
international wind turbine manufacturers experienced in China. Leading global companies used 
to dominate China’s wind energy market with imported wind turbines and later established 
wholly-owned local manufacturing facilities compelled by the localization rules. Some of them 
set up JV plants with indigenous firms for the production of components and parts but not for 
complete units. So far there are four major multinationals producing wind power generation 
units in China, namely Vestas from Denmark, Gamesa from Spain, Suzlon from India and 
General Electric (GE) from the Unites States. These locally invested MNCs are the major rivals 
of indigenous firms within China, and the intensive competition reflects “the fight for the 
middle” that can also be seen in many other industries: while domestic firms are dedicated to 
avoid cut-throat price wars in the low-end of the market by improving manufacturing skills, 
foreign invested firms in the high-end are engaged in cost reduction to meet the local price 
demand through localized operations (Brandt and Thun 2010: 1556). The competition urges 
Chinese indigenous firms to keep running toward the global technology frontier through 
alliances with European KIBS providers, which further intensified the competition with FIEs. 
Despite extensive new energy cooperation efforts across countries, technology partnerships 
were impeded by the competition between domestic and international wind turbine 
manufacturers. With climate change becoming one of the most pressing challenges of all 
countries, many have undertaken bilateral collaboration on clean energy R&D in an effort to 
influence cross-border business activities. China has signed agreements on energy and 
environmental cooperation with other countries via official and unofficial channels, especially 
the European Union and the United States. However, under the umbrella of larger bilateral 
negotiations remains the competition of manufacturers for technologies, resources, and access to 
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markets. A global public interest in the sharing and dissemination of climate change mitigation 
technologies was undermined by the opposing logic of market: while Chinese firms strived to 
secure a technological edge without incentives to share the market with foreign partners, 
international business actors tried to gain access to the Chinese market without a real intention 
to nurture local technology capabilities (Conrad and Meissner 2011: 8). Moreover, because “it is 
hard for any country to put long-term global interests ahead of near-term domestic interests”, 
implementation of the framework agreements were not accompanied by high-level political 
support (Lewis 2013: 180). In the case of China and the US, technology cooperation is 
hampered by the increasingly competitive relationship between the two countries in the global 
economic market place (Lewis 2013: 178). 
In spite of the domestic-foreign contest, international frontier firms’ competitors are actually 
not purely Chinese manufacturers but another group of foreign firms. While in early days wind 
pioneers only sold China wind turbines manufactured overseas, they now have to face the 
competition from Chinese new entrants, whose advantages in cost and skills were unleashed 
through the coalition with foreign KIBS providers. Hence it is necessary to distinguish the 
interests of large international WTG manufacturers from those of small design firms: the former 
slobber over China’s vast wind market without incentives to share know-how with local firms, 
whereas the latter actually benefit from local manufacturing through technology transfer. While 
technology spill-over remains a controversial topic, this is not to make a judgement in that sense 
but to tell apart different types of foreign companies and their roles in an industrializing 
economy. Most existing studies fail to acknowledge the distinction and underline a simplistic 
conflict between domestic and foreign industry actors. In fact, the antagonism is complicated by 
the existence of Europe-based small design and consulting firms, which are indifferent in 
manufacturing but passionate about technological advancements. 
The opposite standpoint of small design firms makes them outright matches for Chinese 
firms, and makes the alliances competitors to leading international WTG producers. European 
design firms and laboratories were attracted to China considering the profit-making potentials as 
well as the operating experiences in the co-development of sophisticated large turbines. 
Together with Chinese WTG producers, they also hope for a flourishing national wind industry 
that spells greater opportunities for both, which are aligned in the pursuit of government support 
and in the defense against external competition. This is why Beijing never met resistance from 
foreign design firms with regard to nationalist policies; and we also could not hear the voices of 
foreign design firms internationally when leading international wind and solar manufacturers 
accused China of protectionism and discrimination. Therefore, the divergence of interests 
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underlined by traditional studies coexists with the convergence of interests seen in the domestic-
foreign alliances in China’s wind energy industry. 
Chinese wind firms in the alliances applauded and actively chased up the central 
government support in building up local manufacturing capabilities. Together with local parts 
suppliers and wind farm project developers, Chinese WTG manufacturers benefited greatly 
from China’s “three-pronged strategy”: market creation through the concession tendering for 
wind projects, incubation of indigenous firms through the local content requirement, and 
support of local R&D efforts through government funding (Nahm 2014). In fact many of them 
came into being upon seeing the policy signals that the sector was targeted for government 
support. Companies began to flood into wind power following the issuance of supportive 
programs and policies, which were officially launched between 2003 and 2005. Aside from 
those involved in wind energy research from beginning, most currently active industrial players 
started their businesses around that time (see Table 5-2). WTG manufacturers mushroomed 
from six by the year 2004 to over 80 by 2009, not to mention the producers of components and 
parts, mainly gearboxes, bearings, power converters, control systems and blades.
8
 Alongside the 
dramatic rise in manufacturing, demand pull policies also spurred the cooperation between 
producers and large power generation companies such as Huaneng, Guodian and Datang in 
winning wind farm projects.  
Like in many other manufacturing industries, Chinese wind firms could leverage the 
opportunities presented by governments at different administrative levels. Aside from Goldwind 
and Windey that originated from public research institutes, many of the new entrants are state-
owned or controlled heavy industry enterprises that diversified their business into WTG 
manufacturing. Sinovel was partly owned by Dalian Heavy Industry (DHI), Dongfang by 
Dongfang Electric Corporation (DEC), and Haizhuang by China Shipbuilding Industry 
Corporation (CSIC). As provincially or municipally administered enterprises, they received 
support from both central and local governments, and benefited from the divergence of policy 
goals at different levels (Nahm 2014). Surfing on the policies for an emerging strategic industry 
like wind power, these enterprises made use of government support but did not necessarily 
follow the policy goals, especially the central goal of building up knowledge-intensive 
capabilities. Similarly, private firms also joined the flourishing wind power sector through the 
help of KIBS providers and government support, with the meteoric rises of Mingyang and 
Envision as most noteworthy. 
                                                     
8 Interview no. CA200612, a researcher at the National Climate Strategy and International Cooperation Center, 
Canberra, 20 Jun 2012.  
Pan, National champions or global partners? 
118 
4. Compliance with state-directions at early stage 
Under the directions of the Chinese state, the wind power industry took on an open stance in the 
first two decades of demonstration and early commercialization. At that time domestic 
manufacturing was still at its infant stage and most wind turbines were imported using foreign 
government grants and loans. In general, Chinese wind industry players cooperated with the 
central government to carry out a dual-track strategy: introduction of foreign wind technologies 
and independent development of wind turbines at the same time. However, the independent 
efforts lagged behind those in the international market, where dominant wind turbines always 
had larger capacity than domestic designs in research (Li et al. 2007: 12). Coupled with the high 
cost for import, Beijing decided to acquire technologies by making matches for state-owned and 
foreign enterprises to enter into JV partnerships, traditionally known as “trading market for 
technology”. Domestic firms engaged in other areas of manufacturing accepted the 
arrangements considering the “special care” and favorable policies that they could receive from 
the government.  
In the first two decades, the presence of domestic wind turbine manufacturers was limited 
and development of the industry remained at the steering wheel of Beijing. At the time of 
revitalizing a national industry, the Chinese state took the initiatives in wind power development 
due to the absence of entrepreneurship and market mechanisms. Until the end of 2003, only a 
few partly state-owned and Sino-foreign JV enterprises were active in the market and largely 
docile to the government for the sake of nurturing policies. Unable to confront long-standing 
and well-developed foreign competitors, these early industry players founded in the end of 
1990s relied on infant industry protection to survive. Unlike in the nuclear power industry 
where industry players had bureaucratic affiliations that were typical of a split between the 
military-defense and energy-economy camps, wind turbine manufacturers originated from 
existing business actors or public research institutes and were all under the jurisdiction of 
economic planning bodies in charge of energy and industry development. Without the 
divergence of bureaucratic interests and connection to the ministerial departments, domestic 
business actors faced similar circumstances in terms of following state directions and fending 
against foreign competition. And because of the access to technologies through licensing, they 
did not have to go into coalitions with international frontier firms to compete with each other.  
4.1 Government-led import and R&D (1984-1993) 
Wind power development in China did not generate stark contrasts in departmental interests, 
which left no historical roots for fundamental divergences in business interests. During the first 
ten years of wind power development, fewer government agencies were involved in the use of 
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wind energy than in nuclear power projects. Since the beginning, the development of wind pilot 
schemes has been in the hands of macroeconomic agencies and categorized in civilian energy 
use. As early as in the 1980s when the Chinese government set scientific research on wind 
energy as one of the national priorities, the State Planning Commission (SPC), the Ministry of 
Electric Power, the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC), and the Ministry of 
Farm Machinery were involved (Williams 1982: 10). In 1993, the Ministry of Electric Power 
proposed a wind power industrialization program at a national wind power work meeting 
(IRENA 2012: 49). We cannot conclude that all these agencies were in perfect harmony as for 
wind power development, but definitely there were no observations of tensions between military 
and civilian camps that were seen in nuclear energy. Import of foreign wind turbines was 
generally accepted when public research institutes led by SSTC were developing their own 
WTG systems. While the independent stream of efforts developed into first WTG manufacturers 
that were regulated by SPC, SETC and later NDRC, among domestic business actors there was 
no conflict that can be traced back to bureaucratic conflicts.  
Aside from the coherent governance over wind power generation, the Chinese state did not 
face the same level of external pressure as seen in the nuclear energy industry. As a mass-
production industry, WTG manufacturing involves a large number of sellers in the international 
market that Chinese could choose from. And due to the relatively short product life-cycle and 
simple installation interface, wind power projects could be realized through international trade 
and foreign technical assistance in a short period of time. Certain buyer-seller interactions were 
needed in the process but the link between them was mainly through trade, not the intimate 
collaboration seen in nuclear power projects. Moreover, as continuity in the selection of wind 
turbines is not necessary for newly planned projects, Chinese recipients bought a variety of 
WTG systems from many different foreign manufacturers. By the year 2003, over 20 foreign 
WTG manufacturers from six countries took up 85 percent of the Chinese market (See Table 
5-3). With the abundant supply of wind turbines, Chinese could shift among trade partners and 
did not have to worry about technology unification that is necessary to the CoPS industries such 
as nuclear power projects. In addition, the state-owned WTG manufacturers that originated from 
the early government initiatives could later enjoy the freedom of choosing other approaches to 
technology acquisition. 
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Table 5-3 Total installed capacity in China by WTG manufacturers through 2003 
Manufacturer Home Country Installed Capacity (kW) Market Share 
NEG Micon Denmark 170,390 30.07% 
Vestas Denmark 95,920 16.93% 
Nordex Germany 88,550 15.63% 
Goldwind China 50,100 8.84% 
XAEC-Nordex Sino-German JV 21,000 3.71% 
Gamesa Spain 20,800 3.67% 
MADE Spain 18,480 3.26% 
Nedwind Netherlands 17,500 3.09% 
Zond USA 16,500 2.91% 
Bonus Denmark 13,550 2.39% 
Bazan-Bonus Spain-Denmark 12,000 2.12% 
AN Bonus Germany-Denmark 9,600 1.69% 
Windey China 6,150 1.09% 
Yituo-Made Sino-Spain JV 5,280 0.93% 
HSM-250T Unknown 4,500 0.79% 
Tacke Germany 4,500 0.79% 
Dewind Germany-UK 3,000 0.53% 
Beijing Wandian China 2,400 0.42% 
Jacobs Germany 1,500 0.26% 
Shanghai Shenxing China 1,200 0.21% 
Windmaster Netherlands 800 0.14% 
FD28-300 China 600 0.11% 
AWT-275 Unknown 550 0.10% 
US Windpower USA 500 0.09% 
Darrious Unknown 350 0.06% 
FD31-300 China 300 0.05% 
Newind Canada 300 0.05% 
Aeroman Germany 300 0.05% 
Wincon Denmark 100 0.02% 
 
 Total 566,720 100.00% 
Source: Shi Pengfei, 2003 nian Zhongguo fengdianchang zhuangji rongliang tongji (The installed capacity of wind 
farms in China in 2003) and CRESP, 2005, National Action Plan for China's Wind Power Industry Development 
Despite the reliance on imported WTG systems in the initial stage, local industrial players 
did not develop long-term strategic coalitions with foreign suppliers. This is because WTG 
installations are much simpler than CoPS projects and can be done without a high level of buyer 
involvement. Unlike complex nuclear power projects, WTG systems do not involve cross-
disciplinary expertise and long-term, large-scale system integration that require day-to-day 
collaborations from the demand side. Therefore, well-established sellers do not need as much 
local support as seen in the nuclear power industry and only need Chinese buyers’ cooperation 
in peripheral installations and wind farm construction. Moreover, as wind turbine production is 
codified and can be easily copied, foreign suppliers hoped to reduce the risk of creating 
potential local competitors by simply making profit through the sales of WTG systems instead 
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of engaging closely with local firms. As a result, utility developers acted as major industrial 
players whereas Chinese manufacturers were absent from China’s first utility-scale wind power 
projects. For power utilities in Xinjiang and other areas that are rich in wind resources, they 
aimed to fulfil Beijing’s initiative of building wind power projects in a short period of time and 
easing power supply shortage in these areas. Due to short product-life cycle and simple 
component interface, they could achieve the goal through one-off import and technical 
assistance from foreign suppliers; and due to the large number of suppliers available in the 
market and limited cost associated with changing trade partners, they did not have the incentive 
to come into strategic coalitions with foreign suppliers.  
When China’s wind power development in the beginning relied on buying foreign wind 
turbines, independent research of wind turbines was underway under the direction of central 
government. To facilitate the learning process, the Chinese government designated some 
departments of provincial governments and public research institutes to develop indigenous 
wind turbines. The predecessors of Goldwind, the Xinjiang Wind Power Research Institute and 
the Xinjiang Wind Energy Company (XWEC) were established in 1986 and 1988 for the 
introduction and absorption of Danish wind technologies. Earlier than that, Windey’s 
predecessor, Zhejiang Electromechanical Design and Research Institute developed China’s first 
wind turbine (18kW) in 1972. It was affiliated to Zhejiang Machinery and Electrical Group, 
formerly the Machinery Industry Department of Zhejiang province, and was the first 
organization specialized in the research and development of home-grown wind turbines (Jia 
2013). However, both were constrained in commercializing their own models due to the limited 
capability in catching up with WTG systems dominating in the market. For example, when 
Windey’s predecessor developed the prototype of a 200kW wind turbine in 1997, 600kW 
turbines dominated the international market already; and when three units of the 200kW 
turbines were installed in 1999, 750kW prevailed.  
4.2 Government-arranged JVs and first entrepreneurial attempts (1994-2003) 
As pioneering manufacturers did not have to tie up with local partners in the sales of WTG 
systems to China, Beijing forced them to. In 1997 the former SPC launched the “Ride the Wind” 
program to encourage domestic firms making use of foreign technologies, or in other words, to 
persuade foreign suppliers pairing up with Chinese firms on the conditions of technology 
transfer and majority Chinese ownership, which was also seen in the auto industry. This was 
meant to increase Chinese exposure to wind turbine production and add to the chance of 
technology spill-over. MADE (Spanish) and Nordex (German) were selected by the Chinese 
government and two JV enterprises were established, respectively Yituo-MADE and XAEC-
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Nordex.
9
  They accepted the terms for a variety of reasons, mostly for a good relationship with 
the Chinese government, minimization of upfront investment, and “name recognition and 
reputation” in a potential market as large as China; for them, these benefits outweighed the 
“costs and concessions associated with the technology transfer and a minority ownership share 
of the company” (Lewis 2013: 90). 
The official arrangement became wishful thinking: these JV enterprises did not work out 
well as the result of diverging business interests and internal conflict between domestic and 
foreign partners in day-to-day operations. Research shows that foreign partners in the JV 
enterprises were half-hearted in their local operations: the compromises they made for market 
entrance are embedded in a larger business strategy and their real intent was to promote the 
sales of more advanced turbines manufactured in their home countries (Lewis 2013: 119). They 
did not submit to Beijing’s desire for JV partnerships, and “there were often conflicts between 
foreign managers and local managers operating in joint-venture enterprises, contributing to 
mutual frustration, resentment, and sometimes failure” (Lewis 2013: 119). Transferred 
technologies were mostly outdated ones compared to those leading the international market. For 
example, Nordex started selling 1.3MW turbines to China immediately following the JV 
agreement and a license for the production of 600kW turbines; soon afterwards, it founded a 
wholly owned company separate from the JV enterprise to conduct service on the imported 
turbines (Lewis 2013: 90). As a wholly owned German company, the Nordex headquarters did 
not want less expensive turbines produced in China to challenge those in its German factory; 
and as a minority shareholder of XAEC-Nordex, it saw the JV partnership as simply a strategic 
move in the larger chess game through the deployment of a broad network of “Chinese outposts 
for Nordex Germany” around China (Lewis 2013: 90). While XAEC-Nordex’s fortune started 
and ended with the 600kW turbines from 1998 to 2004, Nordex Germany continues to provide 
larger turbines and remains active in the Chinese market.  
The experience of Sino-foreign JV enterprises in China’s wind industry is a strong proof of 
the domestic-foreign business tension found in mass-manufacturing industries. The concern 
over losing technology competitiveness in codified manufacturing gives well-established firms 
disincentives to collaborate with local companies in WTG production. The nature of the WTG 
industry determines that foreign companies tend to hold back from sharing all their technologies 
and try to maintain control over important decisions in the Sino-foreign partnerships. Chinese 
government intervention failed in the effort to create harmony within the JV firms because the 
ties with local firms that are necessary and in the interest of CoPS providers are naturally 
conflicting with foreign business interest in WTG manufacturing. As nuclear reactor vendors 
                                                     
9 The two Chinese SOEs were respectively China First Tractor (Yituo) and Xi’an Aero-Engine Company (XAEC). 
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did not have to worry about losing competitiveness in a short period of time even when building 
the most advanced nuclear power plants in recipient countries, they relied on the unity with 
local partners to negotiate with Beijing and make profit. In contrast, because of the concern over 
losing technology advantage, foreign WTG suppliers hoped to do it alone with their Chinese 
partners shelved, not to mention that these partners were not “too big to fail” and not as 
powerful as nuclear industrial players to influence Beijing. Accordingly, Chinese partners felt 
that they were marginalized and JV partnerships were hijacked for other purposes.  
At the time when JV partnership was encouraged, the Chinese government kept up with the 
support of independent research and promoted local manufacturing. During the Ninth Five-Year 
Plan beginning in 1996, Beijing incorporated wind energy research into the National High-Tech 
R&D Program (863 Program) and allocated funding for the development of indigenous 600kW 
turbines with a local content of 40 percent, which were facilitated by the Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MOST) and the former State Development Planning Commission (SDPC). In 
order to reduce production cost and encourage local manufacturing, the Chinese government 
raised tariffs for the import of complete wind turbines and lowered them on imported 
components in 1996, and exempted the value-added tax (VAT) for components in 1998. When 
Beijing recognized that JV partnership and import could not be tamed and domesticated for 
local manufacturing capability, it imposed a 17 percent VAT on imports in addition to the 
existing seven percent customs duty for wind turbine import in 2001 (Danish News Digest 
2001). Around the same time, the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) and SPC 
launched the “National Debt Wind Power Program” to support complete WTG manufacturers in 
the formation of independent IPR. In general, the SPC system, including the former Ministry of 
Electric Power and later the State Power Corporation, continued to lead the wind power industry 
planning at this stage.  
Chinese industrial players worked in a responsive mode to Beijing’s initiatives of getting 
domestic WTG manufacturing out of stagnation after ten years’ development through relying on 
import. Xinjiang Wind Energy Institute was encouraged to build an assembly factory, which 
was later reorganized into Goldwind in 1998 and became the first Chinese company for the 
commercial production of WTG systems. Similarly, Windey was set up by Zhejiang Machinery 
and Electrical Group and Zhejiang Electromechanical Design and Research Institute in 2001 to 
start domestic production while continuing with the independent research. Compared to the 
initial R&D funding from central and local governments, the early wind turbine firms made a 
much larger amount of investment in the development of 600kW and 750kW turbines, mostly 
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through bank loans and international investors.
10
 Recognized as the key 863 projects, both 
Goldwind and Windey together with some universities and research institutes were integrated in 
the development of MW-scale turbines starting from the Tenth Five-Year Plan in 2001.
11
 In 
addition, Goldwind also benefited from the “Western Development Strategy” favoring the 
economic growth in China’s west regions, including Xinjiang. For Goldwind and the Xinjiang 
government, local wind power and industry development were consistent with Beijing’s desire 
of creating a balanced national economy and easing social unrest in underdeveloped areas. 
While there were already a few wind turbine R&D centers available in China, the one in 
Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, was designated a National Wind Power Technology Engineering 
Research Centre. 
As learning is a necessary process for new entrants in most emerging industries, the early 
independent development of wind turbines was actually a complement to the domestic 
production of internationally advanced models. While home-grown models were still in 
laboratory and JV partnership did not help building domestic manufacturing capability, the early 
Chinese wind turbine plants could only start commercial production using licensed technologies 
from KIBS providers. Unlike their counterparts in JV partnerships, Goldwind and Windey could 
maintain their control over business operations without facing challenges from their technology 
suppliers. Therefore, the emergence of KIBS firms increased the chance for indigenous Chinese 
firms to grow up as a challenge to international firms at the frontier of WTG production. Aside 
from imported wind turbines, the last few years of this period witnessed the beginning of 
domestic WTG assembly, mainly licensed production by Chinese-owned and Sino-foreign JV 
firms, and manufacture of home-grown 200kW turbines by Windey.
12
 In particular, Goldwind 
bought a license from Jacobs (later acquired by REpower) for the production of 600kW turbines 
in 1996 and from REpower for 750kW turbines in 2001, after which Windey also started the 
production of REpower turbines through a license agreement. From then on the Chinese wind 
energy industry departed from the hundred percent of reliance on imported wind turbines.  
5. Exploitation of government support since 2003 
At this stage a domestic-foreign rivalry came into being since the emergence of indigenous wind 
turbine producers with access to technologies through the purchase of licenses. At the same time 
of developing MW-scale turbines, new Chinese entrants rapidly filled the market using these 
                                                     
10 Interview no. CA200612, a researcher at the National Climate Strategy and International Cooperation Center, 
Canberra, 20 Jun 2012; international investors include the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank. 
11 The other participants of the R&D of megawatt-scale wind turbines include Shenyang University of Technology, 
Chinese Helicopter Research Institute, and Longyuan Power Group. 
12 There were some other Chinese wind turbine manufacturers such as Wandian and Shenxin but the volume of their 
production was not significant. 
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licensed technologies and managed to break from the sole dependence on import. Because of 
the overseas KIBS firms that have decided not to venture into the market themselves, Chinese 
firms could churn out wind turbines that left the world’s largest turbine makers aside and 
become key industrial players in the Chinese market. The licenses made economies of scale and 
local manufacturing possible, and helped achieve Beijing’s goal of building a local wind turbine 
industry at lower manufacturing costs. The major foreign producers that had sold wind turbines 
to China had to seek other means to get into the market due to the price disadvantage and 
Beijing’s policies in favor of indigenous firms. Out of the concern of technology spill-over, 
many of them went into China by setting up fully owned assembly plants and nurturing their 
own supply chains. Therefore, when Beijing emphasized the development of wind power, 
Chinese and foreign turbine makers went all out, individually, to vie for a slice of the booming 
market. 
Due to the relative independence and exclusive interests of each other, local and foreign 
producers took actions separately in taking advantage of Beijing’s support. Chinese firms could 
seek their own fortunes without clinging on to prominent world producers, which on the other 
hand were indisposed to work with local partners particularly in the assembly of WTG system. 
Therefore, at that time in China cross-border coalitions in wind equipment production were 
neither necessary nor attractive. When Chinese firms were caught up in a craze of making use of 
government support to crank up production, large foreign firms were also eager to join the race 
to grab a share of the industry’s biggest new market. Considering local content requirements 
and their aversion to associate with local firms, foreign turbine producers lost no time to build 
factories in China since Beijing sent out a clear sign that the country was committed to develop 
wind power in 2003. Without alliances with domestic firms, which are essential in the nuclear 
energy industry, they had to change their identities into Chinese to occupy a share of the 
uncultivated land. Though wholly foreign-owned, their local plants were regarded as domestic 
firms so that they could bypass the local content barriers and benefit from the support of local 
firms.  
Beijing’s commitment to throw its weight behind wind power received overwhelming 
support from domestic and foreign turbine makers. Since 2003, the Chinese government shifted 
its focus from demonstration projects to market creation and started to encourage the 
construction of large-capacity wind farms. Particularly in 2005, NDRC introduced a system of 
intensive financial and policy support for the use of wind power, creation of domestic demand 
for wind turbines, and nurturance of local manufacturing capability. With the business 
expansion of existing producers and proliferation of new entrants to the market, the infant 
industry went in full swing and competition quickly heated up among domestic firms and 
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foreign players. As a result, China saw a surge of total wind power installations that doubled 
annually between 2004 and 2009 (CWEA 2011). In the fight for supremacy in China’s wind 
market, domestic firms and global leaders were not inclined to go into coalitions and all tried to 
get the best out of government support for their own business interests. Though in different 
ways, they all played the rules written by Beijing and hoped to outpace their competitors by 
following Beijing’s dictates. However, this does not mean complete compliance with the central 
government because it could not extend its reach into every aspect of business activities.  
5.1 Domestic carnival in response to policy incentives 
Indigenous Chinese firms underwent an aggressive expansion in response to Beijing’s 
promotion of wind power and local governments’ push behind the scenes. Since 2003, the 
central government launched a few rounds of bidding projects for large-scale wind firms and 
economies of scale, namely the Wind Power Concession Program. NDRC, China’s central 
planning agency and industry regulator, further reinforced the use of home-made wind power 
units in 2005 mandating that at least 70% of wind power equipment must be manufactured 
domestically, and wind farms not meeting the requirement of localization rate shall not be 
allowed to be built (NDRC 2005). The Renewable Energy Law enacted in 2006 required a 
mandatory grid connection to encourage power generation companies to invest in the projects 
making use of renewable energies. In addition, NDRC also required wind farm developers 
bidding on the concession projects to bundle their tendering with chosen whole unit producers, 
which was meant to promote wind power development as well as a Chinese wind power 
equipment industry. At the same time, the market could see that the backing of Chinese banks 
and tax incentives also turned to focus on wind power related business activities.  
Public and private investment poured into the industry because wind power delivered on all 
these parameters: government support, low entry barriers, rapid implementation and quick 
returns. Many industry players flooded into the production of wind power equipment without 
any experience or technology expertise: most built factories and devoted themselves to the 
single-minded pursuit of scale production by making the shortcut of buying licenses from 
overseas KIBS firms. They could simply assemble the mechanical parts bought from local and 
high precision parts from overseas according to the purchased blueprints. In view of the 
relatively simple preparatory work for assembly, short production cycle and construction period 
for wind projects, it is possible for whole unit producers to make profit in a short period of time 
without relying on global wind power giants. And because of the policies favoring local firms 
and direct sales channels created by the government, they were able to bring these 
characteristics into full play for their own benefit. 
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With all the factors in place, the most important element for Chinese turbine makers to 
prosper and the market to heat up was foreign licenses. In addition to Goldwind and Windey 
that expanded production capacity using foreign licenses, a multitude of new entrants set up 
their plants by signing licensing agreements with KIBS providers, which stood indifferent from 
the strategy of building turbines and delivering finished products to wind farms. Dongfang 
entered the market with the license from REpower, Sewind from DeWind, XEMC from 
Zephyros, Sinovel and Beizhong from Fuhrlander, and CSIC Haizhuang, United Power and 
Mingyang from Aerodyn. During the same period, dozens of small and medium-sized firms 
swarmed into the market wanting a share of the big cake. “It seems that every day there was a 
new company springing up and starting up operations, like bamboo shoots after a rain.”13 
Within the five to six years between 2004 and 2009, the number of whole unit producers 
increased rapidly from six by 2003 to over 80 in 2009, and 70 out of the 80 firms started 
manufacturing through the purchase of license. Therefore, there was no need for imported 
turbines in China because domestic manufacturers were building up capacity that could meet the 
demand of market growth on their own.  
Following the tradition of picking winners, established producers such as Goldwind and 
Windey continued to benefit from government selection at this stage. Both had ramped up 
production for a greater market share when the big wind power cake was still in baking. Not 
counting the imported wind turbines, Goldwind was already the largest wind turbine maker by 
market share (8.8%), and was selected for one of the first concession projects started in 2003. 
Aside from that, Goldwind was awarded such projects as a contract for “Green Olympics” in 
2006, the first demonstration for China’s offshore wind power plant in 2007, and projects in 
GW-scale wind bases in 2008, which not only brought profit but also consolidated its position 
as the industry leader. In those years, its turnover doubled annually and even tripled in 2006, 
and before it went public in 2007 its market share in China already hit 33%. For the sake of the 
privileges it received from Beijing, it showed a high level of respect for the government 
restrictions on manufacturing companies listing on foreign stock markets. Originally intended 
an initial public offering (IPO) overseas, Goldwind decided to go for a domestic listing at the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in December 2007 (China Energy Newswire 2007; SinoCast 2006b).
 
It was said that the company met objections from regulators and made the change due to 
“unstated reasons”.14  
Among all the new entrants, the most eye-catching players were mainly SOEs with a 
national or international reputation in equipment manufacturing. They all prospered in a policy 
                                                     
13 Interview no. CA200612, a researcher at the National Climate Strategy and International Cooperation Center, 
Canberra, 20 Jun 2012. 
14 Interview no. BJ170912, an employee of Goldwind, Beijing, 17 Sep 2012. 
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environment highly supportive of domestic firms, especially those with a SOE background. 
With a strong industrial base, most of them could make use of existing resources such as fixed 
assets, relationships with component suppliers and with the big utility companies, and 
connections to the government. They all boast strong backing in Beijing relying on the strategic 
role they played in energy and China’s whole economy. For example, Dongfang and Sewind 
were spin-offs from China’s state-owned backbones of producing power generators, 
respectively DEC and Shanghai Electric; CSIC Haizhuang came from CSIC, China’s largest 
shipbuilding group; XEMC, a large electromechanical equipment maker, also started the 
development of wind power generators early in the 1990s and established its wind division in 
2006; Similarly, CSR Wind originated from the former Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Research 
Institute (now CSR Zhuzhou institute), a subsidiary of CSR focusing on railway locomotives, 
mass transit vehicles and freight wagons (CSR Zhuzhou 2015); United Power and Huachuang 
were respectively affiliated to Guodian and Datang, two of China’s five big power companies. 
Among them, DEC, CSIC, CSR, Guodian and Datang are all members of the 112 centrally 
owned companies directly administered by SASAC. Lying back against the giant SOEs, the new 
entrants experienced a rapid rise by responding to the call of Beijing to localize wind turbine 
production.  
Sinovel can be regarded as the most dazzling case of all the wind turbine producers that 
contributed to the explosive growth by being anchored to large SOEs. It made every effort to 
maximize the resources it could get from Beijing and successfully convert them into turnovers 
that once made it the largest wind power equipment producer in China and the second largest in 
the world. Like other domestic competitors, Sinovel derived benefit from the inherent advantage 
in ready access to upstream component supply because its root in Dalian Heavy Industry (DHI), 
the strategic equipment base in Northeast China good at producing customized equipment. The 
licensing of Germany wind turbines from Fuhrlander made it into a “flash championship” and 
an epitome of the use of supportive policies in setting up large-scale manufacturing base with a 
lightning speed. It took only two years for Sinovel to become the second largest Chinese turbine 
maker in 2006 and another two years to become the largest one in 2008. By the year 2009, it 
took 25.3% of China’s wind turbine market, with Goldwind accounting for only 19.72% of the 
new installed capacity in that year. With the state-owned equipment base at its backyard and 
large power companies waiting to pick up its products, Sinovel’s success was an indisputable 
result of its proactive reactions to government policies. 
While the new wind firms backed up by SOEs were all well versed in making use of 
policies and government resources, Sinovel tells a radical version of the story, by fair means or 
foul. It consummated the proactive reactions to Beijing and did all it could to cling to the 
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powerful in the government. It was reported that Han Junliang, the founder of Sinovel and the 
former General Manager of Dalian Heavy Mechanical & Electrical Equipment Engineering Co., 
Ltd, was expert in linking with government leaders in NDRC and localities. Zhang Guobao, 
deputy director of NDRC and later secretary of the National Energy Administration (NEA), had 
been leading the northeast revitalization office under the State Council since 2004 and fostering 
the company that came from northeast China to some extent added to the performance of the 
office (Chen and Yu 2010). In addition, Qi Yumin, the then Vice Mayor of Dalian who used to 
work in DHI also showed his preference to Sinovel: he proposed to develop Dalian into a R&D 
and manufacturing base for wind power equipment when Sinovel was actively seeking the 
support of NDRC as well as provincial and local governments in building such a base (Chen and 
Yu 2010). There was an anecdote that in order to build relationships with the senior officials in 
charge of the strategic planning of new energies, Han used to buy all the first-class air tickets for 
them and lead his subordinates to sit around them; in 2012, he also chartered a cruise ship on the 
River Danube for one of the NDRC leaders visiting Europe when Han attended a wind power 
exhibition there at the same time, even though the invitee did not come (Wang 2012).  
With the contacts in government leadership, the company developed astuteness in assessing 
policy trends and acted skillfully in concert with Beijing. Sinovel showed an ability to 
accurately assess situations and connections and turn these resources to its own advantage. An 
interviewee said that the company was a perfect example of “policy speculation” and always 
able to prepare in advance and dance to the beat of wind power development policies in China.
15
 
Sinovel already started to prepare for the production of large-capacity wind turbines as early as 
in 2004, and it just so happened that the company came out with the first 1.5MW wind turbine 
when Beijing announced a string of policies to encourage the use of large Chinese-made 
turbines in large-scale wind power bases. As for its official foundation in year 2006, one year 
earlier or later would not work out well because there were not so many support policies in 2005 
but the market would be crowded with too many competitors in 2007 (Chen and Yu 2010). 
Looking back, the company was always well prepared and deployed for all opportunities, be it 
the local content rule in 2005, the connection mandate, or the bundled tendering in 2006. 
According to a Caixin article, “from its foundation in 2006 to 2010, Sinovel walked almost each 
of its steps in advance of policy and market, and became the largest beneficiary of China’s great 
wind leap-forward” (Pu and Yu 2013). The same article alluded to Sinovel’s intimate 
interactions with the government agency in charge of wind power when mentioning the 
following facts that happened in just the right time (Pu and Yu 2013):  
                                                     
15 Interview no. BJ090812, researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing, 09 Aug 2012. 
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In 2006, before the Chinese wind energy industry entered the era of MW-scale models, 
Sinovel went for 1.5MW models right after it was first founded while other major 
producers such as Goldwind still had their concentration on 750kW wind turbines; it 
announced a localization rate of over 80% immediately after the official requirement of 
a 70% local content was made public; it waged a price war and quickly seized the 
market when Beijing hoped to drive down the wind power tariffs through bidding for 
the concession projects; it also took the lead in developing 3MW offshore wind turbines 
when NDRC saw the development of 3MW turbines and offshore wind power projects 
as a national honor; therefore, the Shanghai Dongdaqiao 3MW offshore wind power 
project became the symbol that Sinovel established its industry position. 
Sinovel was proficient in image-making and winning favor from the government by making 
itself into a national champion. In return, the central government also took the company’s 
business interests into account in policy-making. According to insiders, when China was 
planning for the Shanghai Dongdaqiao 3MW offshore wind power project, both NDRC and the 
Shanghai municipal government wanted indigenous firms to undertake the project considering 
not only cost factors but also the national image.
16
 When Goldwind and Sewind hesitated to take 
the challenge in view of technology constraints, Sinovel stepped forward despite the pessimistic 
anticipation of wind power experts at that time. Eager to make itself into a national hero, it 
started joint development with AMSC-Windtec on 3MW offshore turbines and finished the 
installation of 34 units of these turbines in two years’ time, which were connected to grid in 
June 2010. Even though cost greatly exceeded the initial budget of the project, the leaders were 
very pleased with it and felt having “face” because of the 3MW offshore turbines when the 
United States still did not have one (Chen and Yu 2010). As a reward, the central government 
gave Sinovel 50 million yuan of special R&D grants and extra 77 million yuan of subsidies for 
the establishment of an offshore wind power R&D center in Han Junliang’s hometown, Jiangsu, 
as the only national one approved by NDRC and NEA at that time (Chen and Yu 2010).
17
 And 
according to a sales person working in the industry for many years, “more than once the 
government mentioned to build China’s Vestas, and everybody knows that this refers to Sinovel” 
(Pu and Yu 2013). 
Having a good nose for inside news, Sinovel could always enjoy first-mover advantages 
through the overall coordination of all resources well in advance. This included not only the 
control of a supply network but also a good relationship in downstream with state utility 
companies. As other new SOE entrants, Sinovel was strong in assembly because of the 
capability in sourcing key components and parts from its backing company, DHI. It also 
                                                     
16  Interview no. BJ220812, researchers at the Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development 
(CASTED), Ministry of Science and Technology, Beijing, 22 Aug 2012. 
17 Sinovel’s offshore wind power R&D center was the first one in China at that time, but later the Ministry of Science 
and Technology approved a similar center to be built by CSIC Haizhuang. As these centers were supported by 
different government agencies, both companies claimed that they are the only one with a national R&D center on 
offshore wind. This case is a reflection of the bureaucratic fragmentation and misalignment between agencies in 
charge of industries and those of science and technology, typically between NDRC and MOST. 
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incorporated the blade factory founded by Wei Wenyuan, one of the first investors of Sinovel 
and later its acting CEO, into its supply system.
18
 In terms of winning orders, Sinovel relied on 
DHI’s long-term strategic relationship with state-owned power companies, particularly Huaneng, 
which played an essential role in bringing up Sinovel. Before Sinovel came into being, Huaneng 
bought 1.5MW turbines from Dalian Heavy Mechanical & Electrical Equipment Engineering 
Co., Ltd, where Han Junliang was the General Manager, for DHI’s pilot wind power project in 
2005. Sinovel went further to hire family members of the staff in the five central power 
companies with low workload and high salaries: this is why salespersons in the company 
received fixed salaries instead of incentives based on commission, which was a rare 
phenomenon in the industry (Wang 2012). As a result, in the concession program dominated by 
state-run utilities, Sinovel became the biggest winner, gaining a portion of 40% of all wind 
equipment orders.
19
  
In addition to business operations, Sinovel also integrated the skills of public relations and 
government affairs into capital management. As a typical case of the combination of state 
enterprises and private equity (PE), its stake in the beginning was held jointly by DHI’s 
subsidiary, the state-controlled company overseen by Han taking 30% of the stake, and four 
venture capitals, each taking 17.5%. The profit-making company quickly attracted the eyes of 
investors and went on the most important capital increase in 2008, from which the mysterious 
New Horizon Capital registered in Cayman Islands reaped the most. Before its IPO in 2010, 
more secret “free-ride” capital came into the company for profit. According to an insider, these 
small shareholders were the so-called “Red PE” that were able to “assist with IPO”.20 Most of 
the secret PE could not be identified because the contact numbers and addresses for company 
registration were all fake (Chen and Yu 2010). On the outside the capital was used for 
expansion and new-product development but actually acted as the conveyance of profit to the 
company’s connections in the government.  
Even though there were a lot of reasons behind the fall of Sinovel, the most cited one was 
the broken link to Beijing it used to have in the first few years. With regard to the particular 
favor it had from NDRC, Sinovel’s business expansion was a perfect fit of the principle of 
“aiming high and going all out” (Dagan Kuaishang) of Zhang Guobao, the primary promoter 
and policymaker of China’s wind industry. Even in the last year of his office Zhang continued 
to add fuel to the flames of China’s wind power development and confirmed the plan of 
building up seven “Ten-GW Wind Power Base” across the country. An article named “Mutual 
                                                     
18 Wei Wenyuan established Kunshan Huafeng Wind Power Science and Technology Co., Ltd and became the acting 
CEO of Sinovel when Han Junliang stepped off on 28 August 2012. 
19 Interview no. BJ090812, researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing, 09 Aug 2012. 
20 Interview no. BJ111012, a former employee of Sinovel, Beijing, 11 Oct 2012. 
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Accomplishing” mentioned that Zhang retired six days before Sinovel’s IPO, alluding that the 
company tried to have things sorted out before Zhang left his position of power on 7 January 
2011 (Pu and Yu 2013). Zhang’s retirement marked not only an end of the special favors 
Sinovel received but also a turning point in China’s wind industry development, which shifted 
from a frenetic pace to a sensible one. One direct result of the shift was raising barriers and 
tightening the approval of new projects, and when the market slowed down in 2012, Sinovel 
saw an avalanche in its performance and market share: in the same year of its IPO Sinovel’s net 
profit slumped by 72.8% and went to deficit in the following years (Pu and Yu 2013). From 
2011 to 2014, Sinovel fell from top one to the tenth whole unit wind producer in China, taking 
only 3% of the new installed capacity that year (CWEA 2012; CWEA 2015). Many sources 
pointed to the same fact that NDRC’s favor of Sinovel heated the industry up, and the 
leadership change in NDRC cooled it down (Luo 2013).  
Aside from Sinovel and other SOE-backed wind turbine makers, a group of privately-owned 
firms joined the game, all with different mindsets of technology but the same purpose of 
grabbing a share of the prospering market. Grown up from grassroots with less superiority in 
resources, these private firms developed along two contrasting paths: innovative enterprises 
focusing on their own intellectual property rights versus traditional workshops relying on the 
extensive use of labor and energy. The former devoted to “learning by doing” through 
international cooperation whereas the latter were typical policy speculators that aimed for a 
quick start by licensing. Despite the distinct approaches to technology acquisition, all private 
firms took the express train of government support in their growth. Local governments favored 
most of them, even those that were least efficient, as long as there was encouragement at the 
center and the firms contributed to local economy.  Sometimes local governments lowered the 
standards for SMEs to remain in the market even if they did not meet such requirements as 
emissions or minimum wage. This type of firms survived taking advantage of the misalignment 
between central policies and local support, and later became the target of industry consolidation 
after the revocation of localization content requirement.  
The technology-driven type of private firms also derived benefit from government support 
but in a positive way, one that catered to the GDPism of local governments and pleased Beijing 
in the formation of indigenous innovation and national firms. One of the most significant cases 
is Mingyang, another typical case of a rapid rise in the mass-production industry though in a 
different way. Instead of licensing, Mingyang started from the joint development with a 
Germany design firm Aerodyn, with Mingyang responsible for detailed design and 
commercialization and Aerodyn for conceptual design. While Aerodyn cooperated with other 
Chinese firms by licensing its technologies, it agreed to joint design and shared IPRs 
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considering Mingyang’s capability in electronic control system, the core of WTG technologies. 
Without the constraint of licensing, Mingyang could tap into the international market after the 
“Chinese turbine with Chinese surname” received the Germany GL certificate and won an order 
of 72 wind power units from the United States in 2007 (Zou and Xu 2008: 42-43). It took 
Mingyang only two years to successfully develop its first 1.5MW prototype with Chinese IPR 
and another three years to get listed on NYSE in 2010. Even though Mingyang differs from 
others in terms of the degree of autonomy in the cooperation with KIBS providers, it resembles 
most Chinese wind firms that it also did not have its destiny tied to the world wind giants but 
still could become a high-performing player in the arena.  
As the first private firm edging into the top five in China and listed overseas, Mingyang like 
others also started its entrepreneurship from gaining recognition of governments. According to a 
MOST study on Mingyang, the company started the cooperation with Aerodyn with seed money 
from the department of international science and technology cooperation at MOST (Shi 2013). 
Mingyang had its first operational capital by seeking the help of local government, which 
boosted the land mortgage of Mingyang’s founding company, Mingyang Electric, by increasing 
the price of its land from industrial to commercial use (Ding 2011). When Mingyang went 
further on the development of 2.5/3.0MW and later larger offshore turbines, it attracted the eyes 
of decision-makers in Beijing and a visit by Premier Wen Jiabao in 2009. Relying on the quality 
products and official support, the “black horse” developed a strong customer base consist of 
state-run utilities such as Huaneng, CPI, Huadian, Datang and Guodian, and the base later 
expanded further to CNNC, CGNPC as well as China Three Gorges New Energy Corp (Xue and 
Zhao 2014). Between 2011-2012, Mingyang’s proposal of building a Guangdong new energy 
industrial cluster led by the company also received support from the Guangdong provincial 
government, which helped it establish alliances with South Grid and Guangdong Yudean for 
strategic cooperation on wind development (Hou and Zou 2012). And coordinated by the 
Guangdong government, it was offered a loan of 5 billion US dollars from China Development 
Bank (CDB) for its venture overseas. Even the founder of Mingyang, Zhang Chuanwei, stressed 
the role of the three forces of government, customers and suppliers in the company’s growth, 
with government support the most important in the beginning (New Economy Weekly 2009). 
A similar but more significant case is Envision. Founded by a LSE graduate that used to 
work in Barclay, the private firm climbed to the upper rank of the wind industry among SOE-
backed wind firms and took the fourth largest market share of new installed capacity in 2013 
and 2014, which was close to United Power and Mingyang, which occupied the second and 
third positions. Compared to Mingyang, Envision also shunned licensed production but adopted 
a more novel approach to independent design: integrating technological and managerial 
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expertise by hiring foreign designers and senior executives all around the world. With a global 
view, it undertook wind turbine production but attached greater emphasis on electronic control 
system than on assembly; it did not want to be mentioned on a par with other wind turbine 
makers and brought forward the concept of a smart energy enterprise committed to software and 
a future of “energy internet”; and its intelligent wind power generator “Game Changer” 
increased the power generation efficiency by 15-20% (Nan 2013; Qin 2014). Positioning itself 
at the high-end of the industry chain, the company challenged the traditional ways of turbine 
making and operating (Wang 2011b). Because of the excellent performances of its prototype, 
Envision received high praises as well as the first order from Longyuan, the largest wind power 
developer in China.  
Even Envision, the innovative nova that experienced a meteoric rise relying on indigenous 
technology capability, knew well to leverage government resources for competitive advantages. 
Its founder, Zhang Lei, acknowledged that even the “Game Changer” derived benefit from 
central and local governments. In addition to the financial and policy support from Wuxi 
municipal government and Jiangsu provincial government, CEO Zhang Lei was listed by 
Beijing as one of the outstanding entrepreneurial innovators of the “1000 Plan” in 2010. The 
recognition is the highest honor for overseas returnees that devote to entrepreneurship in China, 
which is headed by the Central Organization Department, the central human resources body of 
the Chinese Communist Party. Zhang Lei believed that getting into the list added up to an 
endorsement from the central government, which helped build reputation for the company and 
earned patronage from state-owned utilities (Yu 2013). Since the CCTV report on his innovative 
development in 2012, Zhang Lei had appeared in all sorts of official media such as People’s 
Daily and Xinhua, and Envision since then participated in many more projects operated by 
state-owned power companies. In terms of the discussion of business interactions with 
governments, the cases of Mingyang and Envision underline the fact that above all the 
capabilities they have, they all cooperated with government and made very good use of the 
policies, not to mention the private “policy speculators” who are not strong enough and purely 
relying on the supportive policies. 
5.2 Overseas wind turbine makers went local 
Before domestic industry players were preparing for the wild frenzy of capturing the Chinese 
wind power market, large foreign wind turbine makers did not sit and miss the boat. When 
China decided to go on full steam for wind power development in 2003, the global giants such 
as Vestas and Gamesa that had been selling to China started to rethink their business strategies 
and consider moving production to China. The American newcomer, GE entered the wind 
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power equipment industry through the purchase of Enron and prepared to game for the Chinese 
market. Nothing could stop the pace of foreign wind turbines entering China, even 
discrimination: the enthusiasm did not in any sense fade after Beijing elevated the 50% 
localization target in 2003 to the 70% local content mandate in 2005. With no complaints 
related to fair competition and no time to press Beijing to make any changes, a dozen foreign 
manufacturers piled into China, including Vestas of Denmark, GE of the US, Gamesa of Spain 
and Suzlon of India, because they had already fixed their eyes on the biggest new market the 
industry had ever seen and made up their minds to take a part in it at all costs.  
The global wind turbine suppliers were not so much forced as they were willing to set up 
facilities in China, wanting a piece of the cake as well as creating a base for their international 
business. Aside from the local content rule and raised tariffs, the foreign magnates were ready to 
invest in factories in China: they knew that only local production would help them profit from 
the potential market because imported wind turbines cost on average 30% more than Chinese 
ones and some of them proved to be incompatible with domestic projects.  As a senior official 
from one of the world’s top turbine makers based in Beijing said, “The cake is so big that I 
could afford an office made out of gold,” and “There will be orders for everyone” (Nakanishi 
2006). Moreover, local plants would help reduce production cost and maintenance fees, and 
some were turned into regional production bases supplying not only the Chinese but also 
international markets (Graham-Harrison 2007). Even though there are a variety of views among 
commentators on what the companies’ motivations were, the fact is that these companies have 
set up their own entities in China and integrate the Chinese market into their strategic planning. 
A New York Times article pointed out that these firms did not cry foul for the fear of business 
retaliation by Beijing, whereas a Chinese report revealed that some new energy WFOEs tried to 
contain Chinese competitors using their home governments’ anti-dumping measures while 
benefiting from the supportive policies made by the Chinese government (Bradsher 2010; Yuan 
2010). 
GE entered the Chinese wind market in 2004 and became the first multinational to embrace 
Beijing’s rule of localized production. Relying on its long presence and recognition in a variety 
of industries in China, the company made its first 1.5MW wind turbines with up to 90% of 
locally manufactured components and minimal use of imported parts, which outperformed 
Beijing’s localization requirement. It opened its first Chinese wind turbine assembly plant in 
Shenyang in 2006 and later entered into a series of JV arrangements specifically for wind parts 
production. These helped GE build a locally sourced production line exclusively for wind 
turbine manufacturing without the transfer of IPR associated with the wind turbine technology. 
Without any complaints, GE even praised China’s new energy policies and criticized the U.S. 
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policy that did not provide enough support in new energy fields. When most companies 
remained silent after the United Steelworkers Union (USW) filed a petition accusing China of 
discriminatory government policy support in 2010, GE dissented. In “sharply worded 
comments”, Jeff Immelt, Chief Executive of GE, expressed his frustrations about the “stupid” 
current structure of the industry and a lack of government support for new energy technologies 
(Glader 2010). GE’s entry and sales strategy for the Chinese market boosted credibility of the 
industry: the move of a magnate like GE represented the growth potential of the wind power 
industry as well as the Chinese wind market, and many foreign firms followed suit and built 
Chinese factories, including Vestas, Gamesa, Suzlon and Nordex (Lewis 2013: 96; SinoCast 
2006a).
 
 
Like others, the global leader in wind energy, Vestas started its manufacturing in China for 
the prospect of a big potential market that would support its regional operations. It is in the 
interest of Vestas to build manufacturing facilities in the country because it was very important 
to develop an Asia supplier base for it to be competitive in China (Bradsher 2010). Based on the 
rosy picture drawn by Beijing, the company opened a wind turbine production plant in Tianjin 
Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA) in 2006. It later established many more 
factories in major Chinese cities focusing on component production. As Vestas Chief Executive 
Ditlev Engel said, “It has been a very important driver for us in setting up these plants, with the 
long-term commitment and goals which have been laid out by the central government and the 
National Development and Reform Commission” (Dow Jones 2007). Since Vestas long 
regarded China as its largest foreign market, it saw China as part of its global supply chain and 
had plans to build Tianjin into its logistic center for the Asia-Pacific region (Nakanishi 2006; 
Wan 2007). In doing so, it had established a good relationship with the local government in 
Tianjin (China Daily 2007). The company believed that it would stand firm despite the 
pessimistic expectation of a “race to the bottom” in the Chinese market: according to managing 
director of Vestas China, “the market is so big that there is room for both local and international 
players” (Miller 2007). 
Other leading foreign producers were also very open about their motives for manufacturing 
in China and playing by Beijing’s rules. Among them Suzlon was the most direct: “We came to 
China because this is a big market and because of government requirements we have to be here. 
There are no real cost advantages over manufacturing the equipment at our main factory in 
India,” said Paulo Fernando Soares, chief executive of Suzlon’s mainland operations (Dueck 
2007). Suzlon’s Tianjin factory cost USD 80 million, which was the single largest investment 
by Indian businesses in China as of July 2006. Similarly, Gamesa and other leading 
multinational wind turbine makers opted to build plants in China and help train local suppliers 
Chapter 5: The making of “national champions” in the wind power industry 
137 
without fight because they would sooner or later make this happen regardless of the localization 
mandate: “If you plan to go into a country, you really need to commit to a country” (Bradsher 
2010). For Gamesa, the Chinese plant was the first one out of Europe, from which it planned to 
cut costs by about a quarter by focusing on China for components production (Nakanishi 2006). 
The local content rule was not a problem for Gamesa because a large part of the components 
that it assembled were made by the local suppliers trained by Gamesa, which in essence 
undercut Gamesa by selling the same parts to its Chinese competitors. So what is the point of 
getting into China in the first place? It is not hard to see from historical statistics that despite the 
declining market share overtime, these locally operating foreign firms now have a much larger 
sales volume than when they sold complete wind turbine units to China.  
As time goes on, these first-tier wind turbine MNCs did make their commitment to the 
Chinese market by expanding manufacturing presence and R&D activities in China. GE adopted 
a more aggressive strategy since 2009 and built more jointly-owned factories mostly for parts 
production. As part of its increasing investment in R&D, it made its ten-year old Technology 
Centre in Shanghai the key to wind power technology development, including electronics 
hardware and software that allowed for various kinds of bad weather (Bullis 2010). In order to 
remain competitive in China, Vestas even developed a model specifically for the Chinese 
market in 2009, reportedly the first “ever developed by Vestas for any domestic market” (Lewis 
2013: 83). It also launched its China Technology R&D center of USD 50 million in Beijing, 
which was seen as “a natural step” of the company’s development in China and an important 
part of its global innovation network (Wan 2010). All these moves helped them put on more of a 
Chinese identity. Although these moves to some extent promoted Beijing’s aim to strengthen 
domestic innovation capability by bringing leading technologies and fostering local experts, 
fundamentally they were meant to serve their own company, which transferred minimal and 
rather basic technology to the local firms.
21
  
While all overseas firms had the freedom of choice in terms of the strategies to play the 
Chinese rules, most opted to establish wholly owned plants for assembly and JVs for parts 
production. The 1999 policy change of allowing foreign firms to create wholly owned 
subsidiaries is only part of the reason. Aside from the fact that indigenous Chinese firms did not 
rely on the wind giants, the main concern of moving manufacturing to China was technology 
transfer. Therefore, most of the overseas firms established wholly owned foreign subsidiaries to 
maintain full control over ownership and intellectual properties. The global wind leaders 
including GE, Vestas, Gamesa and Suzlon did not team up with Chinese firms when they 
entered China. As for GE, there were not worries about losing its comparative advantage in 
                                                     
21 Interview no. HB120912, a government official at the Science and Technology Department of Hebei Province, 
Heibei, 12 Sep 2012. 
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China because the model of procuring locally from the JV parts suppliers controlled by GE 
would not result in direct transfer of core technologies to Chinese firms (Lewis 2013: 104). 
With its expertise in cross-national operations and particularly its experience in China, GE was 
skillful in cultivating goodwill in Beijing through local manufacturing at the same time of 
exclusively owning its IPRs. Even though it might have trained Chinese firms in supplying parts 
for its turbines, GE largely retained its control over Chinese business through the complete 
ownership of assembly plants.  
The concern of leading wind turbine makers about losing technology competitiveness was 
not groundless. The independence of Gamesa from Vestas after a few years of JV partnership 
served as an alarm to all players in the manufacturing of whole generator units. Many have 
chosen to go it alone to keep operational control out of the concern that they might have the 
same fate with Vestas and create their own competitors in China. Technology theft and illegal 
replication are also one of the concerns. As core technologies of wind turbine systems could be 
migrated in the form of software, foreign firms saw the protection of IPRs as the most important 
aspect of their collaboration with Chinese partners. One of the most sensational cases is AMSC-
Windtech’s charge against Sinovel in April 2011 and the following long-running legal battle 
between the two companies dedicated to joint development. Some did form JV enterprises with 
domestic firms to please Beijing but actually they were not optimistic about the partnership and 
mainly counted on their own subsidiaries in China selling larger and more advanced wind 
turbines. For fear of losing competitiveness in the market, technology transfers to the local 
partners were limited and not up to date.  
Because of the estrangement between domestic and foreign parties, most JV wind firms’ 
business in China was lukewarm or did not last long. One of them was CASC-Acciona, a jointly 
owned firm by Spanish Acciona and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation 
(CASC). The company did not have large production capacities even after years of operation in 
China and its market share remained below 3% after its creation in 2006. Yituo-Made, one of 
the two early JV firms designated by Beijing, stopped production after the purchase of MADE 
by Gamesa. As for Nordex, although it came to China earlier than many other turbine makers, it 
did not manage to boost the business of XAEC-Nordex because of the resistance to local 
manufacturing. Even though since 2005 the stiff-necked Nordex changed its strategies and 
started to build manufacturing facilities for both wind turbines and components in many 
Chinese cities, it did not manage to increase its market share or sales number in China. In 
addition to the tepid performance commonly seen in Chinese wind JVs, some of them broke up 
simply because different parties inside the firms were not like-minded. GE used to partner with 
Harbin Electric for the manufacturing of complete generator sets from 2010, but the two 
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companies broke up in 2013 because of “fundamental differences in business priorities and 
strategies” (Wu 2013). There was speculation that it was because of the minority share of 49% 
that GE felt constrained in the participation in offshore wind farm projects and other issues 
related to production.
22
  
Even the KIBS companies providing licenses to Chinese firms had their own thoughts of 
building their own manufacturing facilities or seeking takeovers by large manufacturers. For 
example, REpower licensed its technologies to a dozen local wind turbine makers, including 
Goldwind and Dongfang, as its lucrative business in the beginning, but when it became stronger 
and attracted by Beijing’s support it set up its own JV to advance into the field of wind turbine 
manufacturing on top of design. As the company believed that foreign firms would be frozen 
out without a local partner, it decided to make wind turbines in partnership with Chinese steel 
maker North Heavy Industry Corporation (NHIC), namely REpower North. As REpower looked 
forward to a bright future in China when awarded a 150MW wind project in 2007, it 
immediately accepted an offer of acquisition by Suzlon in 2008 and announced it would 
withdraw from China in 2011, citing protectionism and price competition (Knight 2011). Before 
the strategic move, REpower expressed its reluctance of building the first 3MW offshore wind 
turbines in China out of the concern of technology transfer and insisted to locate the main server 
in Germany.
23
 Aside from the razor-thin margins in the Chinese market, REpower did not 
complain about the policy environment in China until it retreated from China. Except for the 
withdrawal of Suzlon and its subsidiary REpower, the other three large industry players, GE, 
Vestas and Gamesa remained committed to the Chinese market without complaints, regardless 
of their private thoughts.  
6. Business cooperation with Beijing 
Over the three decades of wind power development in China, domestic producers became 
independent players as well as faithful followers of Beijing’s policy due to the divergence of 
internal and external business interests at the firm level. All companies responded 
enthusiastically to Beijing’s massive push in the use of domestically manufactured wind 
turbines and for making wind power a commercially viable technology in the country. Due to 
the ease of technology transfer, indigenous Chinese firms could make full use of government 
support policies separate from leading global wind turbine makers, and overseas firms lost no 
time to enter the Chinese market without complaints, though not teaming up with local 
companies. When Beijing made clear its strong political will of supporting clean energy 
development, including wind energy, it met with zest of both domestic and foreign firms and 
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23 The project was later taken by Sinovel. 
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saw an unexpectedly fast expansion in the industry. As a result, the central government 
remained strong-handed in the industry’s decision-making and as a result its initiatives to build 
a home-grown wind industry were fulfilled to a great extent. 
6.1 Government-business cooperation in local manufacturing 
When thinking about the commercial use of wind power generation, Beijing never forgot about 
nurturing an indigenous wind power technology industry. Through government support policies, 
“China always intended for its wind industry to ultimately consist of Chinese-owned firms and 
Chinese-owned technology” (Lewis 2013: 43). In the whole process, decision-making for the 
wind equipment industry has largely been centralized in the macroeconomic planning bodies, 
mainly SPC, later SDPC and NDRC, and finally NEA both as a sub-ministerial body as well as 
a supra-ministry (da bu wei) above all other ministries coordinating overall energy development 
in China. However, because of the multilayered aspects of the formidable task of building up a 
national industry and separate functions of different agencies, sometimes it takes a few steps to 
achieve the ultimate goal. If building up a national industry requires two major steps, the 
incubation of indigenous firms and the formation of indigenous technologies, then the 
government support policies from 2003 to 2009 only achieved the first goal.  
Moving toward the ultimate goal, the Chinese government has been relatively autonomous 
in putting support policies into force as well as making changes to them when necessary. When 
in the beginning China did not have any experience in the commercial use of wind power, 
Beijing encouraged independent research and at the same time supervised the import of foreign 
turbines for demonstration projects. When China’s wind power projects were dominated by 
high-cost turbines manufactured overseas, Beijing started to encourage cross-national 
cooperation for local manufacturing capabilities using local content requirements. When the 
local content rule was no longer relevant to the second goal of technological upgrading and even 
derailed the industry, Beijing placed greater emphasis on the promotion of indigenous 
technology capability than before. When in 2010 the bottleneck of domestic demand became 
serious and the local content policy met external challenges, Beijing ended the policy. In the 
whole process, Beijing barely met resistance inside the Chinese market, regardless of whether it 
was domestic or foreign-owned firms. Although business organizations such as the American 
and European chambers of commerce voiced criticism of market barriers and poor transparency 
for project approvals, there was no public resistance from the existing foreign-owned Chinese 
firms. Concerns and accusations were only made by foreign enterprises after they decided to 
exit the Chinese market.  
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In line with the nation-wide indigenous innovation campaign, Beijing’s support of a wind 
industry had been lauded by all new and existing industry players. Scrambling for the prospect 
of a huge market demand, domestic turbine makers reveled in the nurturing of local capability 
while overseas manufacturers grabbed a share of the market by establishing local manufacturing 
capabilities. As a result of the strength of policy intervention, the Chinese wind equipment 
industry experienced a rapid expansion with a dozen of foreign companies moving 
manufacturing facilities into China and the number of Chinese WTG manufacturers surging 
from six to almost 80 in 2009. Even the JV companies hesitating to answer Beijing’s call started 
to build factories in China after others had done so. The installed capacity increased over 45 
folds from 566.7MW by 2003 to 25,827.7MW by 2009. The pace quickly exceeded the 2020 
target of 30,000MW, which was outperformed by the total installed capacity of 44,730MW by 
2010, only three years after the target was specified in 2007 (CWEA 2011).  
The active response, however, does not mean complete compliance with every aspect of 
Beijing’s policy goals. The manufacturing of wind turbines could be achieved right away but 
technology and management transfer could not be rushed through. Many companies 
manipulated the policies for quantitative growth but left reliability of the products aside, which 
led to massive failures and vicious competition especially at the looming tipping point of new 
capacity overwhelming demand (Dueck 2007). One principle among many local firms was that 
it was good enough “as long as the wind turbines could be erected and begin to spin” within the 
shortest possible time.
24
 As many of the problems could not be spotted in short-term, massive 
expenditure on operation and maintenance were needed because the turbines are expected to 
continue turning for 20 years. For those relying on licensed production, there were core 
technologies for electronic control and precision production that firms could not buy along with 
the blueprints. One major discrepancy is that before the foreign models were proved suitable for 
Chinese terrestrial and environmental conditions, wind turbines based on the foreign designs 
had been produced and installed in a large scale in China (Xinhua News Agency 2009a). 
Moreover, many of the designs did not have proven track records even overseas.  
After five years of blind pursuit of installed capacity and operating scale, the negative 
impact of the investment bubble started to surface. The market was overcrowded and overheated, 
and there was a structural overcapacity due to the bottleneck of grid connection. With 80% of 
the capacity concentrated in a few large firms, there were dozens of firms producing wind 
turbines with poor quality. Due to the limitation in technological and managerial capabilities, 
many of the copy cats of foreign designs still relied on the import of key components including 
electronic control system and had a high failure rates in their products. Without a focus on R&D, 
                                                     
24 Interview no. HB120912, a government official at the Science and Technology Department of Hebei Province, 
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many indulged in “binge eating” and then got “indigestion and obesity” but remained weak after 
years in the market.
25
 “In China, irrational, speculative and herd-like investment behavior is not 
just endemic of retail investors in its red-hot stock markets. Erratic investment boom-bust cycles 
are also a hallmark of many industries, including wind power” (Ng 2007). Even Sinovel as a 
large SOE-backed firm was also known for this tendency. The General Manager of Longyuan, 
Xie Changjun, openly criticized the quality of turbines produced by Sinovel: “if I have other 
choices for offshore models, I will not buy from you” (Li 2011). Because Sinovel’s turbines 
went into a lot of problems only after two months in operation, its resident technicians had to 
stay in the wind farms all the time, which still could save some of them from collapsing. 
Chinese firms’ overreaction to Beijing’s call and misuse of its support prodded the Chinese 
government to review existing policies. The reconsideration was concentrated on three aspects 
of the overheated industry: lack of indigenous designs, price competition and weak domestic 
market demand. Because of low entry barriers and short product life-cycle, many firms rushed 
into large-scale production without paying much attention to quality control and independent 
R&D, which brought the industry into a vicious cycle of excessive competition and a continual 
pressure of cost cut. According to Gu Weidong, Vice President of China Energy Society, it is 
meaningless for 100% of the components to be procured locally if most Chinese manufacturers 
do not own IPRs (Wu 2010). In 2009, Beijing started to think about eliminating the local 
content policy, and the consideration was supported by a few experts and a report by NDRC’s 
ERI, which concluded that since the country has already established in-country manufacturing, 
it was the right time to lift the restrictions (Gao and Luo 2009). Both Shi Lishan from NEA and 
Shi Pengfei from CWEA believed that eliminating the policy would compel indigenous firms to 
focus on R&D and free the competitive firms from price wars. Another point that was made was 
the limited domestic demand and a need to enter foreign market. “In view of the bilateral 
discussion between China and the EU over market access to solar PVs, it is not possible for 
China on the one hand to privilege Chinese companies in the domestic market, and on the other 
seek entry by Chinese companies into foreign markets”.26 
Although there were different responses to the proposal for cancelling the local content rule, 
Beijing was able to implement it without much resistance from inside the country. The possible 
revocation was particularly favored by large Chinese firms that already had their own IPRs and 
could sell to other countries without any restraints. This would find an outlet for their products 
and free them from the inefficient price wars so that they could devote themselves to the 
development of more stable and reliable products. For firms that had set up assembly plants in 
China, the local content rule was no any longer a barrier in the sense that most of them had 
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cultivated local suppliers and the percentage of local parts that GE, Vestas and Gamesa used for 
production had reached 90%. But for small private firms, especially those that were not well 
established yet and were not strong enough to compete with others in terms of technology, 
Beijing’s intention was equal to throw a cat among the pigeons. With Beijing committed to 
consolidate the industry, these small firms’ available choice was not to protest, but to withdraw, 
or to seek acquisition. As director of NDRC’s ERI, Li Junfeng said, the turbine makers were 
facing an industry-wide reshuffle and in future we need 80% of the market to be concentrated in 
three to five manufacturers. At a time when the Commerce Secretary Gary Locke pressed China 
hard for it, China reached consensus with the US in the Sino-US Joint Commission on 
Commerce and Trade (JCCT) meeting in 2009, and announced it would abolish the local 
content rule in 2010 (Zhong 2010). 
6.2 National Champions’ independent R&D and overseas adventure 
After a “wind power winter”, the Chinese government continued with building a home-grown 
wind power industry of Chinese companies with indigenous technologies. Picking winners 
returned onto the stage after the explosive growth: Beijing increased R&D support through 
MOST, MOF and other ministries for the establishment of a network of national key 
laboratories, including those by Sinovel, Goldwind, Windey, United Power and XEMC. Apart 
from financial support, the main benefit for these labs was “the honor the firm received and the 
recognition which came with it”. At the same time, government selection also turned to the 
support of R&D on offshore wind turbines, which are more complicated and require greater 
reliability than those on land. With higher technology barriers and greater needs for installation, 
construction, and operation and maintenance, the development of onshore wind turbines cannot 
be simply copied to offshore wind. In contrast to their attitudes in the onshore projects, foreign 
firms such as Vestas and Siemens were interested to cooperate with Chinese partners in the 
development of offshore wind plants (China5e 2012). Other than that, there were needs for 
indigenous firms to focus on modifications to adapt to the local environment as well as grid 
integration. 
Thanks to the government support, many of the Chinese wind turbine makers now have 
their patented self-developed designs, and have successfully transitioned to become innovators 
in their own rights. According to the 2010 Chinese Wind Power Report, all of the top ten wind 
turbine producers had built their R&D teams and were gradually moving from joint 
development to independent R&D. Most of them have already had the capability to design and 
produce 1.5MW and larger wind turbines themselves (Li 2010). Private innovators such as 
Mingyang and Envision have ascended like bright stars especially after the 2010 consolidation, 
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and respectively became the third and fourth largest wind turbine producers with their own IPRs. 
There were also other companies engaged in independent R&D from the beginning. By working 
together with Shengyang Industrial University, Huachuang started from a partly state-owned 
company and successfully developed the first indigenous 1.5MW wind turbine in 2006. After it 
was bought by the SOE utility Datang in 2011, Huachuang’s business increased in the recent 
years. With a strong industrial base, Shenyang Yuanda started wind turbine design as its sideline 
business and finished the installation for the first large-scale use of its first prototype in 2013.  
At the time of a slump in the demand of wind turbines, many Chinese producers started to 
use their success in the domestic market as a bridgehead to win market abroad. The total export 
of Chinese-made wind generation sets surged from 56.6MW by 2010 to 269.7MW by 2011, to 
700.2MW by 2012, to 1,392.5MW by 2013, and to 1,761.3MW by 2014, amounting to a total 
thirty-fold increase within five years. With the backing of state-owned banks, Goldwind, 
Sinovel, Sany, Mingyang, United Power, Sewind, CSIC Haizhuang, and XEMC started 
international operations and sold their turbines to countries such as the US, Australia, France, 
India, Turkey, Iran, Chile, Ecuador and Ethiopia, with the US as the largest importer of Chinese 
wind turbines, totaling 357.8MW and accounting to 20.3% of the total export (CWEA 2015). 
While they all saw overseas markets as a new growth point, Mingyang was the most aggressive 
one among the pioneers of the international expansion. Unlike most other domestic firms, 
Mingyang started to eye the “going-out” strategy right after its foundation in 2005 because its 
joint development with Aerodyn gave independent IPR for its turbines that could be sold 
overseas. Since then, Mingyang has signed contracts with firms from a lot of countries; the most 
recent ones were with the Reliance Capital from India and Paunescu Corporation from Romania 
(Hou and Zou 2014; Smith 2013). It was reported that overseas markets would be the focus of 
Mingyang in the near future, and estimated that by the year 2015, exports will account for 30% 
of its overall business (Shi 2013). 
7. Conclusion 
The chapter has argued that in a mass-manufacturing industry like the production of wind power 
equipment, turbine makers in the emerging countries tend to develop their own business 
independently from world-leading companies; and the competition between domestic and 
foreign businesses makes them rivals in the local market. In the Chinese wind turbine industry, 
a large percentage of local firms started manufacturing through the purchase of licenses, which 
allowed them to achieve large-scale production in a short period of time and make full use of 
government support policies. At the same time, it was unlikely that overseas manufacturers 
would transfer intellectual property and proprietary technologies to local companies that could 
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become competitors. While a transnational coalition was not necessary for local firms and not in 
the interests of foreign competitors, leading global companies opted to enter the market without 
teaming up with Chinese partners. Regardless of whether they were Chinese-owned firms or 
foreign-owned Chinese firms, they all tried to make a fortune playing by Beijing’s rules, which 
essentially contributed to the formation of a Chinese wind power equipment industry made up 
of indigenous firms. Although the goal of improving indigenous technology capabilities was not 
yet fully accomplished, Beijing’s intention to encourage local manufacturing and its 
assertiveness to consolidate the industry was implemented largely without internal resistance. 
Throughout the past three decades, Chinese firms in the wind power sector have consistently 
maintained a defensive stance toward leading global wind turbine makers, and a cooperative 
mindset to coordinate with Beijing in the reduction of foreign dependence. Thanks to the ready 
access to technologies, Chinese firms were able to compete with foreign firms in manufacturing 
by making use of government support at the central and local levels. Even though both nuclear 
and wind industries started at the outset of China’s reform and open door policy, Chinese wind 
firms did not enter into long-term business coalitions with world-leading producers and 
challenge Beijing as seen in the nuclear power industry. And Chinese wind firms did not 
become national champions only in the new century: they have been so since their formation in 
China’s most open days. As discussed in-depth in Section 4, even in the 1990s when the 
Chinese government strongly encouraged domestic wind firms to pair up with foreign wind 
turbine producers, the domestic-foreign cooperation did not work out well. Throughout the 
whole process, Chinese indigenous wind firms did not develop strategic business relationships 
with well-established foreign manufacturers. On the contrary, some bought foreign designs for 
domestic manufacturing and others developed domestic models in collaboration with small 
foreign design firms. 
Chinese turbine producers and foreign manufacturers at the frontier of wind technologies 
made their way into the Chinese market separately, and the competing interests of gaining more 
market share met Beijing’s intention of cost reduction through local manufacturing. Due to 
standardized production and short production cycles in wind turbine assembly, local companies 
could quickly scale up production and challenge foreign competitors even without core 
technologies. Unlike in the CoPS industries such as nuclear power plants, wind turbine designs 
and codified technologies could be easily acquired through licensing or joint development. In 
addition, because each single turbine maker is only one of the many players as a result of low 
entry barriers, the market is highly competitive and market share can be only obtained through a 
large number of transactions. Because of these features of wind turbine assembly, all industry 
actors need to compete for greater capacity and more orders, with wholly owned foreign 
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subsidiaries participating in the game without local partners. So when the central government 
decided to develop large-scale wind farm bases, both local and foreign manufacturers went all 
out to fight for a share of the newly created demand. 
There have been three categories of company producing wind power generation sets in 
China: indigenous Chinese firms, wholly foreign owned enterprises, and Sino-foreign joint 
ventures. They have played different roles in different periods but almost all built wind turbine 
manufacturing facilities and fostered component supply capabilities for the Chinese market. 
Aside from Goldwind and Windey, which set up wind turbine factories early in the 1990s, most 
other Chinese companies started their businesses after 2003. As many of the new entrants were 
linked to large state-owned enterprises, they benefited from strong industrial bases, relationships 
with existing parts suppliers as well as with state-run power companies. While most of them 
acquired wind turbine designs by buying licenses, a particular group of private firms joined the 
battle with an immediate focus on core technologies, mainly through joint development and 
independent design. Although working at a slow pace, some other Chinese firms diversified 
their business activities into the manufacturing of wind turbines based on their own capabilities 
or ventured into the field in cooperation with technological universities. Several wind power 
giants in the world also established their wholly owned subsidiaries and trained parts suppliers 
in China. Even the joint ventures with a majority foreign stake decided to move their 
manufacturing facilities after years of resistance.  
Having ready access to wind power technologies, Chinese wind turbine makers cooperated 
with the state to compete against foreign producers. In response to Beijing’s call of building a 
national wind power industry, Chinese wind firms played the role of “national champions” by 
enhancing local manufacturing and designing capabilities. Since Beijing launched the wind 
concession program, the firms started independent production with the help of small design 
firms. In collaboration with state-owned utilities, they also managed to sell their products to 
large-scale wind farms through government procurement. With the government’s support, many 
of them were committed to the formation of proprietary technologies through joint development, 
independent R&D, or mergers and acquisitions. While only the companies with independent 
intellectual property rights and core technologies could weather the storm of industrial 
consolidation as well as a depressed market, production capacity started to be concentrated in 
the hands of several large and strong ones. As for large foreign producers, the greatest trials for 
them are the low sales margins and difficulties in getting orders, especially when a large supply 
exceeds the Chinese market demand and even local firms are seeking overseas outlets for their 
production. While it took only five years for indigenous Chinese firms to grow bigger and 
another five years to become stronger, it is likely that they will soon break free from the reliance 
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on small foreign design firms and become global wind power leaders in terms of production and 
innovation, even though their foreign competitors never expected that they would lose their 
competitiveness in such short time. 
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China in the western media has been treated as a stereotype of techno-nationalism but also as 
embracing global economic integration at the same time. Reports on subsidies, restrictions on 
foreign investment, and currency manipulation all depict a protectionist Beijing that struggles to 
prop up a national industry by leveraging the opportunities of the world market. With a different 
perspective, this thesis has stressed that the state-industry cooperation necessary for effective 
policy intervention is not always found in China, and state-directed initiatives do not always 
meet positive responses from industry. In this sense, the Chinese government is far from 
successful in carrying out its nationalist initiatives. Owing to the specific characteristics of 
production and technologies, Chinese domestic firms from different sectors associate with 
foreign counterparts and respond to state directions in different ways. Firms in some sectors 
submit to Beijing for “reciprocal consent” and insinuate their interests into state policy, but 
those in others test Beijing and devote themselves to the defense of the interests they share with 
their foreign business partners. Despite the lack of immediate evidence, industrial policy and its 
implementation have been driven by variant firm behavior in different sectors. One thing that 
cannot be denied is that the inconsistent capacity of the Chinese state in coordinating group 
interests is closely linked to business interests and firm behavior, which are in turn determined 
by the nature of industry sectors. The comparative case studies conducted in the previous two 
chapters support the argument.  
This chapter begins by reviewing the argument and analyzing the findings from the case 
studies on China’s nuclear and wind energy industries. This reaffirms the linkages among 
production characteristics, domestic-foreign business relationships, and firms’ responses to state 
directions. The discussion then shifts to considering the implications of the findings for 
understanding state-industry relations and state capacity in policy coordination. Adding to the 
traditional notion of how bureaucratic structure affects state capacity and policy effectiveness, 
this thesis accentuates the impact of industry characteristics on the same set of institutions in 
different industry sectors. Then the chapter turns to discussing limitations of the study and what 
needs to be done for future research. The last section of the chapter puts the findings back into 
the wider context of issues in international political economy, mainly techno-nationalism, 
development, and international economic cooperation.  
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1. Findings 
Two principal findings emerge from the preceding case studies on China’s new energy 
industries. The first is that the distinct characteristics of production in nuclear and wind power 
brought about different domestic-foreign business relationships in the two sectors. While 
nuclear power plants (NPPs) exemplify complex product systems (CoPS) in which production is 
highly customized and engineering-intensive, wind power equipment represents traditional 
mass-manufacturing that is typical of standardized production and relatively simple component 
interfaces. One important aspect of the contrasting natures of the two industry sectors is that the 
transfer of technology and production capability is much less likely in nuclear than in wind 
power. For that reason, the ways that indigenous Chinese firms relied on foreign technologies 
have been different in the two sectors. As core capabilities of the nuclear sector lie in systems 
integration and engineering, which feature low technology transferability, Chinese nuclear firms 
need international vendors to play a large part in their daily business operations for a long 
period of time. On the contrary, Chinese wind firms can quickly undertake independent 
production and challenge top global producers through economies of scale and cost reduction. 
As a result, Chinese nuclear firms individually paired up with international vendors for long-
term strategic partnerships whereas Chinese wind firms sprang up as cut-throat competitors to 
foreign producers.  
Due to the CoPS nature of NPPs, all major nuclear firms in China developed long-standing 
business partnerships with top nuclear vendors in the world. As NPPs have to be tailored to user 
requirements and produced on-site, negotiations on all sorts of issues are necessary between 
sellers and buyers throughout all the stages of design, delivery, maintenance and upgrade. This 
is exactly what happened in China’s nuclear energy industry. On the recipients’ side, Chinese 
nuclear firms relied on international vendors for not only design and production but also 
management and services. Even in the case of SNPTC-Westinghouse where technology transfer 
was agreed, the Chinese firm still relied on its foreign partner throughout the whole process, 
especially in the conversion from conceptual designs to workable packages. On the suppliers’ 
side, global lead firms need to oversee the NPP projects in China and in fact secured strong 
control over domestic production for a long period of time. Their partnerships with local firms 
are necessary for both project needs in China and self-improvement through experience 
accumulation. Due to the stickiness of core capabilities in NPPs, they do not have to worry 
about losing their competitiveness even through close interactions with Chinese buyers. And 
long product lifecycle in nuclear power projects also helped sustain the interdependence 
between Chinese nuclear firms and international vendors over the past decades.  
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As expected in mass-manufacturing sectors, Chinese and foreign wind equipment makers 
have seen no common ground between them. In contrast to the hard-to-copy capabilities in the 
nuclear energy industry, Chinese firms in the wind sector have ready access to technologies and 
skills and find it unnecessary to tie up with foreign producers. They could begin independent 
production with the help of foreign design firms providing knowledge-intensive business 
services (KIBS), generally through licensing agreements or joint development. And thanks to 
the advantages in cost and productivity, Chinese late-comers quickly came to the front 
challenging global lead firms in wind turbine production. Just as Chinese firms did not see the 
need to partner with top multinational firms, well-established turbine makers also tried to avoid 
close interactions with Chinese firms in local manufacturing. This is out of concern for losing 
competitive strength considering the relative ease of technology transfer in the sector and a lack 
of IPR protection in China. Therefore, transnational business coalitions in the sector are neither 
necessary for Chinese late-comers nor appealing to global lead firms. Indeed there has been 
domestic-foreign cooperation, in which Chinese wind firms rely on foreign technologies 
provided by small design firms, but these foreign partners have hardly anything to lose because 
they are not engaged in manufacturing and hence not taking part in the frantic scramble for 
market share. 
Because of the lack of incentives to associate with each other in wind turbine production, 
transnational collaboration became ever more elusive in the sector. The hostility is best 
illustrated in Beijing’s failed attempt of bringing domestic and foreign firms into joint venture 
(JV) partnerships, which were meant to encourage technology sharing from the foreign 
producers that were interested in the Chinese market. Both domestic and foreign parties that 
followed the arrangements found it hard to sustain the relationship. As the foreign party within 
the JVs only transferred outdated technologies but sold to China the most advanced turbines 
manufactured overseas, the Chinese side did not have a chance to grow in capability and 
become equal matches to their partners. While foreign producers had no incentive to share their 
intellectual property, Chinese firms were not content with remaining subject to foreign control. 
This is why later most multinational producers and Chinese new entrants decided to build their 
own manufacturing facilities individually. When multinational corporations were forced to 
move manufacturing facilities to China because of the local content rules, they entered the 
market without teaming up with local partners. Most of them set up wholly owned assembly 
plants even at the cost of training local component producers and establishing a supply network 
that also benefited local competitors. Under the circumstances, Chinese indigenous firms acted 
as assisted challengers of their foreign-owned counterparts in the Chinese wind energy market. 
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The second finding is that contrasting business relationships between Chinese and global 
lead firms led to different firm responses to state policy in China’s nuclear and wind power 
sectors. While Beijing attached to nuclear and wind energies roughly the same level of 
significance in achieving its techno-nationalist goals, the central targeting did not receive equal 
responses from the two sectors. Even though firms in the two sectors were similarly responsive 
to national support, those in the nuclear energy industry teamed up with international vendors 
and played into bilateral government relations to promote the use of foreign models, whereas 
those in the wind sector maintained a clear boundary between competition and cooperation with 
foreign firms, and seized market share from top global producers with the help of small foreign 
design firms. In both sectors, firms made use of foreign advanced technologies and equipment, 
and at the same time worked on home-grown innovations and localized foreign designs. 
However, the focus was different in the two sectors. As a result of the converging interests, 
Chinese nuclear energy firms entered into political coalitions with foreign firms and were 
unwilling to cooperate with Beijing in reducing the dependence on foreign technologies. In fact, 
despite the localized models Chinese nuclear firms have acted as their foreign partners’ sales 
representatives in each round of deploying new-generation reactors. In contrast, indigenous 
wind firms ran after state policy and competed with foreign pioneering manufacturers making 
use of government support. Most top Chinese producers were dedicated to the formation of 
technological capability through joint development or acquiring design capabilities through the 
purchase of KIBS firms. 
In the nuclear energy industry, Chinese firms had shown a systematic bias toward buying 
foreign technologies regardless of the significance of self-reliance in China’s first NPP at 
Qinshan. No matter which faction the nuclear firms belonged to, they all went into coalitions 
with global lead firms to promote foreign nuclear reactors in the Chinese market. Even the 
company coming out of the independent faction depended for its competitiveness on 
collaborating with international vendors and helping to sell their nuclear technologies in China. 
Aside from a few home-grown models, most operating reactors in China were imported or 
modified based on foreign designs. In the three major rounds of NPP approvals each in the early 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s, reactors from France, Canada, Russia and the United States were 
selected as the result of internal and external pressures, among which domestic nuclear firms 
played an important role in the process. Looking back at the history of civilian nuclear 
development in China, domestic firms and their transnational coalitions were accountable for 
the introduction of foreign nuclear reactors into China at different stages. As a result, many 
referred to China’s nuclear energy industry as one featuring the “flags of all nations” or the 
“united nations” approach. 
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In over three decades, the coalitions of Chinese nuclear energy firms and international 
vendors drove the Chinese nuclear energy sector onto an integrationist path. Internally, domestic 
firms and their predecessors not only interfered with central directions but also joined up with 
their foreign partners to compete with domestic peers. Externally, international vendors lobbied 
their home governments to exert influence over Beijing through leveraging bilateral political 
and economic relations. The two forces worked together to promote the sales of foreign nuclear 
reactors to Beijing, through which the transnational coalitions hope to gain advantages vis-à-vis 
others in the Chinese market. The coalitional struggles were best reflected in Beijing’s failed 
attempt at unification to a single model in the early 2000s. For the sake of management, safety 
concerns and cost control, the Chinese government decided that foreign advanced third-
generation reactors should be the “technology roadmap” for China’s grand nuclear energy 
expansion. Ironically, instead of being standardized, more reactors were introduced into China. 
Each transnational coalition managed to have its new model approved and the sector witnessed 
greater diversity in terms of the deployment of reactor types. As a result, the divergent practices 
opened the gate wider for international firms and further increased the use of foreign 
technologies in China’s nuclear energy sector. 
The transnational coalitions turned domestic firms into a barrier to Beijing’s effort of 
building a technology platform based on domestically developed reactors. In the early days, the 
collaboration with international vendors in fact undermined the willingness of domestic nuclear 
firms to focus on independent designs. Even though later they were all under great pressure to 
dedicate themselves to the development of their own reactors, the indigenous efforts they made 
relied greatly on their foreign partners, and most importantly, were segmented among different 
cross-border coalitions. Since unification to an indigenous model was firm on Beijing’s agenda, 
all hoped that their own models would become the future hegemon of China’s nuclear energy 
industry. As each pair of domestic and foreign firms sought to generate advantages over other 
pairs, Beijing’s order of consolidating domestic resources to develop a “national” nuclear 
reactor was repeatedly ignored. The coalitional fragmentation was well proven by the difficult 
birth of Hualong-One (China Dragon-Number One), the first third-generation reactor with 
Chinese IPR. While Beijing wished to “mobilize resources to get great things done” (Jizhong 
liliang ban dashi), all the pairs were moving in different directions because no one wanted to 
give up the future of their own reactors in national deployment. Owing to the continual 
interference, it took years for Beijing to merge two similar but separate strands of indigenization 
efforts into one, namely Hualong-One, which, however, did not guarantee the merge of interests 
among stakeholders.  
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As for the wind power sector, Chinese firms reacted positively to the state policy 
encouraging local production and limiting foreign technology control. Making good use of 
government policies, all have been engaged in a battle with foreign owned firms and 
unavoidably with each other for a larger share of the market. When Beijing made known its 
intention of promoting wind energy development in the early 2000s, many SOEs in heavy 
industries and private firms flooded into the industry, and strived to translate supportive policies 
and government resources into their own benefits. Most managed to scale up their productions 
through licensed production in a short period of time. In order to meet Beijing’s local content 
requirement, Chinese wind equipment producers actively sourced components and parts locally 
and developed their own supply systems within the country. In terms of bidding for national 
concession projects, they followed Beijing’s instruction to seek coalitions with wind farm 
developers, which helped them gain leverage over foreign competitors. In an effort to promote 
the sales of domestic products, Beijing made it obligatory for wind farm developers to bundle 
their tendering with wind turbine manufacturers in winning contracts. Because of cost 
competitiveness and their linkages with state-owned utilities, domestic wind firms were able to 
quickly grab market share making use of the policies. Between 2003 and 2010, the share of 
wind turbines made by Chinese firms and joint ventures overtook that of foreign producers and 
rocketed from 25 percent to 90 percent (CRESP 2005: 8; Li, Shi and Gao 2010). 
Regardless of the initial dependence on foreign technology imports, most top Chinese wind 
equipment producers responded actively to Beijing’s call to develop indigenous technology 
capabilities. During the great expansion of the wind energy industry, some domestic firms were 
devoted to the learning-by-doing process that Beijing encouraged because they found that only 
companies with innovation capacity and quality awareness could maintain sustainable growth 
and secure a market position. There were many others temporally climbing up the ranks not 
through technological upgrading but through cost cutting and price wars, but they were not 
favored by Beijing and hence “deselected” from the support list. During the industry 
consolidation after 2009, most of the companies went bankrupt or were taken over by others, 
which were picked by Beijing as winners. For those selected, firms have been seeking to 
develop their own designs through joint development, independent R&D or the purchase of 
design firms so that they can sell to the overseas market. These included companies that Beijing 
targeted for support when they were still public research institutions, new entrants with a strong 
SOE background, and private firms with a strong focus on independent design. Regarded as 
national champions, this group of domestic firms dedicated themselves to indigenous innovation 
so that they could gain competitiveness in the global market, which fit the developmental goal at 
the center.  
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Drawing together the comparative analysis of the two case studies, this thesis comes to a 
firm judgement about the hypothetical linkages between industry characteristics, domestic-
foreign business relationships, and firm responses to state policy. Chapter 2 sketches out the 
causal mechanisms that explain the opposing firm behavior presented in the title of the thesis: 
why Chinese firms in the nuclear energy industry act as global partners but those in the wind 
power sector live a life of national champions. The first category shows that the two industry 
sectors differ from each other along a variety of dimensions in production and are respectively 
the archetypes of CoPS and mass-manufacturing. Second, due to distinct industry characteristics 
and technology transferability, firms in the two sectors have associated with foreign firms and 
developed reliance on foreign technologies in different ways. While the domestic-foreign 
business relationship in the nuclear energy industry has been coalitional over a protracted period 
of time, it is outright rivalry in the wind power sector. Last, as the consequence of technology 
acquisition in nuclear is bondage but freedom in wind, firms in the two sectors reacted to 
Beijing’s nationalist initiatives in different ways. Chinese nuclear firms were less responsive to 
state policy in the process of working toward strong partnerships with international vendors, but 
Chinese wind producers were generally more cooperative with Beijing in their competition with 
foreign firms. 
Table 6-1 The making of global partners and national champions 
Analytical 
Categories 
Nuclear Power: 
Complex Product Systems (CoPS) 
Wind Power: 
Mass-Manufacturing 
Nature of 
Industry 
(Production) 
- Complex component interfaces; 
- Customized projects, in small batches; 
- Systems integration and engineering; 
- Long product lifecycle; 
- Stickiness of technologies and capabilities. 
- Simple component interfaces; 
- Standardized production, in large volume; 
- Economies of scale and cost minimization; 
- Short product lifecycle; 
- Relative ease of technology transfer.  
Domestic-
Foreign 
Business 
Relationships 
- Interdependent, strategic partners; 
- Intimate business interactions;  
- Chinese dependence on international vendors; 
- Foreign involvement in local projects without 
worrying about losing competitiveness; 
- Teaming up to win contracts.  
- Mutual-exclusive market competitors; 
- Disincentives to collaborate in production; 
- Independence with the help of KIBS firms; 
- Foreign producers avoid Chinese firms for 
the fear of technology transfer; 
- Competing for orders. 
Firm 
Responses to 
State Policy 
- Global partners; 
- Promoting foreign nuclear reactors; 
- Interfere with a national technology platform; 
- Ignoring Beijing’s nationalist initiatives; 
- Politically powerful coalitions played into 
bilateral government relations. 
- National champions; 
- Being engaged in independent production; 
- The formation of technological capability; 
- Assisting Beijing to build a national industry; 
- Foreign firms changed their “nationality” to 
Chinese by setting up local plants. 
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The nature of technology and production accounts for firm behavior in different industry 
sectors regardless of time variation. Some may propose that China’s economic transformation is 
the explanatory variable, and argue that China’s opening policies in the 1980s and 1990s made 
Chinese nuclear firms into global partners and the nationalist policies in the 2000s made 
Chinese wind producers into national champions. The argument is not valid because it is based 
on the false assumption that there is a difference in the timing of industrial policy formation in 
the two sectors. Wind power did not see spectacular growth before the 2000s, but this does not 
mean that there was no industrial policy in that sector. Both nuclear and wind sectors started 
roughly around the same time and went through the same period of national economic 
transformation. The two sectors in examination exhibited contrasting firm behavior against the 
same background, and firms in each sector responded to the Chinese state’s directions in a 
consistent way even in the face of changing policy environment. By holding the general context 
constant, the thesis comes to conclusions that are not only specific to the two sectors in China, 
but also generalizable to other political economies and can be applied to other industry sectors. 
2. A new perspective on techno-nationalism and industrial policy 
The thesis has built on studies in the fields of techno-nationalism and the developmental state 
and sheds light on the understanding of late development. It contributes to the literature by 
explaining why firms in some industrial sectors proactively cooperate with the state but those in 
other sectors are unresponsive to state directions. Existing studies have argued that the techno-
nationalist rationale of industrial policy in China and other countries originated from the fear of 
lagging behind others in economic development and national defense (Keller and Samuels 2003; 
Samuels 1994). According to this line of research, states intervene into economic activities for 
the sake of national security and prosperity, and a synergy between state and industry is 
essential to the implementation of state policy. Aside from the fact that the state is not all-
powerful, national interests sometimes cannot be pushed through due to resistance from certain 
industry sectors. While most have recognized the impact of firm behavior on state capacity in 
policy-making and implementation, not much attention has been given to the explanation of 
why companies in different sectors respond to state directions differently. This study has argued 
that because of the varying nature of production, the responses of firms towards state directions 
in different sectors can vary from cooperative to uncooperative behaviors. Far from a nation-
wide symphony directed by Beijing, one sector can look less “nationalist” than another. In this 
research, the nuclear power sector played out in a more open and integrationist way than the 
wind sector because of nuclear firms’ global partnership and unresponsiveness to Beijing’s 
nationalist initiatives. 
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By focusing on firm behavior, this thesis has aimed to divert scholarly attention from an 
exclusive focus on internal state structure to the linkages between variant business interests and 
state capacity. In the nuclear case, inter-agency rivalries prevented the Chinese central 
government from coordinating the interests of various stakeholders and working toward a 
nuclear energy program through long-term strategic planning; and the state capacity problem 
has been the major impediment to China’s pursuit of a nationalist agenda in the sector (Xu 
2010).
1
 Agreeing with the above argument, this thesis has extended it by considering the impact 
of domestic-foreign business linkages on firm behavior, state-industry relations, and arguably 
policy effectiveness. In addition to state structure, this research has considered how business 
interests influenced state capacity in policy-making and implementation. It is necessary to 
acknowledge that the Chinese nuclear firms corporatized from state agencies have since been 
engaged in commercial operations and had their own interests in relation to foreign partners. 
Bureaucratic contentions might play a primary role in the first introduction of foreign nuclear 
reactors in the 1980s, but the central decisions on the second and third round of turn-key project 
imports were made in a context in which the interests of local nuclear firms were taken into 
account. The import bloom of nuclear reactors in the 1990s was driven by the need for large 
commercial NPPs and economic profitability in the midst of other concerns such as 
strengthening diplomatic ties and relieving energy shortages. As for the importation of third 
generation reactors, Beijing made the decision not only for safety reasons but also to break the 
ice among nuclear business coalitions. This is how Chinese nuclear firms managed to have their 
individual coalitional interests reflected in state policy and force Beijing to depart from its 
intended course.  
Similarly in the wind sector, the explanation of firm behavior enriches the understanding of 
state capacity in policy coordination, which is traditionally based on state structure. Lema and 
Ruby (2007) underscored the fact that the poor results of China’s wind power development in 
the early days were attributed to the coordination failures of the Chinese state and a lack of state 
capacity that stemmed from bureaucratic conflict and struggles between central and local 
authorities; but the reforms of energy bureaucracy toward centralization in the early 2000s 
contributed to a unified policy regime and brought about a take-off in the sector later on. 
Nevertheless, the importance of “collusion” between the Chinese state and wind firms in the 
effort of building a national wind industry of not only Chinese firms but also Chinese 
                                                     
1 Decision-making in the nuclear power industry was fractured among a variety of government agencies and has gone 
through many changes in its governance. Since the civilian application of nuclear technologies was first spun off 
from the weapons program in the 1970s, jurisdiction over nuclear energy has gone through several changes and has 
been put in the hands of defense, electricity, economic development, and science and technology agencies before a 
vice-ministerial body for energy was created in 2008. Accompanying the bureaucratic changes were intense inter-
agency rivalry and policy oscillations over various issues. One of the most contentious areas was whether foreign or 
domestic technologies should be used for China’s nuclear projects. 
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technologies should not be overlooked. Throughout the process, Beijing has selected winners in 
the wind power sector and made them more competitive through policy intervention. Clear 
evidence for this is that during the industry consolidation in 2010, the Chinese government 
abolished the local content rule and put all wind firms, Chinese or foreign, large or small, on a 
level playing field in the local market. The release of control to the market benefited the firms 
following Beijing’s will and devoted to the formation of indigenous IPRs and production 
capabilities. In this light, the move was meant to favor the national champions while weeding 
out the small inferior firms.  
Just as state policy is sometimes driven by business interests, policy effectiveness is also 
subject to state-industry relations and particularly firms’ responses to state directions. While 
existing literature highlights the negative impact of decentralization on effective state 
intervention, this thesis has stressed the influence of firm behavior, which is closely linked to 
the nature of industries. In the effort of fixing market imperfections through policy intervention, 
the state faces challenges from both internal conflict and business resistance. Even though in the 
nuclear sector the nationalist goal was partially achieved in Hualong-One, the domestic-foreign 
coalitions played a large part in preventing this to happen or at least in slowing down the 
process. Compared to the nuclear energy industry, it is relatively easy for Beijing to promote 
indigenous technologies in the wind sector. As discussed in Chapter 5, top producers such as 
Goldwind, United Power and Mingyang have developed their own wind turbines with Chinese 
IPRs. Even though they acquired the models mostly through collaboration with foreign design 
firms, these Beijing’s favorites have been submissive to Beijing in technology acquisition. 
With firm behavior and state-industry relations as vehicles, this thesis has established a link 
between state capacity and industry characteristics. Among a variety of factors, whether the 
state-led nationalist initiatives could bring desired results depends in large part on firm behavior 
(see Chapter 1). Based on findings from the case studies, this thesis has argued that firm 
behavior is determined by the characteristics of technologies and capabilities in a specific sector. 
In the nuclear sector representing CoPS, the Chinese state saw cross-border coalitions and 
business resistance, which had a negative impact on its capacity to push through a nationalist 
agenda in the sector. In the mass-manufacturing sector of wind power equipment, the Chinese 
state has been generally autonomous in building national capabilities because of the support of 
local firms and a public-private synergy in policy implementation. Of course, the stark contrast 
is not meant to define the Chinese nuclear sector as a complete failure and the wind sector a full 
victory. Rather, the comparison is made to stress the different firm behavior and its influence on 
policy-making and performance in the two sectors. It turns out that the level of state capacity 
and hence the effectiveness of policy intervention varies across industry sectors. As discussed in 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
159 
this thesis, the Chinese state has seen better coordination and coherence in its interactions with 
wind firms than with nuclear firms, and has had greater capacity in the implementation of 
nationalist policies in the wind than in the nuclear sector.  
3. Directions for future research 
With a special interest in China’s nuclear and wind energy industries, this study suggests a few 
aspects in need of further investigation. In consideration of the need for comparison in case 
studies, it is always good to put more cases to the test and see whether the theory applies to 
other sectors. In-depth studies of other industry sectors would help establish a greater degree of 
accuracy on the arguments developed in the research. The cases do not have to be new and 
renewable energy industries but can be any sectors that are targeted by a developmental state. 
One major task in the selection is to differentiate the sectors according to their features and 
assign them into the two categories of CoPS and mass-manufacturing. Admittedly, within each 
category there are sectors with different types of production that vary along many dimensions 
such as scale, cost, and technical skills. In this sense, wind turbine production is more like 
assembly in the automotive (auto) industry than for solar photovoltaics (PV) and 
semiconductors. Compared to solar PV, wind and auto are typical of higher entry-barriers, 
technology complexity, and production costs. Notwithstanding the varying degrees of 
complexity, they are all mass-manufacturing sectors sharing such basic characteristics as 
standardized production processes, simple component interfaces, and high volume production. 
Likewise, NPPs and off-shore oil drilling platforms fall in the CoPS category despite the 
different features present in their production and construction.  
A caveat in the selection of case studies is that some CoPS industries have a military origin 
and the focus should be on civilian industry sectors. The core capability of CoPS, systems 
integration, stemmed from the development of weapons systems during the Second World War, 
and many CoPS sectors are actually engaged in defense or aerospace production, such as 
nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and rocket propulsion (Hobday, Davies and Prencipe 2005). 
Because in many countries these projects are undertaken directly by the government due to 
security concerns, business interests are not involved and there is no chance to observe firm 
behavior and state-industry interactions, not to mention the collaboration between domestic and 
foreign firms. In the case of China, the country boasts accomplishments in spacecraft and 
submarines but these were achieved through massive and continuous investment without the 
consideration of profitability. Most importantly, these projects are highly sensitive in terms of 
national security, and the way that China mobilized resources to make them happen is not 
comparable to civilian projects such as high-speed railways or even NPPs. In China, only in 
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civilian industries can we expect a conflict between long-term national interests and short-term 
business interests. Therefore, it is necessary to bear in mind the commercial nature of industry 
sectors when choosing case studies.  
Although it is not feasible to go into detail here, a brief review of China’s solar PV sector 
suggests that it lends support to the argument developed in this thesis. As expected in mass-
manufacturing industries, indigenous Chinese PV producers became rivals in the fight for 
market share domestically and internationally, and the situation in solar PV is no less fierce than 
in the wind power sector. In spite of the weakness in upstream production and the need to 
import basic stoke, polysilicon, Chinese solar PV firms were able to enter the market through 
the purchase of production lines and inundate the market with low-cost products through large-
scale production. Because of the ready access to technology, they could compete with foreign 
PV producers not only in China but also in overseas market shortly after start-up. With their 
strength in downstream production, mainly low value-added assembly, they could make good 
use of low labor cost and play cost advantages to the full. As a result, China has dominated PV 
cell and module production since the mid-2000s and its shares of global production capacity of 
PV cells and modules respectively reached 58% and 65% in 2013 (Ayre 2014). Foreign PV 
makers could not secure a foothold in the Chinese market throughout the time and were 
challenged by Chinese firms in their own markets: some even went out of business due to the 
disadvantage in price. From the anti-dumping tariffs imposed by the US and the EU on Chinese 
solar products we can see how tense the relationships between Chinese and foreign firms have 
been in the sector. In the process, Chinese PV producers have been cooperative with the 
government in carrying out national policy and did bring spectacular growth to the sector, 
though the “over-embeddedness” of local governments in business also produced a lot of 
problems.  
Aside from the need for more case studies, it is recommended that further research be 
undertaken in the context of other industrializing countries. Needless to say, future investigation 
needs to aim for countries pursuing a benevolent developmental trajectory because state-
industry coordination is not a prominent feature of predatory states. One could look into current 
emerging economies such as India or trace back the history of industrialized countries to test the 
associations between industry characteristics and firm behavior in the same sectors. Nuclear 
power development in Japan and South Korea is of particular interest because of the techno-
nationalist traditions in the two countries and because both purchased reactor designs from 
international vendors. While Japan had largely established its own domestic nuclear power 
production capacity within twenty years in its NPP program, South Korea also has developed 
important capabilities of its own since the 1950s (WNA 2015c; WNA 2015d). Even so, the 
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Japanese tend to lag internationally and the Koreans still rely on the partnership with 
Westinghouse, reflecting the difficulty of technology acquisition in the industry (Metzler and 
Steinfeld 2014). Considering China’s experience, it would be interesting to see whether the 
transnational business partnerships influenced firm behavior and the implementation of national 
policy in the nuclear energy sector of Japan and South Korea. 
Finally, more research may need to be done in order to assess the impact of industry 
characteristics on state capacity in different industrial sectors. The evaluation of state capacity in 
the policy process has never been an easy task. Within a single country where the principal-
agent relationship is the same, there are many more factors to be taken into consideration. As 
internal state structure and state-industry ties are inextricably intertwined, it is hard to sort them 
out in terms of influence. However, it is possible to evaluate whether and how industry 
characteristics influence other aspects of institutional structures than those examined in the 
thesis, and to what extent state policy is driven by them. The expectation is that varying types of 
production across sectors may affect not only government-business interactions but also inter-
agency and central-local relationships in specific sectors. And it would be intriguing to know 
which of these factors plays a greater role in policy-making and implementation than others. In 
this sense, the investigation of industry characteristics may not necessarily be limited to CoPS 
and mass-manufacturing but can be carried out along other dimensions. Again taking the 
example of China’s solar PV sector, the major conflict has been between the central government 
and the symbiosis of local government and business. The decentralization to local governments 
seems to have greater influence on the national effort of industrial upgrading in solar PV than in 
wind and nuclear. The nature of solar PV production, particularly low entry barriers in capital 
and technology, might play a large part. In this sector, small private firms dominate the market 
and the state-industry relationship at the local level is more significant than it is at the center.  
4. Implications for international political economy 
The findings of the study have important implications for the wider context of development in 
international political economy. By linking the characteristics of industrial production and the 
effectiveness of state intervention, the research indicates that state capacity varies across 
industry sectors. It is part of a growing body of literature on the diversity of institutional 
structures in developing countries, particularly in China. Adding to the rising scholarly interest 
in the internal structure of bureaucracies and business groups of different localities (Segal 2003; 
Thun 2006), this study stresses diverging institutional patterns in different sectors. In this sense, 
this thesis is another version of the state as a mosaic of different pieces, not across regions but 
across sectors. The effectiveness of policy intervention in a particular sector is subject to 
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whether the industry cooperates with the state in that sector. Therefore, in the understanding of 
sectoral economic outcomes, it is necessary to examine how business interests drive state policy 
and undermine state capacity in certain sectors but not in others. This is not to argue that 
industry characteristics are the only determinant of effective state intervention, but rather that 
they should be taken into the consideration of state-industry relationships, and this should be 
done along with institutions within the state.  
Relating to the asymmetry in state capacity, this study also suggests that a country labeled as 
techno-nationalist may not have coherent policies and practices. Even though a country such as 
China aims to tilt the system in favor of local firms and help them overcome the barriers to 
development, nationalist initiatives may not bring the desired results. On the one hand, state 
policy may in large part be driven by business interests, as we can see from Beijing’s 
compromises to the transnational coalitions in NPPs approval. On the other hand, nationalist 
policies may be ignored or even thwarted by local firms in implementation. This is why in a 
country where a techno-nationalist ideology is historically rooted, some industry sectors always 
turn out to be less “nationalist” than others. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Chinese 
nuclear energy industry has been more open than many other sectors in terms of dependence on 
foreign technologies despite the strategic nature and military origin of the sector. The mixture of 
varying practices in industrial sectors extends the understanding of techno-hybrids or neo-
techno-nationalism, a regime reconciling both liberal and mercantile elements in an economy 
(Keller and Samuels 2003; Suttmeier and Yao 2004; Yamada 2000). With substantial resources 
going into the economy, China has seen mixed success in technological upgrading across 
sectors. 
An immediate indication of the previous points is that the state effort in industrial upgrading 
should be sector-specific. As the pattern of production in a particular sector does not change, the 
patterns of business responses to state-directed industrialization tend to persist through time in 
much the same way that domestic firms relate to foreign ones. It seems that firm behavior in a 
sector is destined, completely dictated by the nature of production and technology. If there is a 
time limit, then it should be until the day when indigenous firms in the catching-up countries 
become independent in technological innovation, not only production. Just as the nuclear firms 
in Japan did, they could sever the ties with international vendors after developing the capacity to 
design and construct reactors by themselves. Because of the fundamental change in associating 
with foreign firms, the way that local firms relate to the state may no longer be determined by 
industry characteristics. But before that, states still need to consider industry characteristics and 
try to find a balance between embeddedness and autonomy in different sectors. There is no one 
size for all in “getting the institutions right” and building the institutions that promote efficient 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
163 
coordination. Therefore, the state-directed effort of industrial growth and technological 
upgrading needs to consider the pattern of government-business relations based on the type of 
production and technology acquisition in a particular sector.  
More generally, this thesis offers a new perspective for cross-national economic cooperation, 
especially between industrializing countries and their economic partners. The notion of sectoral 
variation in technology acquisition and state-industry interactions helps predict when a certain 
set of policies dominates a particular sector in a developing country. It is expected that in the 
sectors that technology is not easily replicable there is hardly any chance for developmental 
states to break domestic-foreign coalitions, not to mention excluding foreign participation. In a 
standardized manufacturing sector, industrial policies at the early stage generally focus on 
promoting the growth of all indigenous firms but later turn to the support of technologically 
competent ones only. As a result, the discrimination against foreign firms would gradually 
diminish when market mechanisms are becoming more relevant than protection in building 
strong national industries. In cooperating with developing countries like China, it is necessary to 
pay attention to regional and especially sectoral diversity stressed in the thesis. In addition to 
internal variety, late-industrializers are also constrained in the selection of policy tools by the 
dramatically different external contexts they face, for instance, their participation in 
international regimes and regional trade agreements. With the exception of a few key fields in 
defense production, national resource mobilization in the rest of China’s economy is no longer 
as straightforward as it was for Japan in the post-war era. In the pursuit of industrial and 
technological upgrading, industrializing countries like China have to incorporate the goals of 
nurturing domestic industrial capability and opening up to the world economy, which are 
sometimes complementary but sometimes also conflicting. 
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Appendix: The list of interviews, 2012-2013 
Code Organizations of the Interviewees Location Date 
CA200612 
Researcher at the National Climate Strategy and 
International Cooperation Center 
Canberra 20 Jun 2012 
BJ090812 
Researchers at the Institute of World Economics & 
Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 
Beijing 09 Aug 2012 
BJ140812 
Professors at the  Centre for Global New Energy 
Strategy Studies, Peking University 
Beijing 14 Aug 2012 
BJ150812 
Professors at the Institute of Economic Research, 
Renmin University 
Beijing 15 Aug 2012 
BJ160812 
Researchers at the Development Research Center of 
the State Council (DRC) 
Beijing 16 Aug 2012 
BJ170812 
Former researcher at the School of Public Policy & 
Management, Tsinghua University 
Beijing 17 Aug 2012 
BJ220812 
Researchers at the Chinese Academy of Science and 
Technology for Development (CASTED), Ministry of 
Science and Technology 
Beijing 22 Aug 2012 
BJ280812 
Researcher at the Energy Research Institute (ERI), 
National Development and Reform Committee 
(NDRC) 
Beijing 28 Aug 2012 
BJ290812 
Researcher at the National Academy of Economic 
Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS) 
Beijing 29 Aug 2012 
BJ310812 Caixin reporter Beijing 31 Aug 2012 
BJ040912 Former employee of CGNPC Beijing 04 Sep 2012 
BJ070912 
Researchers at the Institute of Nuclear and New 
Energy Technology, Tsinghua University 
Beijing 07 Sep 2012 
HB120912 
Government official at the Science and Technology 
Department of Hebei Province 
Hebei 12 Sep 2012 
HB140912 Employee of Huide Hebei 14 Sep 2012 
BJ170912 Employee of Goldwind Beijing 17 Sep 2012 
BJ240912 
Professor at the School of International Studies, 
Peking University 
Beijing 24 Sep 2012 
BJ111012 Former employee of Sinovel Beijing 11 Oct 2012 
BJ121012 
Government official at the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC)  
Beijing 12 Oct 2012 
BJ151012 Sinochem Industry Co.,Ltd Beijing 15 Oct 2012 
CA060813 Research fellow at the ANU Canberra 06 Aug 2013 
BJ171013 Former employee of CNNC Beijing 17 Oct 2013 
BJ251113 Manager of the China Wind Power Center Beijing 25 Nov 2013 
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